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The starting assumption of this thesis is that to fully 
understand legal practices – including legal reasoning – 
we need to get a grasp of the complex body of knowledge 
into which they are immersed. Legal studies have often 
assumed that legal knowledge can be reduced to the 
knowledge of legal rules. This research departs from this 
perspective and argues for an understanding of legal 
knowledge that includes the complex set of conceptual, 
procedural and affective considerations which shape legal 
practices in general, and legal reasoning in particular. 
Herein we argue that not only legal knowledge is wider 
than the knowledge of rules, but that there are also some 
aspects of legal practice that cannot be properly addressed 
by explicitly drafted legal rules. 
We purport to build such an account upon 
epistemologically-informed comparative legal 
perspectives and insights of the cognitive sciences, by way 
of discussing a particular factual problem. The case to be 
studied in this thesis is the apparent loss of certainty in 
Mexican legal practice, when legal professionals engage in 
precedent-based reasoning. The situation, which was first 
reported in 2006, has remained broadly unexplored, and 
by default has been reputed as a problem concerning the 
set of explicit rules that regulate the system of legal 
precedents in that national context. We argue that the 
situation cannot be fully comprehended and remedied if 
we exclusively focus on the dimension of legal rules, but 
that it would be better understood if we direct our attention 




This thesis builds a case for a broadened approach to legal 
knowledge by unveiling the historically built knowledge 
structures in which the Mexican understanding of 
precedents is embedded. As we shall see, this particular 
framework has acted as a deterrent to precedent-based 
reasoning, as accounted by a set of theories of law and 
legal reasoning. By focusing on the several processes of 
legal change and the collateral epistemic revisions that 
Mexican legal professionals seem to be experiencing for 
the past decades, this thesis argues that changing deeply 
embedded knowledge structures is a difficult task that 
needs to be supported by revising the processes of 
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Novelty can signal danger, a new problem that demands a solution before it is too 
late. If a primitive hunter is surprised by an unfamiliar large animal in the forest, or 
the leader of a modern democracy is confronted by the rise of a threatening dictator 
abroad, action cannot wait for the gradual accumulation of knowledge over hundreds 
of similar occurrences. In such situations we want a rapid understanding of the 
situation that brings with it some idea about what to do.   
 








“A large part of what has been asserted concerning the 
necessity of absolutely uniform and immutable 
antecedent rules of law is in effect an attempt to evade 
the really important issue of finding and employing rules 
of law, substantive and procedural, which will actually 
secure to the members of the community a reasonable 
measure of practical certainty of expectation in framing 
their courses of conduct.” 
John Dewey, Logical Method and Law 
 
1. The Problem of Legal Precedents in Mexico 
This thesis has been motivated by a reported problem of the Mexican legal 
community:
1
 law professionals seem to be experiencing difficulties when 
encountering legal precedents in practice. In 2006 the Supreme Court of Justice 
published the results of a three years national inquiry about the problems concerning 
                                                          
1
 In this thesis the term legal community will be used to refer to the internal legal community, i.e. the 
group of legal professionals formed under the same framework, which engages into a somehow 
homogeneous legal practice, and holds a shared outlook of that practice (that is, a common knowledge 
framework). For us, the internal legal community consists of legal practitioners - that is, lawyers 
(courtroom advocates and solicitors), judges, prosecutor and even legal scholars. We understand this 
community as opposing an external legal community of citizens that hold a set of lay understandings 
about the law and do not engage into the legal practice as participants, although they might 
tangentially interact with the legal world. Using the language of community is, however, full 
complexities. Communities of practice, epistemic communities and interpretative communities have 
been often understood as groups sharing highly consistent clusters of knowledge that engage into 
equally consistent practices. Nevertheless, it does not seem the case that communities integrate 
individuals with identical schemata – outlooks as well as practices are in reality not as homogeneous. 
For example, within the members of the so called internal legal community we might find judges, 
lawyers and prosecutors, some of them dedicated to civil matters and others to criminal or tax law. In 
this respect, civil judges, e.g., might have a somehow different viewpoint from tax lawyers – these 
smaller groups should be understood as sub-communities that share more extensive knowledge 
features, but there is still a wider dimension that they all are participants of. In this thesis we do not 
claim that all members of a legal community possess exactly the same webs of meaning or that they 
engage into absolutely consistent practices, but that there is a shared baseline that that gives cohesion 
to a group of individuals and their practices. For a similar perspective on legal communities see: Brian 
Tamanaha, ‘The Internal/External Distinction and the Notion of a "Practice" in Legal Theory and 
Sociolegal Studies’ (1996) 30 Law & Society Review 163-204. 
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the administration of justice in Mexico. This was an open investigation that aimed to 
collect information regarding any problem related to the administration of justice in 
Mexico from any citizen, either lay or legally trained. A large part of participants, 
mainly active members of the legal community, reported some concerns connected to 
the increasing numbers of judicial precedents being used in daily practice. Others 
indicated that the lack of clear and explicit rules for the ‘application’ of judicial 
precedents has produced confusion in practice. Thus, they raised questions on how to 
account for past judicial resolutions, and some of them asked for the promulgation of 
clearer rules of validity for such legal features. Additionally, legal professionals 
expressed their confusion when dealing with (what in their view is) a vast amount of 
precedents that sometimes seemed to be repetitive and others to contradict each 
other; with this in mind, they requested a more efficient institutional mechanism to 
unify the criteria prevailing in the legal system. In a similar consultation performed 
in 2007 by the Senate of the Republic, participants raised similar concerns and 
offered analogous suggestions. Later communications have also shown the 
persistence of the problem. Generally, then, this information reveals that practitioners 
in the Mexican context seem to be experiencing specific problems when dealing with 
judicial precedents: they appear to face confusion when attempting to account for 
past cases and use them in practice; they sense that the current use of precedents is 
inconsistent and has lessened the possibility of predicting legal outcomes; and, as a 
consequence, the legal community has asked for some institutional measures that put 
a remedy to the current state of uncertainty. 
The concerns reported by the local legal community are fairly relevant and need to 
be properly addressed. The problem apparently caused by legal precedents in this 
context is actually one that has the potential of harming one of law’s core aims: that 
of securing legal predictability or certainty. It has been frequently argued that one of 
the law’s main purposes is that of securing human expectations. The law creates this 
sense of certainty by providing a more or less clear categorisation of human conduct 
according to the ‘lawful – unlawful’ divide. Knowing in advance what is considered 
to be lawful or unlawful allows us to make plans and, most importantly, to engage 
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into human relationships based on trust.
2
 Thus, failure to guarantee certainty might 
be interpreted as a major problem for a legal system. The inability to orient human 
action due to the lack of clear indications of what is legal or illegal is a highway to 
legal failure.
3
 In this way, it is important that we take seriously the concerns raised 
by the legal community and try to offer a suitable solution. The fact that the Mexican 
legal system is usually reputed to present a number of important anomalies is not a 
reason to ignore the existence of apparently milder problems affecting legal 
practice.
4
 Legal deficiencies are accumulative, and they could dangerously distance a 
particular legal system from what is considered to be a (working) system of law.
5
 In 
this sense, relevant problems ought to be addressed and not allowed to build up.  
In the case of the Mexican legal system, the reported difficulties to consistently 
account for precedents and identify clear legal patterns translate into problems to 
identify what is considered lawful or unlawful in this legal system, which might 
detriment legal certainty not only in legal practice, but also in all sort of law-based 
interactions. If legal practitioners, which presumably posses the most developed legal 
knowledge, are not able to read clear indications of what is legal or illegal according 
to information contained in precedents, the sense of unpredictability is likely to 
expand beyond the confines of legal practice. Precedents are means used to 
understand a wide range of legal scopes (such as, criminal law, family law, 
commercial law, and so on). Thus, the fact that legal precedents are perceived as 
unsettling in themselves is particularly worrying, as any area of law where 
precedents are taken into account can potentially report increasing unpredictability. 
For the above described reasons the concerns of the legal community deserve our 
                                                          
2
 According to MacCormick values like legal certainty or legal security are of moral value because of 
the form of life they provide to citizens. See: Neil MacCormick, Rethoric and the Rule of Law. A 
Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford University Press 2005) 12.  
3
 See: Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (first published 1964, Yale University Press 1969) 33-70. 
4
 Some of the most compelling problems seem to be the widespread corruption among officials and 
the high levels impunity. These institutional problems, among others, and the exacerbation of criminal 
activity led to some voices announcing that Mexico was a ‘failed state’. See: United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, Civil and Political Rights Including Questions of Independence of the 
Judiciary, Administration of Justice, and Impunity. Report on the Mission to Mexico 
(E/CN.4/2002/72/Add.1, 2002); Joel Kurtzman, ‘Mexico's Instability Is a Real Problem. Don't 
Discount the Possibility of a Failed State Next’ The Wall Street Journal (New York, 16 January 2009) 
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123206674721488169> accessed 15 November 2013 
5
 Fuller reminds us that ‘legality’ (or in more contemporary terms the ‘rule of law’) remains an 
aspiration. In his view, ‘infringements of legal morality tend to be cumulative’ distancing a system 
from its aspirational target. Fuller (n 3) 92. 
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attention. The problem has, however, not yet been comprehensively analysed. Our 
intention therefore is to fill this analyses gap by providing an insightful look into the 
issue, diagnosing its causes and suggesting possible solutions. 
Despite the lack of studies accounting for the noted problem with precedents, several 
proposals on how to get out of it have been submitted in response to enquiries by the 
Mexican Supreme Court - most notably, a consultation by the legal community, and 
the official line of action articulated by a group of researchers appointed by the 
Court. Most of these advise for the promulgation of statutory rules, indicating the 
scopes of validity of precedents and the creation of institutional agencies that unify 
the precedents’ form and substance. Such solutions follow a top-down approach that 
depends on institutional reforms to vertically control the production and use of the 
body of precedents. Moreover, the documents submitted by the legal community 
show an almost blind reliance on the power of statutory-rules and institutional reform 
to put an end to the problem experienced with legal precedents. This thesis argues 
that the proposed actions above mentioned are built upon a defective understanding 
of the problem and that they do not address its core causes, for which these remedies 
are likely to be insufficient and to present further complications in the long run.  
On the one hand, the as proposed solutions seem unaware of the historically-built 
cognitive cargo that directs the expectations regarding precedent-based reasoning of 
the Mexican legal community. Additionally, the measures they suggest fail to take on 
board the knowledge demands which emerge from a context that has been deeply 
challenged by extensive legal changes on different levels; that is the current 
dynamics of knowledge change that were triggered by the persistent rule of law 
reformation efforts of the past years, and that call for a different style in facing 
particular practical matters. Also, they crucially seem to overlook core insights about 
the function and operation of legal precedents, found in comparative, theoretical, 
computational and historical analyses; on the contrary, these solutions implicitly 
reflect an alternative model of precedents that lacks functionality, especially in the 
current scenario. All of these shortcomings mirror a deficient understanding of the 
wide framework of legal knowledge that shapes legal practices. They denote an 
overreliance on the power of rules to guide all practical aspects (including matters 
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related to legal reasoning) and a tendency to overlook other important knowledge 
features that act normatively over practice. The focus of the solutions seems to 
ignore the limitations of explicit rules in building competence in how to do certain 
things, especially how to reason.  
In recent years there have been some developments in respect of implementing the as 
noted solutions. In April of 2013 a new Amparo Act was enacted, to create a new 
judicial organ in charge of the unification of precedents. The new instance started 
functioning in June of 2013. Additionally, the Act included a new set of explicit 
rules, expanding further the already complex system of rules that regulates Mexican 
precedents, with the intention to make case-law a more homogeneous body. It is still 
too early to see the results of these reforms, but we believe that they are likely to 
eventually prove insufficient. The reforms do not address the actual problem of the 
Mexican legal community when handling legal precedents; instead, they just offer 
temporary relief to the increasing complexity that precedents are introducing in this 
legal system. In this respect, legal practitioners will remain equally unable to handle 
complexity and construct orderly maps of the law from previous cases. The 
proliferation of judicial precedents is no more than a reflection of the important 
change of view regarding the function and operation of the law and certain legal 
institutions in that context; a situation that is unlikely to be reversed in the immediate 
future. In this sense, the solutions already implemented might serve as palliative 
measures for some time, as long as complexity does not overpass the unification 
efforts of the new courts. However, as these measures do not offer the deep solutions 
that the problem at hand substantially requires, this will probably re-emerge in the 
near future. Thus, this thesis aims to give an alternative reading of the issue, over 
which we might build long–lasting and more conscious of the circumstances at play 
solutions.  
2. A Problem of Knowledge 
What we mainly argue is that the problem that Mexican legal practitioners are 
experiencing is more than anything else a problem of knowledge; and that as such it 
must be solved by addressing the legal community’s deep cognitive-affective 
6 
 
structures. In fact, the complaints and suggestions formulated by the legal 
community mirror expectations of legal performance based on a particular 
understanding of the legal enterprise. These sets of structures, which have been in 
operation within the resident context for some time, now appear to be somehow 
defective under Mexico’s changing economic, socio-political and – in response – 
legal circumstances. Mexico has tightened relationships with its northern neighbour 
by means of different agreements (such as NAFTA or Merida Initiative), but also has 
become a full global participant and has subscribed to widespread ideas such as that 
of the rule of law (as understood by aiding programs). These interactions have, 
eventually, involved discursive changes, which at the same time call for cognitive 
reconfigurations.  
The traditional Mexican approach to the law has been characterised by an atypical 
rigidity, which permeated different areas of practice, including the use of precedents. 
Nevertheless, in recent years the Mexican legal system has suffered important 
modifications that aim at introducing a more flexible and dynamic form of law. This 
intensive reformation effort has given rise to crucial knowledge incompatibilities, 
and thus calls for a modification of the prevailing deep-knowledge structures. Legal 
practitioners in Mexico seem to be experiencing conflicts transiting from their former 
knowledge and the requirements of a new framework. In this transition, 
understanding legal precedents has been particularly complex for Mexican 
practitioners. 
According to certain jurisprudential insights, along with comparative and 
computational legal perspectives, legal precedents are flexible and dynamic legal 
resources that cannot be easily comprehended according to non-scalar concepts such 
as bindingness, validity and applicability.
6
 In the Mexican context, however, legal 
practitioners seem to be experiencing problems with understanding precedents under 
this flexible form of operation. Thus, they request a series of modifications that 
reproduce the type of certainties created by a strict system of rules of legislative 
origin. Practitioners ask for rigid rules declaring the scopes of validity of legal 
precedents that allow them to clear contradictions and apply them to concrete cases.  
                                                          
6
 Neil Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedents (Cambridge University Press 2008) 23.  
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Mexican legal practitioners seemingly experience confusion when facing more 
diffused and flexible resources. They seem to feel overloaded and in this sense to 
experience difficulties in trying to find more or less clear patterns in what is still a 
fairly small number of precedents. This raises concerns not only about the legal 
community’s conceptual understandings of precedents, but also regarding their (lack 
of) related procedural knowledge. As we shall see, ‘the problem of precedents’ in the 
Mexican context can only be accounted for and solved if we direct our attention to 
the whole body of knowledge in which that practice is immersed, in opposition to the 
body of knowledge that this practice is calling for.  
In this way, this thesis forms an investigation into legal knowledge. It explores what 
constitutes legal knowledge, how this arises, develops, changes and affects legal 
practices. It does not do so, however, in an abstract way, but as a necessary reflection 
surrounding the factual case that we are to study. Herein, we understand knowledge 
in a fairly wide manner, comprising declarative and procedural, explicit and tacit 
cognitive features, and informed by affective inclinations.
7
 These features all 
together form the knowledge framework in which legal practices are circumscribed. 
Our objective will therefore be to explore a frequently neglected subject in legal 
research: that of the cognitive-affective structures and methods held by legal 
practitioners and that guide them in their professional affairs. In this respect, in 
examining the case of Mexico we are in reality discussing the broader paradigm of 
developing legal knowledge and practices. 
3. A Cognitive-Jurisprudential Approach to the Problem of Precedents 
Following that, this thesis brings together comparative law, legal theory, legal 
pedagogy and legal Artificial Intelligence (AI) in new, and we hope useful, ways. 
The aim is twofold: the first is to gain a better understanding of legal systems in 
transition; more particularly, transition that is not determined by a radical turning 
point (e.g. change of regime) but occurs in the course of fast-paced changes within 
                                                          
7
 We follow Paul Thagards approach to cognition. Accordingly, cognition can be seen as a collection 
of concepts, beliefs and other representations, associated to emotional attitudes and correlative 
procedures. See: Paul Thagard, ‘How Cognition Meets Emotion: Beliefs, Desires, and Feelings as 
Neural Activity’ in Georg Brun, Ulvi Doguoglu and Dominique Kuenzle (eds), Epistemology and 
emotions (Ashgate 2008) 167-84. 
8 
 
the contemporary global setting. The second is to develop concrete solutions and a 
new approach to help with this transition and to address some of the concerns raised 
by those caught up in the process.  
Transitions like this have been discussed in the past. Prominent discussions have 
taken place with the background of legal harmonisation in the European Union. 
While valuable lessons can be learned from that debate, the institutional set-up and 
the particular the institutional setting make it problematic to generalise the results 
and ideas that it created. This study focuses on legal developments in Mexico, a 
country that has subscribed to some characteristics of the civilian tradition with 
particular strength and that currently experiences a ‘pull’ towards a different style of 
practice and knowledge. Unlike Europe, these processes are not mediated by a 
specific legal framework and an overarching institutional system that can similarly 
allow a process of mutually trading legal concepts. 
Despite these caveats, the debate regarding legal harmonisation in Europe has made 
valuable contributions to the theory of legal change, which are also relevant in our 
discussion. In particular, we can observe something that could be called a ‘cognitive 
turn’ in legal theory and comparative law.  If law were nothing else but a system of 
rules, as the positivist and formalist tradition assumed, legal change should be 
unproblematic; a mere question of replacing some rules by new ones. For lawyers 
working in these systems, experiencing this change should not be much more 
disruptive than, say, learning a new bus timetable, and adjust one’s travel to work 
accordingly. This is however not what we observe in reality, where the impact of 
these changes runs much deeper and is much more contested. We rather face changes 
here that affect the deep level of human cognition and a change in their very identity 
as lawyers of a specific legal community. The cognitive turn in comparative law has 
over the last few decades increasingly pointed out the importance of these ‘deep 
structures’ when analysing legal change. It has however also let some comparatists to 
conclude that radical, and in particular revolutionary change, is impossible. As 
discussed above, even those who do not share this conclusion typically require some 
institutional set up to manage these changes and mitigate their fallout. But for the 
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Mexican situation, neither position is tenable: change is happening and its impact on 
‘legal minds’ is measurable. 
We argue that the missing element that helps us to understand the process of legal 
change, and also to understand its problems, is mainly legal education. Comparative 
law and legal theory both focus on the notion of a legal system that presupposes a 
cognitive or interpretative community. We find this in the comparative work of 
Legrand as much as in the legal theories of Fish or Dworkin. But here is also a 
problem: if being a Scottish, French or Mexican lawyer means by definition to be 
part of a certain  cognitive or interpretative community, then anything that changes 
the identity of this community also threatens the identity of its constituent parts: the 
individual lawyers. By reifying legal culture or legal community, we take away its 
dynamic aspect and with this its openness for change. Common (civilian) lawyers are 
not born; they are made, within a culture and specific educational setting. Similarly, 
legal theory assumes too often that there is already a mature legal system in place 
that simply shapes lawyers to join the interpretative and cognitive habitus of that 
community. What we do not find in the theories of, for example, Dworkin or Fish is 
attention to the very processes that turn young pupils into lawyers in the first place, 
and with that the mode of cultural transmission of legal knowledge through the 
generations. Or put differently, we cannot participate in a Dworkinian chain novel if 
nobody taught us first how to write literature.  
Bankowski uses the image of the journey to understand the process of European 
integration.  In this account, the journey is the never finished process of becoming of 
the EU.
8
 When we travel, we absorb parts of our environment and change as a result, 
but we also leave parts of ourselves behind, have an impact on the people we meet, 
and so change the landscape through which we travel. We may think of legal 
education as that kind of journey. Where it is most successful, it is not a mere passive 
reception of legal rules by a student, but a process that changes his cognitive attitude. 
Legal communities emerge through the network of interaction between students in an 
educational setting horizontally, and vertically through the interaction with the 
                                                          
8
 Zenon Bankowski, ‘The Journey of the European Ideal’ in Andrew Morton and Jim Francis (eds) A 
Europe of Neighbours? Religious Social Thought and the Reshaping of a Pluralist Europe (Centre for 
Theology and Public Issues 1999).  
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educators. And, of course, this journey also never truly ends. We cannot rightly 
understand key themes in modern theory of law and comparative law if we are blind 
to the formative years of a legal mind.  
The interaction, however, works also in the other direction: once we put legal 
education at the centre of a cognitive theory of legal reasoning, we can get traction to 
facilitate the change that legal systems are experiencing due to outside pressures. 
This is the more practical part of this thesis that claims that the best way for Mexico 
to manage the measurable anxiety that results from current legal changes is to revisit 
the way it forms legal minds at the law school. Here, legal theory plays an important 
role: just as we cannot understand legal theory without also looking at legal 
education, so we cannot reform legal education without reflecting on legal theory. In 
later parts of this thesis, we therefore propose a new approach to legal education that 
is informed by comparative and jurisprudential reflection. 
We noted that the cognitive turn in legal theory allowed us to think of law as 
something more than a mere system of positive rules; they are rather rules embedded 
in a cognitive framework. One of the most important results of this approach in 
recent years was the idea that in understanding legal education and legal reasoning, 
we have to ‘go beyond text’. The outcome of this reorientation was a rising interest 
in legal visualisation, an interest that in particular has also influenced the artificial 
intelligence and law community.  However, unlike visualisation in computer science 
more generally, where it also gained much of its recent impetus through our need to 
interpret and make sense of larger amounts of data, visualisation in law and legal AI 
has so far focused mainly on visualising legal arguments; with that it remained in its 
imagery mainly indebted to the text-based paradigm. After analysing the specific 
needs of the Mexican legal profession, we suggest a much more radical new 
approach to legal visualisation: one that preserves the dynamic of an adversarial legal 
trial and evokes not just the intellectual notion of logical argument relations, but also 




To summarise, the thesis develops around reported difficulties with understanding 
legal precedents and with engaging in a consistent manner with precedent-based 
reasoning. Our project can be described, first, as an observation of the use of 
precedents within the Mexican practice, in the light of the local (traditional) 
framework of knowledge and in times of a strong knowledge change; second, as a 
responding attempt to facilitate the construction of functional cognitive-affective 
structures.  Therefore, a large part of it is dedicated to illuminating the typical legal 
knowledge structures in the indicated context and the ways in which these latter 
influences precedent-based reasoning.  But, moreover, this work sets out to discover 
how such knowledge structures can be challenged and restructured in view of legal 
change and proper reform, calling in the process for new concepts, beliefs and ways 
of doing things.  
4. Structure of the Thesis 
The discussion will unfold in six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces our perspective on 
legal knowledge. It provides an overview on how legal knowledge has been 
approached by legal theoretical accounts. It argues that legal theoretical portraits 
usually have taken for granted the epistemic considerations over which legal 
practices are built. In our view, even those socio-legal studies that draw heavily on a 
shared cultural load do not provide a full and clear enough analysis of the cognitive 
dimension; that is, they forget that legal knowledge is something that happens in the 
minds and hearts of legal practitioners. In this way, the chapter presents an account 
of legal knowledge that is informed in the cognitive sciences and that throws light on 
some overlooked matters regarding legal cognition.  
 Chapter 2 takes a leap into the legal history of Mexico. The aim is by no means to 
make a historical contribution, but to gain understanding regarding the cognitive load 
that Mexican legal practitioners possess and with which they face tasks such as 
precedent based reasoning. The chapter analyses how some legal ideas, concepts, 
beliefs, values and ways of doing things became popular in the past, finding support 
in cultural and socio-political facts and ideas, and turned into the traditional model of 
law; that is the shared framework within which legal practitioners were formed for 
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several generation. Moreover, it analyses how this mental establishment has led to 
particular expectations, understandings and practical engagement with regards to 
legal precedents. 
Chapter 3 discusses the transition of the Mexican legal community from the 
traditional model of law towards one that emphasises the openness of the legal 
enterprise and the active role of the courts in the construction and development of the 
law. It provides an account of cognitive change derived from legal change that draws 
on insights of comparative legal studies and the cognitive sciences. This theoretical 
framework serves to discuss the process of reformation undertaken in Mexico in 
order to commit with the global ‘rule of law’ ideal and that detonated major 
discursive and cognitive reconfigurations. The rule of law ideal, as understood by the 
major aid agencies entailed the ‘germs’ of a different form of law, which eventually 
spread globally in the form of concrete reform packages and abstract ill-defined 
ideas. The chapter will explain how these reforms activated discursive, but most 
importantly, cognitive reconfigurations in the Mexican context, eventually leading to 
some problems mastering the new knowledge. In this way, this chapter discusses ‘the 
problem of precedents’ in light of the intensive cognitive reconfigurations legal 
practitioners are experiencing and, consequently, identifies it as a problem of 
knowledge.  
Chapter 2 and 3 take an interpretative approach. They build an image of the Mexican 
traditional legal (cognitive) load and of the challenges experienced nowadays, which 
are based on the analysis of relevant texts, the reviews of, mainly, secondary 
literature and, less often, primary sources. The reader will find several transcriptions 
that illustrate the argument, many of which were originally in Spanish. The 
translations are ours, unless the contrary is explicitly stated.  
Chapter 4 aims to provide an external picture of precedents and the process of 
precedent-based reasoning over which Mexican legal practitioner can take some 
lessons. This chapter offers some of the main theoretical perspectives that give an 
account of precedents. It focuses on understanding precedents as argumentative tools 
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rather than as sources of law in the strict sense.
9
 Nevertheless, in awareness of some 
explanatory limitations of legal theories, we look towards a widened perspective that 
reflects better the nature of precedents and precedent-based reasoning. Therefore, the 
chapter presents a brief historical account of the use of precedents in the common 
law and civil law tradition that allows us to understand precedents beyond typical 
descriptions. Moreover, it recurs to the developments of the legal artificial 
intelligence community in the scope of precedent-based reasoning as a form to 
expand our insights on the matter. Our main aim is to identify the relevant 
knowledge that needs to be developed by Mexican legal practitioners in order to 
become experts in precedent-based reasoning. 
Chapter 5 reflects on the role of legal education in creating the professional traits that 
distinguish a specific legal community. It argues that the forms of seeing, thinking 
and engaging in legal activities are the product of relevant communications, from 
which the process of legal education is the most relevant. In this form, the discussion 
turns to the question of how to create meaningful educational experiences for both 
fully formed legal practitioners and law students in the Mexican context that would 
allow them to master precedents in practice. The chapter aims to offer an educational 
platform to help developing the required knowledge needed by Mexican legal 
practitioners so as to become competent precedent-based reasoners. Following the 
broader narrative of this thesis, the platform is offered as means to help remedying 
the problem of precedents currently being experienced in the Mexican context, 
which, since it is a problem of knowledge, requires solutions that attend to the deep 
knowledge structures of the local community.  
Chapter 6 is the final and conclusive chapter. It reflects on the practical and 
theoretical implications of this thesis. 
 
                                                          
9
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1. Addressing the Hearts and Minds of Legal Practitioners 
 
“I shall consider human knowledge by starting from the 
fact that we can know more than we can tell. This fact 
seems obvious enough; but it is not easy to say exactly 
what it means.” 
Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Legal practices are grounded on much more than a set of legal rules. To understand 
fully legal practices we must address what is in the heart and minds of legal 
practitioners. Arguably, legal communities are shaped by a set of cognitive-affective 
features, over which they develop certain competencies. Legal practitioners generally 
hold sets of ideas, concepts, beliefs, values, methods, and affective inclinations (that 
we will generally refer to as ‘knowledge features’), which contribute to the formation 
of a determined legal style. Becoming a legal practitioner, involves the acquisition of 
a conceptual framework, some emotional predispositions, and a set of methods and 
procedures; in other words, it involves the acquisition of the local knowledge 
framework over which legal practice has been founded and performs.   
The relevance of these broad schemata, however, has been often neglected in legal 
studies. Generally, legal scholars have focused intensively on legal rules, but little 
has been said on the knowledge structures that allow legal practitioners to carry on 
legal operations with and beyond legal rules. As a consequence, this has led to the 
assumption that the knowledge of legal practitioners can be somehow reduced to the 
knowledge of rules; which, in turn, has led to overlooking the wider spectrum of 
knowledge features that lies behind legal practices. In this respect, Geoffrey Samuel 
has argued that ‘the assumption that knowledge of the law consists of knowledge of 
rules – that is, normative propositions capable of being expressed in symbolic 
15 
 
language (natural and mathematical language – is inadequate.’
1
 Legal professionals 
display on a day-to-day basis a complex knowledge framework that gives them 
direction when engaging with legal practice. Legal practices cannot be explained 
exclusively on the platform of legal rules, but most importantly through a set of 
intertwining theories, concepts, beliefs, methods and emotions, which in some cases 
are impossible to communicate expressly. In this respect, legal knowledge is not only 
greater than the knowledge of rules, but legal rules alone will often prove to be 
insufficient in order to build practical competence. As Samuel pointed out, ‘[t]his is 
not to deny that law can be seen in terms of texts, that is to say normative 
propositions stated in natural language. In fact the very existence of statutory texts 
and law reports settling out applicable rules indicates that it would be idle to deny the 
existence of linguistic propositions. The point to be made, however, is that there is 
more to legal knowledge than just rules, in the same way that there is more to the 
natural and social sciences that just rules.’
2
 
In order to understand legal practices in the correct light it is necessary to see them as 
deriving from a greater set of assumptions and inclinations. In this chapter we aim to 
provide a framework for understanding the broader dimensions of legal knowledge, 
those over which legal practice is actually built. First, we will study some legal 
theoretical perspectives approaching the matter of legal knowledge: those that 
emphasise text-based rules as the core of legal knowledge, and a set of socio-legal 
insights that observe legal practices as happening within a fuzzy socially built 
cognitive framework. However, these legal perspectives have not fully developed the 
scope for understanding legal knowledge, and still entail some problematic 
comprehensions. We will attempt to enrich these perspectives and overcome some of 
their main problems by introducing insights from cognitive sciences. These studies 
have developed important understandings regarding human cognition that can help 
us build a more accurate image of legal knowledge.  
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1.2 Knowledge of Text-Based Legal Rules 
Legal rules are probably the most easily recognisable legal features; but even if those 
rules are important sources of legal knowledge that we shall not ignore, they should 
be understood as constituting only a small portion of the wider framework. In legal 
theory, the discussion that the law is more than rules is, actually, nothing new. 
However, certain theories approach the law as an enterprise having to do with barely 
more than (text-based) propositions, which tends to reduce legal knowledge to the 
knowledge of rules.
3
 Rule-based accounts of law, however, are built over several 
knowledge assumptions; for example, they presume the existence of legal subjects 
with certain understandings, which allow for making sense of texts when the text 
itself is insufficient.  
Interpretative theories of law presuppose that there are subjects capable of making 
consistent decisions regarding textual sources. In fact, at the core of interpretative 
perspectives lies the image of an interpretative community. The community of 
interpreters, according to Stanley Fish, possesses a common conventional point of 
view from which it constructs the meaning of texts.
4
 Despite generally differing to 
this account, Dworkin’s theoretical project also presupposes the existence of an 
interpretative community that participates in a set of shared understandings on 
different levels: from certain interpretative solutions to (most importantly) procedural 
grounds that indicate how to handle legal sources. Dworkin notes that ‘[c]ertain 
interpretive solutions, including views about the nature and force of legislation and 
precedent, are very popular for a time, and their popularity, aided by normal 
intellectual inertia, encourages judges to take them as settled for all practical 
purposes. They are the paradigms and quasi-paradigms of their day.’
5
 However, for 
Dworkin agreement, and particularly on certain procedural grounds or the law seems 
to be a basic precondition for legal practice. He notes that ‘[l]aw cannot flourish as 
an interpretive enterprise in any community unless there is enough initial agreement 
about what practices are legal practices so that lawyers argue about the best 
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interpretation of roughly the same data.’
6
 Despite the importance of this set of 
knowledge, Dworkin seems to take it for granted and does not provide further 
analysis. 
There are many more theories, and several of them elaborate in more detail the 
different operations that legal practitioners perform when engaging with legal rules.
7
 
Nevertheless, they tend to overlook the fact that performing these procedures 
presupposes the existence of particular knowledge structures. Therefore, legal 
perspectives of this sort are of limited utility when trying to understand the cognitive-
affective framework surrounding these practices. As these schemata are usually taken 
at face value, the theories omit any reflection on the broader dimension of 
knowledge, and, most importantly, on how they happen to develop and become 
shared starting points. In this manner, they can only show us fully formed practices 
as if they had emerged spontaneously. 
1.3 Knowledge of Fuzzy Socially Constructed Features 
Socio-legal perspectives have highlighted the importance of a common set of implicit 
dispositions, understandings, habits, customs, skills, abilities and so on in shaping a 
particular way of thinking about and practicing law. In this respect, Sacco has argued 
that a legal system comprises ‘[a] combination of both spoken and mute elements.’
8
 
This mute aspect of law refers to the normative commitments that surpass linguistic 
formulation. He also notes, however, that ‘lawyers are primarily interested in spoken 
sources and acts and feel uneasy with mute sources and acts.’
9
 Nevertheless, such 
bias seems unable to erase the mute or unspoken dimension of law, that is, the 
practical understandings that go without saying.  
Martin Krygier has also reminded us that having knowledge of the law is more than 
having learned a set of rules. Building over Michael Polanyi’s ideas, he observes that 
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there is a tacit dimension of knowledge underlying legal competence.
10
 In Krygier’s 
view, this knowledge is built and transferred as a matter of tradition. Thus, ‘[l]egal 
traditions provide substance, models, exemplars and a language in which to speak 
within and about law.’
11
 A tradition ‘shapes, forms and in part envelops the thought 
of those who speak and think through it’
12
 and they, in turn, determine what 
constitutes the ‘obvious’ or ‘natural’
 
for that legal community.
13
 For Krygier, legal 
practices surrounding posited texts, such as statutes, are also deeply embedded in 
tradition. Posited rules presuppose the existence of an underlying ‘invisible 
discourse’ that makes possible and understandable any ‘visible discourse’.
14
 Patrick 
Glenn, who also highlights the traditional character of law, argues that working 
within a tradition provides a set of common (epistemic) factors.
15
 For Glenn, 
traditions are composed by information – i.e. ideas – which imposes an epistemic 
structure in the community. For him, information shared by the tradition-bound 
epistemic community is far broader than a set of legal rules; it may include concepts, 
beliefs, values, stories and so forth.
16
 Nevertheless, Glenn’s understanding of 
‘tradition as shared information’ is certainly narrower that Krygier’s perspective of 
tradition, which might actually generate some problems when using Glenn’s ideas to 
account for a ‘tacit’ and more ‘hands-on’ dimension of legal knowledge. 
Certain socio-legal perspectives have recurred to even broader concepts, such as 
culture, to account for the set of shared understanding and consistent patterns of 
action. For David Nelken legal culture is ‘one way of describing relatively stable 
patterns of legally oriented social behaviour and attitudes.’
17
 In his view, the 
elements of legal culture range from facts about institutions, to forms of behaviour, 
and other ‘nebulous aspects’ such as ideas, values, aspirations and mentalities.
18
 
Similarly, Jeremy Webber notes that culture provides individuals with a shared 
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language, beliefs, concepts and phases that help them to make sense of the world. 
This ‘intersubjective dimension of human understanding […] derives not just from 
the body of articulated concepts and beliefs one inherits, but also from the patterns of 
interaction existing in any society, even when these have not been articulated in 
conceptual terms or when they remain the subject of only partial and pragmatic 
articulation.’
19
 For Webber, social interaction of certain intensity allows subjects to 
share a broad set of understandings; e.g. a sense of what is considered important, a 
set of points of reference, styles of reasoning, interpretations, vocabulary and implicit 
norms.
20
 Culture, thus, provides a broad framework from which explicit features – 
such as institutional structure, form and content of enactments, etc. – can be 
explained in relation to a whole order.
21
 Also, according to John Bell ‘[t]he law is 
something more than simply a system of rules or legal standards. Those rules operate 
in a context of institutions, professions and values that form together a “legal 
culture.”’
22
 In his view, legal actors are only able to understand and join the practice 
if they share this broad cultural background. In fact, for Bell these cultural 
understandings are constitutive of the (institutional) practice; i.e. they are 
prerequisites without which the practice would not have any meaning.
23
 
Culture, however, is a very broad concept. In this respect, Cotterrell has noted that 
the term legal culture is overly vague and groups together ‘extremely diverse 
elements’ to be a useful explanatory resource.
24
 He, thus, has proposed 
compartmentalising it. According to Cotterrell ‘culture […] typically embraces 
traditions (a sense of shared cultural inheritance of some kind) and values or beliefs 
(a sense of convergence or commonality in ways of thinking, commitments, 
outlooks, or attitudes in a population). Overlaying these components of culture are 
often affective (emotional) elements that colour shared traditions, value-
commitments, attitudes, or outlook.’
25
 Communities share diverse cultural elements: 
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culture might be a matter of tradition based on common geographical and historical 
experience, shared beliefs and values, or emotional bonds. Therefore, in his view, it 
becomes important to distinguish between communities of belief or values, 
traditional communities, affective communities and instrumental communities.
26
 
Cotterrell is right in that some groups are majorly connected by affective ties and, 
thus, share emotional elements, while others are majorly connected through their 
shared beliefs. However, segmentation of culture is not of much help to account for 
the knowledge frameworks that the legal communities possess. As we shall see, 
beliefs and concepts (‘cold cognition’) and emotional elements (‘hot thought’) are 
not necessarily disconnected, making it difficult to do classifications according to 
Cotterrell’s criteria.  
The focus on culture and tradition has led to an increasing interest in the knowledge 
frameworks that affect legal practices. Focusing on questions over the broad set of 
knowledge features held by legal practitioners seems to be more and more common 
in legal comparative studies. John Bell points out that this is because legal 
comparativists ‘rather than focusing simply on the rules and institutions of different 
legal systems and asking about their functional equivalence, [...] are concerned to 
understand what these features signify in terms of deep differences which exist 
between legal systems.’
27
 Some comparativists have realised that meaningful 
comparison between legal systems or legal traditions need to go beyond legal rules 
and other propositions.
28
 Comparative lawyers have noted that focusing on legal 
rules alone might sometimes give an incomplete outlook of legal practice. In this 
way, it is possible to observe in some comparative works an effort to uncover the 
broader epistemological considerations that make a legal family, tradition or system 
what it is. According to Geoffrey Samuel, legal comparativists are growing more 
aware of the fact that ‘the foundation of their enterprise is essentially 
epistemological.’
29
 As noted by Samuel, ‘comparing legal cultures raises a host of 
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questions about the paradigms, concepts, schemes of intelligibility, processes of 
explanations and so on.’
30
 
Pierre Legrand is possibly the most representative (and fierce) advocate of the 
epistemologically-informed comparative legal approach, and for this his particular 
account deserves a more extensive analysis. Building upon a set of sociological 
perspectives, Legrand concludes that the law is much more that a set of rules. He 
argues that each legal community possesses particular epistemic inclinations through 
which rules are ‘filtered’. The model of cognition forged by cultural processes 
provides the legal community with a particular legal outlook that determines legal 
practice. These are deeply embedded structures residing at the core of the legal 
system, making it what it is and what it is not; that is, giving it its particular identity. 
Thus, the cognitive and emotional inclinations held within a legal system are of 
extreme importance to wholly understand the legal enterprise. In Legrand’s view a 
meaningful account of legal systems must be performed at the level of mentalité 
(mentality) – which he alternatively calls worldview, weltanschauungen, viewpoint, 
outlook, episteme, epistemological clusters or mindset.
31
 A mentality is a set of 
‘factors which, although usually intervening in the realm of the unconscious, mould 
the structures of thought legal actors use to interpret and understand the social world 
around them and their own location within it.’
32
 Mentalities, thus, can be understood 
as states of mind, ways of seeing the world, modes of understanding reality, or 
mappings of the world constructed under de influx of culture.
33
 They fulfil a 
normative role, as they control and direct legal practices.
34
 Legal mentalities give 
form, for example, to the way the community conceives the role of law, what they 
consider to be relevant for the law, what is the place of certain legal features and 
what are the characteristics of a particular legal practice. This collection of 
tendencies, inclinations or propensities is the receptacle of legal developments, legal 
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precepts and the starting point when engaging in legal practices, including legal 
reasoning. For Legrand, mentalities seem to be deep layers of assumptions, or ‘a 
framework of intangibles’ shared almost unconsciously by legal communities, and 
which limit the possibilities of experience.  
Legrand has also reflected on the origins of a particular legal mentality. For him 
mentalities seem to be built by internal legal socialisation and external influences.
35
 
Legrand argues that legal professionals are socialised human beings, or individuals 
educated in a specific cultural environment, and as such they are the participants of 
particular socially-shared understandings that provide them with versions of the legal 
world, a set of values, beliefs, attitudes or a general outlook; that is, a legal mentality 
that is not possible to isolate from its broader cultural heritage.
36
 In his view, the law 
participates of an ‘inherent worldliness’, which means that legal viewpoints are 
‘haunted [...] by discursive formations – historical, political, economic, social, 
psychological, linguistic [...].’
37
 In a similar way, Robert Gordon (whose work 
Legrand acknowledges) finds that law is something that happens within society – i.e. 
that law is irremediably attached to a broader set of social interactions. In his view, it 
would be hard to understand the law as the product of a culturally isolated tribe of 
beings. Thus, as legal professionals are participants of a culture, legal practices are 
‘simple dialectics of [that] parent speech’.
38
 In this way, ‘a legal system [...] is 
unlikely to depart drastically from the common stock of understanding in the 
surrounding culture, in the methods it uses to categorise social realities, the 
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arguments about facts and values that it recognizes as relevant and persuasive and the 
justifications it gives for its exercises of power.’
39
   
Legrand’s approach is important as it focuses on the legal knowledge structures of 
legal professionals. It reminds us that legal experts do not approach daily life in a 
blank slate, but with a baggage of assumptions about how the world is, how it works, 
how they should deal with it and, even, how they should feel about it. In other words, 
it points out that legal communities share a framework of knowledge that gives place 
to certain legal practices, and restrains others; that they share a map that provides 
some cohesion to community performance, giving it an identity, style, or general 
sense of what being a professional means in a specific legal system or legal tradition. 
In this sense, this epistemic turn unveils a set of considerations (beyond the 
dimension of rules) that guide legal practices, and that usually remain hidden. This 
perspective, however, inherits some ambiguities from its theoretical subscriptions, 
which we would like to avoid. Here we will attempt to bypass some of these 
shortcomings by introducing certain insights developed by cognitive sciences and by 
adopting a multilevel approach.  
Looking therefore at Legrand’s account, one main problem is detected in the core 
idea of mentalities, that being overly vague and diffused.
40
 Legal mentality emerges 
as a fairly ambiguous concept, denoting a very broad knowledge structure that 
includes both tacit and explicit knowledge about the law.
41
 Knowledge structures 
indeed involve a broad range of features: declarative, procedural, conceptual, 
emotional, tacit or explicit. A broad or catch-all term such as mentality can be a 
useful communicative resource (and this thesis will often recur to it to facilitate its 
narrative), but it equally falls short of encompassing a better grasp of how this 
knowledge is articulated and related. Nevertheless, we consider that certain insights 
and methods of cognitive sciences could help us get a neater image of the knowledge 
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held by legal practitioners. For cognitive sciences there is no novelty in the fact that 
human practices are related to knowledge structures; thus, it comes as no surprise 
that they have more developed accounts and methods to represent knowledge. In this 
respect, taking on board the insights of cognitive sciences on how mental structures 
are integrated might help us advance towards a better understanding of legal 
knowledge. Additionally, using cognitive-affective maps (that is, visual graphs that 
include information about the positive and negative emotional values related to 
conceptual structures) could help us put some order to at least part of the confusing 
reality of legal knowledge.
42
 
Another problem with Legrand’s account is that despite the fact that he aims to focus 
on the epistemic aspects of the law, he does not focus much on individual minds. In 
fact, his standpoint leads to an over-emphasis on the social dimension of knowledge. 
Legrand does distinguish between the individual and the social dimension, as he 
recognises that the anthropomorphisation of communities as entities capable of 
though and remembrance is not always a useful resource.
43
 However, his focus on 
the analysis of social discourses tends to leave behind the individual. As the 
individual becomes forgotten, socially constructed discourses seem taking distance 
from human reality; without a human ‘repository’ to hold them they become an 
abstraction, an almost mystical entity navigating across the skies.
44
 The problem with 
this distribution of the individual and the social is not only that it involves an 
unnecessary fiction, but it also leads to some mistaken conclusions regarding the 
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possibilities of changing legal knowledge, as human minds may be more malleable 
than social discourses.  
Also, for Legrand mentalities are local or contextual products. Nevertheless, the way 
he understands this contextual character is somehow problematic when attempting to 
account for legal change. For him the local outlook seems to be only receptive of 
local happenings, but impervious to foreign disruptions or influences. This 
appreciation has lead him to conclude that there cannot be legal transplants in a 
meaningful way,
45
 as the local will always impose itself over the foreign or external. 
In this sense, legal mentalities become self-referential or characterised by some sort 
of closure, similar to that of autopoietic systems.
46
 This leads to a wrong impression 
regarding the interaction of understandings held within a native legal system and 
those of foreign origin, as well as regarding the possibilities of experiencing a 
meaningful change of mind and heart. We will return to this matter in Chapter 3 
where we present an alternative account of legal change and (derivative) cognitive 
change, consonant to the insights of cognitive sciences as examined below in section 
1.4. 
First, however, we should point to one final problem in Legrand’s take on legal 
knowledge, where the relationship between social interactions and knowledge 
structures is not always clearly sketched. For example, Legrand often asserts that 
mentalities are historically and culturally constructed, but he does not deeply analyse 
which (and how) enculturation processes deliver cognitive traits. He frequently 
affirms that legal viewpoints are the consequence of social, political and economic 
considerations. He therefore seems to emphasise the role of extra-legal 
considerations in shaping legal mentalities. Other times he highlights the schooling 
processes in which students become professionally educated, stressing the role of 
internal to law narratives in the formation of the professional outlook. In all this, 
Legrand does not analyse how internal and external understandings interact in 
different contexts to form the local legal mentality. In this respect, the argument that 
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legal mentalities are culturally or socially constructed appears somehow empty, if not 
backed by a deeper understanding of the role and interaction between such 
constructive processes in the relevant context. 
Looking back at the examined socio-legal perspectives, we find them not only steps 
further into recognising the relationship between legal knowledge and legal practice, 
but engaging intensively with it. However, even Legrand’s account of legal 
mentalities, the most advanced of these approaches in dealing specifically with the 
minds of lawyers, seems one way or the other incomplete. A possible way forward 
can be then considered in the work of Geoffrey Samuel, a frequent collaborator of 
Legrand in recent years. Samuel offers a historical account on the epistemology and 
methods used by legal professionals in different European legal systems and at 
different times, providing for a more accurate view of the ‘situated’ processes of 
construction of legal knowledge.
47
 His approach seems more fruitful, as it may be 
taken to suggest that in order to understand the cognitive cargo of the legal 
community we must perform a contextual analysis of the particularities of the legal 
system in question.  In this thesis we argue that such an analysis is necessary for 
avoiding the impasses of aprioristic generalisations, like those noted in Legrand’s 
work. Next we will show how the scope of a contextual analysis of this calibre would 
be enriched with insights from the field of cognitive sciences. 
1.4 Knowledge according to Cognitive Sciences 
In order to get a better grasp of the knowledge features that form legal minds we can 
take into account developments in the cognitive sciences, especially in the work of 
Paul Thagard. Cognitive sciences can help us find a more balanced interplay between 
the social and the individual dimensions of knowledge. Additionally, the cognitive 
sciences’ research can aid us in getting a deeper understanding of the types of 
knowledge that are generally included in the ambiguous terminology of culture, 
traditions or mentalities. Actually, some methods used by cognitive scientists, such 
as cognitive-affective mapping, can be of use for acquiring a clearer idea about sets 
of relevant knowledge features and how they interconnect between them. Here we 
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will examine four of these insights and methods as more relevant to the development 
of our discussion. 
1.4.1 A Multilevel Approach to Knowledge 
According to Thagard, one should not fall for the holistic view that reality is just the 
product of social construction (which makes us forget about the role of the 
individual); but at the same time should also avoid the other extreme, that is the 
individualistic perspective which reduces social events to actions of individual 
people as determined by self-interest. In his view, the key to a middle point is the 
recognition that life happens on multiple levels. We ought to understand that ‘the 
actions of groups result from the actions of individuals who think of themselves as 
members of groups.’
48
 A social group is tied together by social bonds, which are 
largely psychological. Social groups are formed by individuals that share mental 
structures, and through which they become members of that group. Different sorts of 
social interaction derive in cognitive-affective frameworks by which individuals 
become members of a group.
49
  
Based on this interconnection between the social and the psychological dimensions 
Thagard uses a multilevel approach. This method takes into account that parts (from 
the smallest to the biggest) constitute wholes at different levels of organisation.
50
 He 
argues that the self is understood as a system that operates at the social, individual, 
and even lower levels. The social level consists of individual persons that are 
influenced by an environment; particularly, by their social and communications 
interactions. At a lower level we find individuals with particular mental 
representations (such as concepts and beliefs) and behaviours.
51
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In this sense, socially shared knowledge structures can be said to be the ‘product of 
interaction between networks of mental representations at the individual level and 
networks of social communication at the group level.’
52
 At the individual level we 
observe ideas, beliefs and values that give rise to a person’s understanding and, thus, 
behaviour. At a social level we find individual minds that by means of their 
interactions and communications give rise to collective mentalities and action. These 
two levels are somehow interconnected insofar as changes in an individual’s mental 
structures might trigger changes to the social communications, but also since social 
exchanges might trigger the reformulation of individual mental schemata. 
Nevertheless, we must not forget that ultimately social groups do not have brains, 
and thus cognition takes place in the minds of individuals. The concepts, beliefs and 




Being aware of the fact that the mental representations, which people need to 
function as a group are to a large extent psychological, permits us to demystify 
perspectives which present socially shared knowledge as a discourse disconnected 
from individuals. This distinction between knowledge as social discourse and as 
psychological structures delivers eventually significant practical consequences. For 
example, it helps us realise that some social experiences or communications might be 
more powerful than others in psychological terms as a means to build knowledge 
structures. Most importantly, it allows seeing that changing socially-shared 
knowledge goes beyond the macro-sociological dimension; it is not only a matter of 
changing discourses, but also involves changing people’s minds. 
The shared knowledge framework that is forged through relevant social interactions 
and which constitutes the background to certain practices (but also to certain 
practical failures) will be extensively discussed in other parts of this thesis; it features 
                                                          
52
 Thomas Homer-Dixon and others, ‘A Complex Systems Approach to the Study of Ideology: 
Cognitive-Affective Structures and the Dynamics of Belief Systems’ (2013) 1 Journal of Social and 
Political Psychology 343. 
53
 ibid 346. 
29 
 
heavily in the contextual analysis of particularities of legal systems that, as 
previously stated, our overarching discussion has set to engage with.
54
   
Sociological studies of knowledge, cognitive anthropology and the history of ideas 
are domains that have been particularly interested in reporting on different forms of 
socially shared knowledge. In the scope of the law, certain comparative, historical 
and sociological legal studies might provide us with insights about the knowledge 
features shared by a legal community. Sometimes such accounts are based on the 
personal views of members of legal communities; others on studies of legal 
doctrines, rules or theories, on external descriptions of non-members of the epistemic 
community, and so forth. As we shall later see, these studies could serve in indicating 
the knowledge framework which operates behind a specific legal community, as well 
as the reasons for its particular development.  
1.4.2 Knowledge Acquisition  
Individuals acquire knowledge through their interactions with the environment and 
society. Learning through social interactions and communications is a process that 
can arise spontaneously but in many occasions it is the result of deliberate 
socialisation. According to Dewey ‘[s]ociety exists through a process of 
transmission’ and that ‘[t]his transmission occurs by means of communication of 
habits of doing, thinking, and feeling from the older to the younger.’
55
 He notes that 
communities emerge due to the communication of shared aims, aspirations, beliefs 
and knowledge, i.e. a ‘common understanding’ or ‘like-mindedness’.
56
 In other 
words, different socialisation processes result in shared mental representations that 
tie people together in communities.  
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The main processes of socialisation vary depending on the type of community being 
studied. In complex societies formal education is necessary to transmit knowledge 
that would not be developed otherwise. Therefore, professional education is usually 
developed within the setting of formal education. In this way, legal professionals – as 
we know them nowadays in the Western world – are largely a product of formal 
education. The law school experience is the most important one with regards to the 
formation of legal professionals: it is the event where a set of knowledge features are 
communicated to students in order to help them become members of the legal 
community. In the law school students acquire concepts; they learn rules and, most 
importantly, how to ‘think like a lawyer’.
57
 The most basic knowledge structures that 
distinguish a member of the legal community from someone not belonging to it are 
acquired through formal legal education. For this reason, when analysing the 
knowledge framework of legal practitioners one should pay special attention to what 
is transferred through the process of schooling.  
However, we should not forget that legal practitioners are not living in a vacuum: 
they are situated in a specific context and are participants of many different social 
communications characteristic to it. In the way noted by Legrand and Gordon, legal 
practitioners are participants of the wider social, political, economical and cultural 
understandings, and in that way their broader knowledge features might find their 
way into their legal minds.  
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1.4.3 Accounting for Different Knowledge Features 
Many theories of learning and cognition have distinguished between propositional 
knowledge and procedural knowledge.
58
 Both types of knowledge appear to be 
essential for performing in complex environments. Propositional knowledge – which 
is also known as ‘conceptual knowledge’, ‘declarative knowledge’, ‘theoretical 
knowledge’, ‘factual knowledge’ or ‘knowledge that something is the case’ – is 
integrated by theories, beliefs, concepts and so on. Nevertheless, the different 
propositional features are entangled with values associated to them; and these values 
are emotional in character.
59
 In this sense, propositional knowledge involves not only 
a form of ‘cold cognition’ but it also represents some sort of ‘hot thought’. 
Procedural knowledge – i.e. ‘know how’ – is knowledge of the way to do certain 
things. Procedures might be expressed in a set of steps; however, common 
procedural knowledge is quite difficult to capture fully when made explicit. In other 
words, procedural knowledge might be put in denotative language, but it generally 
will surpass any effort to be made explicit. This brings in mind Michael Polanyi’s 
assertion that ‘we can know more than we can tell’ – or in other words that there is a 
tacit dimension of knowledge.
60
 Polanyi recognises that an important part of our 
knowledge of how to do things cannot be put into words. In fact, many tasks require 
knowledge that cannot be made explicit, as e.g. when we try to account how we 
recognise a face or how we keep balance on a bicycle.
61
 According to Eraut, tacit 
knowledge is knowledge ready to be used, while explicit knowledge may still be too 
abstract to be used without further learning.
62
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For Thagard tacit knowledge entails a quick and effortless intuitive recognition of 
relevant patterns for making a decision or acting appropriately.
63
 In a way, tacit 
knowledge involves identifying relevant features and seeing fine connections 
between them. This knowledge is difficult to be communicated with words, but it can 
be developed through experience; that is through a more or less prolonged interaction 
with the particular environment. The enhanced ability to find complex patterns is 
actually part of what we account as competence or expertise. Experts in different 
areas are capable of seeing relationships that novices are unable to detect. These 
complex operations are usually observed by experts as flowing or arising naturally; 
as being intuitive. This happens, in a sense, due to the fact that the intuitive 
identification of patterns is largely dependent on sensorial experience.
64
 Intuition 
involves ‘having a feeling’ which is largely an emotional reaction. Therefore, 
intuition and emotions are deeply connected.
65
 
Attaining competence or expertise in practical matters involves holding a broad 
spectrum of knowledge, both tacit and explicit, which will surface according to the 
task at hand. In this fashion, the required knowledge for building competence will 
come forward in accordance with the necessities of each environment. Nevertheless, 
not all of this knowledge can be explicitly learned, as some (tacit) knowledge has to 
be learned implicitly. The acquisition of tacit knowledge features, however, and that 
of explicit are arguably interrelated. Tacit knowledge might not easily develop in an 
environment where adverse ideas are held. For example, it would be difficult to 
believe that a legal system where most of court communications are made in writing 
would be a fertile ground for creating legal experts with the necessary tacit 
knowledge about how to argue orally in trials. If an idea, such as ‘legal 
communications are made in writing’ has such value and acceptance in a social 
environment, we might assume that the educational efforts will be consistent with 
this idea and that the local community of practitioners will develop tacit knowledge 
associated with how to make written legal communications. Nevertheless, there 
could be some mismatches between ‘espoused theories’ and ‘theories in use’ which 
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could eventually lead to the development of knowledge that is not explicitly 
supported.
66
 In this sense explicit knowledge does not need to precede tacit 
knowledge.
67
 Tacit knowledge can be developed independently of learning explicit 
considerations as long as there is the required practical engagement. However, 
introducing some explicit understandings may form the supporting ground in the 
acquisition of tacit knowledge.
68
  
1.4.4 Mapping Knowledge Structures 
Some of the knowledge features integrating cognitive schemata may be better 
appreciated if visually observed. A wide range of research areas – from psychology, 
education, computer sciences, politics, management, to history – have used cognitive 
mapping or visual representations of mental models to gain a better understanding of 
the cognitive load associated to a determinate society, group, corporation or 
individual at a specific moment. Mental maps are graphical tools for providing an 
organised representation of knowledge.
69
 They usually indicate a set of propositional 
knowledge features (mainly concepts and beliefs) and the relationships between 
them. Cognitive maps have been used to represent the sets of concepts and beliefs 
guiding human action; however, they have usually failed to represent the affective 
dimension – i.e. the web of emotions and motivations that guide thinking. Thagard 
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has argued that mapping should also represent the affective values attached to 
particular concepts and beliefs. The cognitive-affective maps he proposes are not 
only visual representations of interconnected concepts, but also of the values that a 
group or individuals assign to them.
70
 The maps show the relationships between 
concepts and beliefs that are mutually supportive or conflicting.  
Thagard suggests a method to generate cognitive-affective representations. First, we 
must identify the concepts, beliefs, goals, and emotions of a person or shared by a 
group. Second, we must classify them as emotionally positive or negative. Third, we 
should identify the relationships between concepts, beliefs and goals, and moreover 
whether they are mutually supportive or conflicting. Fourth, we ought to make sure 
that the representation map captures the understanding of the individual or group of 
people. In order to transform the information into representations, he suggests a set 
of conventions that can be summarised in the following way: 
1. Emotionally positive elements should be represented as ovals. 
2. Emotionally negative elements should be represented as hexagons. 
3. Neutral elements should be represented as rectangles. 
4. Ambivalent emotional associations (triggering both positive and negative 
emotions) should be represented as a superimposed oval and hexagon. 
5. The thickness of the contour of the elements should be used to represent the 
strength of the value associated to them.  
6. Solid lines should be used to connect mutually supportive elements. 
7. Dashed lines should be used to connect elements incompatible with each 
other.  
8. The thickness of the connecting lines should be used to represent the strength 
of the positive or negative relation. 
The method and semantic convention to create cognitive-affective maps has been 
used to perform various representations,
71
 proving to be a quite useful tool in gaining 
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better perspective over individual and socially shared knowledge. Such 
representations invest their explanatory strength in visualising diagrammatically 
certain practices, the existence of conflict between different schemas and the changes 
in knowledge through time. For example, according to Thagard the concepts, beliefs 
and attitudes of the British with respect to themselves and the native tribes of the new 
world might be represented as follows:  
 
1.1 Cognitive-Affective map of the British view of themselves and indigenous peoples
72
 
Cognitive-affective maps can also help us map the knowledge framework that makes 
a ‘group-self’. This socially shared knowledge can be unveiled by using different 
data, from interviews, surveys, to literature analysis.
73
 In the next chapter we will 
analyse a broad range of similar resources in building cognitive-affective maps of the 
traditional knowledge structures shared by the Mexican legal community; that is the 
structures which underlie the practice of precedents in that context. Later on we will 
compare those representation maps against the set of ideas that have been permeating 
the Mexican context in the past years due to the rule of law reform efforts. 
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In general, cognitive-affective maps should be understood as an interpretative means 
towards grasping the broad body of knowledge held by an individual or a group of 
individuals. Mental representations do not only assist us to observe knowledge in a 
specific moment (as if taking a picture of the cognitive-affective schema). They 
furthermore help us to take note of cognitive changes that occur during epistemic 
revisions of different magnitudes, as well as to identify compatibilities and 
incompatibilities between different psychological schemata (i.e. of individuals or 
groups). Nevertheless, there are some limitations to maps that one should be aware 
of. First of all, a cognitive map does not entail an exact replica of what is to be found 
in a legal practitioner’s mind. Another important limitation of not only maps but also 
of explicit representations in general is that they only capture conceptual or 
propositional knowledge and glimpses of the emotional cargo attached to it. Finally, 
procedural knowledge, especially that which operates implicitly, is not one that can 
be mapped. Note, though, that despite this limitation, knowledge maps can still help 
us in understanding procedural knowledge in as much as it exists in connection to 
conceptual structures. 
1.5 Final Remarks 
Understanding legal practices as deriving from a broad cluster of cognitive-affective 
features takes us steps further beyond the legal theoretical input, which sees legal 
knowledge as barely more than the knowledge of rules, and the socio-legal 
perspectives, which address legal knowledge as fuzzy cognitive traits of social 
origin; it enriches those approaches, and bears some important consequences when 
attempting to fathom actual practices. Therefore, we must acknowledge that fruitful 
practices, but also problematic ones, are founded on a complex interplay of 
knowledge features that goes beyond legal rules. Legal rules might add on the bulk 
of knowledge or even be a reflection of broader knowledge structures; however, they 
barely stand on their own as grounds for legal practices. Thus, a comprehensive 
understanding of legal practices must aspire to unveil the complex cognitive-
affective framework over which they are built.  
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Additionally, an examination from this vantage point into the knowledge structures 
of legal communities can significantly reshape the way we perceive change, 
including legal change. Change might involve the revision of epistemic systems; that 
is, modifying conceptual categories or building new procedural knowledge. Legal 
change is change in a similar fashion, of certain magnitude and in relation to 
characteristic knowledge structures. Since not all legal changes are of the same kind 
(for example, some might involve authentic revolutions), some cognitive-affective 
reconfigurations can be more complex than others, and lead to asynchronies. As we 
shall see, some legal changes identify, in fact, with deep changes across the 
cognitive-affective structures of legal practitioners.  
The insights we therefore extract about the cognitive-affective dimensions of legal 
practices link directly with the approach we are adopting in building the discussion 
of this thesis. In the following steps of this study we will work on framing an 
understanding over the Mexican way of thinking about and of reasoning with legal 
precedents. With this aim in mind, we will pursue to bring out the deep cognitive-
affective framework over which the practice of using legal precedents takes shape in 
that context. We argue that some of the problems that legal precedents involve 
therein are connected to the deep layer of assumptions about their role and function, 
and to the procedural knowledge that has been developed under that particular 
framework. In other words, we argue that the problem of precedents in the Mexican 
context is deeply connected to what (still) lies in the hearts and minds of legal 






2. The Mexican Legal Mind and the System of Precedents  
 




Legal practice across legal systems may vary in many ways. For example, in some 
legal systems practitioners formulate their arguments in written form, while in others 
they do so orally. Alternatively, some legal professionals tend to be more acquainted 
with using certain legal features, such as precedents while others seem more inclined 
to using codes and statutes. As discussed in the previous chapter, these differences in 
practice cannot be explained exclusively as emanating from the variety of explicit 
legal rules. These different ‘styles’ reflect deep knowledge structures (i.e. concepts, 
beliefs, ways of doing things, and affective cargo) shared by a particular legal 
community.  
These established frameworks are built through time, that is, historically. In this 
respect Martin Krygier has noted that ‘[i]n every established legal system, the legal 
past is central to the legal present.’
1
 The complex set of beliefs, concepts, values and 
forms of doing things are developed, preserved and transmitted over generations. In 
this manner the past makes its way into the present.
2
 However, that does not mean 
that the past is fully transmitted to the present. Only some fragments or sediments 
survive and become part of the establishment while others face oblivion. Bengoetxea 
uses a metaphor to explain how in our present we find sediments of the past: in his 
view these are like ‘fragments of an old mosaic or a mural painting that one struggles 
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to reconstruct, or to a Venetian Murano vase that falls into the ground and breaks 
into many fragments, themselves further breaking into even more fragments.’
3
 
In this sense, many of the traits present in current legal styles are the product of the 
past. This, however, does not mean that legal professionals are fully aware of the 
historical past that influences them. Reconstructing the segments of the past is a 
useful activity when attempting to understand the present concepts, beliefs, values 
and ways of engaging in practice. Therefore, many clues and explanations about a 
current state of affairs can only be collected if we take a deeper look into the legal 
past. Going back to previous times casts our present under a different light. 
Remembering the decisions of previous actors and the circumstances that surrounded 
the construction of what now is considered a firm and established framework is a 
way of acquiring a different, somehow wider, perspective regarding our ways of 
thinking and engaging in practice, but also about our current problems and faults. A 
look into the past, might reveal the way certain beliefs, inclinations and ways of 
doing things (still reflected in our days) developed and became entrenched, while 
others did not survive, suffered radical transformations or distortions. In other words, 
unveiling the mental structures present in our days may be more easily attained if we 
focus on how they came to exist. In this way, legal history helps us gain a clearer 
understanding of the way relevant knowledge features are organised in the present. 
This chapter looks back into the past of the Mexican legal system aiming to provide 
an overview of the process formation and consolidation of what can be said to be the 
local knowledge establishment held by the legal community. Special emphasis is 
given to those features that explain the current (problematic) approach to legal 
precedents. Herein these knowledge structures will be analysed parallel to the legal 
and extra-legal scenarios that allowed them to emerge and be perpetuated. The 
historical narrative will necessarily draw on relevant social and political facts 
occurred during the turbulent early years of independent life of the Mexican State, as 
they to a certain extent influenced a number of beliefs and inclinations regarding the 
law and the dynamics of legal practices. This analysis will cast light on the legal 
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(re)sources available, relevant legal doctrines and legal ideas circulating within the 
system, and their interaction with other beliefs. It will indicate how this particular 
cognitive-affective framework has been further transferred through the process of 
legal education and has led to the promotion of certain ways of doing things, that is, 
a determined procedural knowledge. One of the aims in this particular chapter will be 
to give a historically informed account of the cognitive structures shared by the 
members of the local legal community, and that lead to a particular approach to legal 
precedents in that context. Additionally, we aim to understand how these structures 
unfold into specific ways of performing legal activities within that legal system, 
specifically with respect to the manner of reasoning with legal precedents, and the 
forms these have consolidated. 
This account has been performed mainly with the aid of secondary sources about the 
Mexican political, social, economic and legal history, although sometimes, in the 
absence of secondary bibliography, we have recurred to some primary sources, such 
as former codes, statutes, legal doctrinal books and periodic legal publications. This 
is mainly due to the fact that some parts of the history of law in Mexico are still 
underexplored. It has now been recognised that Mexican legal historiography faced, 
until recent years, underdevelopment.
4
 It was not until the mid-1990s that a change 
could be perceived in the long-standing ‘historical legalism’ that for long condemned 
the history of the law to the exegesis of statutes and codes. As new focuses and 
methodologies are being introduced, they have been casting light over a set of 
ignored historical happenings, which constitute what Pablo Mijangos has called ‘a 
new Mexican legal past.’
5
 This thesis has benefited from this new wave of studies 
and the many new insights about the emergence of legal institutions and practices. 
Nevertheless, we have often faced a shortage of information, especially regarding the 
history of the local legal ideas and methods. Our aim herein is not to provide an 
original contribution regarding Mexican legal history. Nevertheless, this account 
hopefully aids connecting some previously unlinked historical ‘nodes’, which 
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contribute to the overall understanding of the Mexican legal mind and local 
viewpoint regarding precedents.  
Our narrative will start from the independent era of Mexico (traditionally dated in 
1810), which coincides with the formative period of the nation-state and the 
consequent development of state-based legal structures. As we shall see the first 
years of independence are marked by the intensive disturbance and (re)definition of 
the social, political, economic and juridical order, which constitute a point of 
diversion from the previous colonial past. Thus, the first years of this period will be 
rich of decisive facts that directly or indirectly determine the shape of legal values, 
concepts, beliefs, attitudes and ways of performing legal tasks, which altogether have 
characterised the Mexican legal style. As we move thought time (especially after the 
first 60 years of independence) we will start to find more settledness and continuity; 
that is a period of normality.
6
 Our historical overview will end in the period of 
extensive reformation of the Mexican state of the early 1990s, which brought 
important legal changes with the aim of harmonising the local structures with the 
global tendencies. These changes, which will be explained in the following chapter, 
have represented important challenges to the establishment that we have presented 
along this historical overview. 
2.2 Towards a Lasting Establishment 
2.2.1 Embracing the Ideas of Nation-State, Constitutional Order and Codification 
After eleven years of war, the former colony of the New Spain (now Mexico) 
achieved its independence from Spain officially in 1821. It has often been argued 
that after independence a new nation-state emerged from the rupture with the 
colonial past. However, it was in response to the massive structural crisis aggravated 
by the independence that the Mexicans had to invent Mexico and not before.
7
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Essentially, one of the main problems during the first five decades was making all 
the relevant decisions regarding the emerging political, social, economic, and legal 
organisation. Moreover, this process of founding the Mexican state underwent a long 
turbulent period of intermittent internal wars, regional separatist movements,
8
 and 
foreign invasions attracted by its weak embryonic shape.
9
 This stage of turbulence 
lasted until the late 1860s, a time during which Mexico was giving the picture of a 




The long transitional period was marked by the continuing struggle between factions 
holding contending ideas about the structure of the post-colonial world: 
fundamentally, maintaining of the colonial tradition was contrasted against 
embracing diverse forward looking ideals that prescribed a different interaction 
between the main social, political, and economic actors. This diversion of opinions 
was evident in the political sphere. As Agustin de Iturbide, the man who led the first 
Mexican monarchical government after the independence, wrote in his memoirs, ‘the 
[people of the American continent] wished independence, but did not agree upon the 
method of acquiring it, nor upon the system of government that ought to be adopted 
[…] There were votes for absolute monarchy modified with the Spanish constitution, 
for a federal republic, etc. Every system had its partisans.’
11
 However, none of the 
political projects seemed to endure the hardships of the first years of independence. 
Thus, the period from 1821 to 1867 is one of conflict and discontinuity, in which 
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Mexico alternated between monarchy and republic, centralism and federalism, 
liberalism and conservatism. The outcome of these facts was: numerous ephemeral 
congresses, executives, constitutions
12
 and a very confusing body of law. 
Despite the serious substantive disagreements, all different factions agreed upon 
pursuing certain modern forms, such as the nation-state, constitutionalism and 
codification. These features had in general a very positive reception, as they were 
usually seen as the necessary path that the new country had to follow in order to join 
the modern world and attain development. There prevailed the belief that these 
features would help solving most of the social and political problems of the former 
colony. Nevertheless, embracing these features often meant ignoring or adapting 
their broader ideological background to a large extent to fit the ideas of different 
local factions. In this way, for example, there were advocates of a nation state that 
aimed to preserve the feudal system distinctive of the colonial days, even if these two 
models involved important contradictions. 
Although the colony had remained foreign to constitutionalism for the largest part of 
its history, the brief experience of the Constitution of Cadiz in 1812 strongly marked 
the legal developments of the 19th century. The constitutional experience opened the 
door to receiving a great deal of the liberal ideas about legal institutions. By 1820 the 
idea of constitutionalism had spread deeply its roots and all political factions aimed 
to imprint their agenda in a constitutional text, even those that pled for the 
conservation of the immanent socio-political order and the de jure perpetuation of 
class privileges.
13
 During this phase of ‘constitutional euphoria’ constitutions became 
an ideal expected to magically solve all the problems of the new nation-state.
14
 By 
the 1830s the proliferation of unsuccessful constitutions had declined the faith in 
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 yet it did not lead to its withdrawal as one can see with the many 
further constitutional attempts. During the first half of the 19
th
 century all 
congressional efforts were directed towards the establishment of a constitutional 
legal order, although in absence of long lasting decisions in so many substantial 
aspects there was little possibility for developing the state-based legal system any 
further.  
Since the very early days of independence, most governments had made efforts 
towards attaining another welcomed feature of modernity: legal codes. The idea of 
codifying the law had already been circulating in the colony for some time, following 
the reception of French liberal ideas in Spain, but it could actually flourish only when 
it reached maturity and found a fertile ground. By the last third of the 19th century 
codification was an idea widely embraced by the legal community, regardless of 
political affiliations: legislators and jurists from a liberal or conservative background 
agreed that the code ‘was the best that could happen to a society’, and the only point 
contention was whether the codes should be general or federal.
16
  
Several commissions were appointed to draft the codes; however, even modest 
results were difficult to attain where governments in power would constantly change 
and payments to drafters would frequently be suspended due to various reasons. It 
thus became impossible to enact efficient and endurable codes and statutes to replace 
substantially the colonial laws. The delays in enacting the codes created a system full 
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of gaps and contradictions, aggravating legal practice in the process.
17
 For example, 
the Supreme Court of Justice was paralysed in 1825 when it could not appoint 
members due to the lack of procedural rules,
18
 and later in 1848 and 1853 when it 
could not decide on petitions because there had been no response procedures in 
place.
19
 Several statutes and codes were never finished or enacted, or they just lasted 
for a short period of time, immediately followed by contradicting rules that created, 
suppressed, or modified legal procedures and authorities. As a result, not only it was 
not possible to break completely with the colonial law but, on the contrary, there was 
a constant recurrence to it as a subsidiary legal source,
20
 delivering legal practitioners 
in extremely complex scenarios. Some of the difficulties experienced by the legal 
community at that time were expressed in 1839 by the distinguished jurist Juan N. 
Rodriguez de San Miguel: 
Ours [the law], after almost 30 years of revolution, not only of weapons, but of habits, 
government and State, mourns and resents more than any other the compilation, the 
diversity and uncertainty of the legislation. The monarchic [laws] of several centuries 
[…] mixed with Spanish constitutions, compiled and not compiled laws of the Indias, 
the federal and the central ones, ones partly in force, partly modified, partly adapted; 
with nomenclatures of authorities, corporations and causes that have disappeared, as 
viceroy, chief magistrates, intendants, consulates, etc., and whose functions have been 
distributed, according to their nature, between the legislative, executive or judicial 
power, all create a sinister chaos, delay the administration of justice, obstruct the 
function of authorities, and impede the instruction, being necessary to make a 
considerable expenditure in order to obtain the essential codes […]
21
 
Consequently, most of the early Mexican production of legal literature was primarily 
dedicated to compiling, commenting on and systematising the various (legal) orders 
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so as to help legal practice and education.
22
 However, this particular literary 
enterprise was not free from the influence of ideological underpinnings and it often 
led to disparities in the recognition of normative orders as legal by the various 
contributing authors. One of the most contested issues was the positioning of the 
canonical laws in the legal order. On the one hand, legal professionals of a 
conservative background viewed the canonical order as actual law and rejected e.g. 
the provisions regarding freedom of religion and the expropriation of the clerical 
property, while those who held the liberal agenda pled for a strict separation between 
the church and the state.
23
 The unsettledness of the environment reflected in the way 
new legal practitioners were educated. The university could not provide its students 
with definitive legal perspectives in the middle of so much uncertainty.
24
 All this 
facts only increased the longing for the arrival of the awaited permanent constitution, 
the codes and, in general, a lasting framework.  
2.2.2 Challenging the Colonial Legal Mind 
The triumph of the liberal project in 1867 and the reestablishment of the Federal 
Constitution of 1857 (which had been suspended largely due to the armed conflicts 
that dominated the 1860s) gave the (temporal) stability necessary to construct the 
national legal order and to finally leave behind the subsidiary colonial law. 
Consequently, the decade of the 1870s is the one in which important legal 
developments, such as the codification of the law, took place. The codification 
movement was finally consolidated in 1870, when Justo Sierra’s project of civil code 
was finally enacted as the Civil Code for the Federal District and the territory of Baja 
California. The code was based on the French Civil Code to a great extent, but also 
on dispositions of the Spanish project of Garcia Goyena (based also on the French 
one), making a few adaptations to the local circumstance. But the Civil Code was 
only the starting point of a wave of codifications; thus, new substantial and 
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procedural codes on different legal areas were drafted and enacted in the following 
years both at the federal and local level. 
However, the constitution and codes were new legal features, carrying with them 
novel ideas and different dynamics. Therefore, the transition from a colonial 
structure to an independent modern state meant the introduction of new concepts and 
beliefs about the law, as well as the introduction of a set of related legal practices, 
which generated new doubts and challenges for legal professionals. All of these 
features aimed to reduce the complexities of the law by introducing a rational order. 
The model of nation-state aimed to erase from the map the overwhelming pluralism 
of the colonial world. The constitution looked towards securing the primacy of the 
state, as well as unifying the legal status of a mass of subjects that were formerly 
organised according to a system of casts and privileges, through the recognition of 
universal rights. The codes aimed to reduce the plurality of laws to simple 
systematised abstract prescriptions, which would comprise all subjective 




In this sense, the new legal forms involved abandoning the casuistry of the colonial 
law, so as to build upon the Enlightenment’s ideals of universalism and rationalism 
reflected in these features. Until that time, the law ruling in the colony, known as 
‘Law of the Indies’, had a different structure than the one that came to replace it. The 
legal system was built upon the principle of inequality based on the differences 
regarding social position. Therefore, the law was a collection of precepts of diverse 
origin, nature and scope, which were cited and applied with consideration of the 
particular cases and situations, that is, in accordance to the subject, the peoples, the 
times and the circumstances of each case.
26
 This law was ‘deeply dynamic, subject to 
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compressions, expansions and distortions.’
27
 It operated in a segmented society, with 
plurality of powers and independent agents, in which even if there was a strong 
central organ there was also certain autonomy around the periphery. Thus, central 
laws did not apply to the entireness of that complex structure, giving rise to various 
customs as means to give stability to the local orders and bring equilibrium between 
the diverse social and political powers.
28
  
The colonial lawyers and judges were formed in the universities and courts to 
perform in that particular scenario. They studied Roman and Canonical law, and 
additionally, they were introduced to the royal (Spanish) and colonial laws. 
Nevertheless, most practitioners opted for the study of the canons as the church was 
often a better employer than the civil service. The methods used in the university 
were the meticulous reading of a text or fragment of a book aided by explanations, 
and the so called ‘disputes’, in which the student held an opinion with regards to a 
controversial matter while other students argued in favour or against that 
conclusion.
29
 The objective of the classes was not to retain specific rules or concepts, 
but to develop competence in dialectic arguing, even though being able to retain in 
memory segments of texts was highly praised.
30
 Also, the formation of lawyers and 
judges was not exclusively legal; they were prepared to understand and engaged with 
the complexities of life reproduced in the law.
31
 The practice for which they were 
prepared was far from being legalistic.
32
  
As we can see, new features called for unification, which was definitely a challenge 
for the pronounced legal pluralism of the New Spain, in the sense that this transition 
aimed to exclude the various normative orders and create a monolithic state law. 
State law claimed exclusivity in the scope of the legal, leaving behind other 
contending (social) orders recognised as law in previous times. The new law, 
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however, not only cancelled other forms of legal order, but attempted to create an 
abstract rational order that notoriously contradicted the previous casuistic law. These 
modifications entailed not only a set of epistemological changes for those practicing 
law, but also important methodological shifts – in other words the arrival of the 
constitutions and codes asked for a renovated legal knowledge, both propositional 
and procedural.  
The transition from one form of law to the other represented a series of challenges 
for the legal community of the time. They had to restructure the profession to fit the 
new imperatives. Also, they had to become acquainted with novel institutions, 
embrace the new framework and become experts in the use of codes and the 
deductive method. Nevertheless, this task was by no means easy. Legal practitioners, 
however, not only had to relearn their science, but they also had to accommodate a 
set of legal ideas that contrasted to a large extent with the society they were supposed 
to rule.  
The magnitude of the transition was a matter of worrisome among the legal 
practitioners of the time. This can be perceived from the assertions published in the 
popular legal periodical ‘El Derecho’ in 1871 that we transcribe herein. According to 
the legal community  
‘[t]he immediate effect of these new legislations is easy to predict. The rules that during 
three centuries and until today have served as norm to the social relationships will 
disappear; the most serious transition will operate: the last traditions of the Colony will 
be erased, and before the voice of the new law is heard; before its precept incarnates in 
the customs and even if it is understood in the scope of speculation, serious confusion 
and disturbance will overcome and, with them, one of these crises that can only be 
dominated with the faith in the future […]
33
 
2.2.3 Accommodating a New Form of Law 
As we have just mentioned, the legal transition had important consequences affecting 
the legal community. The line of developments presupposed a different way of 
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conceiving e.g. the administration of justice, the legal profession and legal education. 
The structure of legal education and professionalisation underwent important 
changes, gradually allowing in the liberal features. This was mirrored in different 
aspects of the academic life, for example, the contents reviewed in the law school 
started moving away from the traditional roman-canonical law and progressively 
introducing national constitutional, civil and criminal law.
34
  
Besides, the increasing demand of trained lawyers led to an increase in the number of 
students choosing for legal studies, opting for secular law instead of the previously 
popular canonical law.
35
 Also the organisation of the legal profession underwent 
several changes. On the one hand, the professional College of Lawyers faced the 
necessity to adapt to the liberal ideas, which meant the abandonment of its structure 
as corporation of privileges, in order to become an organisation of citizens with 
intellectual aims.
36
 Thus, indications of the former structure, such as the proof of 
cleanliness of blood, were overruled, establishing the free access to the exercise of 
the legal profession.
37
 The new legal institutions required of technically instructed 
professionals to take over the work that was previously done by lay persons, but even 
professionals were not acquainted with the new law and the methodology behind 
grounding petitions and decisions according to legal texts. Understandably, legal 
practice (especially judicial decision making) during the first years of transition 
lacked cohesion. Therefore, several initiatives to bring back unity in practice were 
carried out, such as the creation of the institutions of amparo and jurisprudencia that 
will be discussed later on.
38
 
However, the most difficult part for the transition seems to have been 
accommodating the new liberal imperatives in a somehow incompatible socio-
political ground. This process of adaptation imprinted on legal practitioners certain 
beliefs about the law and the way it performs. The ideas interconnected to the new 
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legal features were in tension with the pre-existent socio-political order inherited 
from the colonial times. These legal features were, however, perceived as the 
righteous pattern to which reality had to adhere, but in fact that reality was so foreign 
and often opposite that risked the efficacy of the new structures.
39
  
In this respect, it has often been argued that the Constitution of 1857 was highly 
aspirational.
40
 This meant that it looked into a future state of affairs, to a ‘where we 
want to be’ rather than to the past or the present identity, posing an irresoluble 
conflict between the liberal aspirations and the social and political legacy.
41
 Also, the 
codes reflected the influence of the European ideas of modernity; they presupposed 
the monopoly of the law by the state, emphasised equality and individual freedom, 
which poorly mirrored the actual operating arrangements. The facts were truly 
different. The state struggled to achieve predominance in a non-secular, corporatist 
society full of intermediaries, which often kept on operating behind the official legal 
system. Likewise, equality was far from being a fact; the social fabric was still 
multiform and subject to different de facto orders, which were left outside the scope 
of law for the sake of accuracy to the institutional design.
42
  
There existed a mismatch between a framework that was faithfully adopted and a 
reality that had not achieved the expected development by means of the features of 
the new legal regime. This led to a sense of disappointment and to intellectual 
reformulations. The chaos inherited by half a decade of conflicts and the difficulties 
adopting the liberal model gave rise to a claim for order. In this way, philosophical 
positivism (which held the motto ‘liberty, order and progress’) became an influential 
ideology.
43
 With the arrival of the positivists there was an attempt to abandon 
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aprioristic ideals and, instead, to embrace empirical realities. As positivism was set to 
the service of a political group of influence and to the achievement of specific 
political aims, it was distorted. Soon the importance of liberty would be forgotten to 
remain only the idea of order, which was used to support scientifically the 30 years 
long dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz and its guiding principles: ‘order and progress’.
44
 
The group of Mexican positivists, known as ‘Scientifics’, started building upon 
evolutionist premises that allowed the existence of institutional inequality on natural 
grounds. For them progress would irremediably create, in the manner of the 
evolution of the species,  a fortunate class of more talented people possessing the 
right to exploit the other classes. Thus, the Scientifics frequently expressed that 




The positivist shift turned into an attack towards the liberal legal institutions. 
Nevertheless, liberal features, such as the constitution, kept on ruling during the 
dictatorship of Diaz without substantial nominal changes. This is the start of a 
complicated relationship between the law and factual order in the Mexican context. 
Buffington has explained that during this historical period the liberal revolution was 
perceived a premature attempt to change social forms, but that social modernisation 
would happen slowly as long as order and progress was not affected.
46
 The features 
of the legal liberal revolution had become fixed in the Mexican landscape, at least 
nominally. In this respect, it is possible to observe several legal advancements, along 
the lines of liberalism during the dictatorship of Diaz. Nevertheless, these 
developments were double edged: on the one hand, secondary legal institutions with 
an administrative or procedural function developed, new codes and regulations were 
enacted and helped bringing over regularity and certainty; but on the other hand, the 
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legal institutions with political overtones or getting on the way of the factual order 
were unable to materialise.
47
 
The three decades of dictatorship, also known as ‘porfiriato’, were central in the 
building the Mexican political system that operated until the end of the twentieth 
century. Also, these were very relevant years for the building of a long lasting legal 
establishment. The dictatorship’s acceptance of factual orders and inequalities, 
parallel to the (virtual) operation of certain legal features consolidated a particular 
relationship between law the law and society, which is said to exist until these days. 
Law’s isolation from society was, in part, made possible by embracing the scientific 
stand prescribed by the positivist wave. This perspective confined the law to the 
exegesis of texts, and especially to the following of rigorous procedures, which 
eventually was reflected in the form and substance of legal education.  
2.2.4 Developing the New Framework 
The dictatorship finally came to an end with the revolutionary movement of 1910. 
However, the revolution had again brought about economic instability and political 
division. Certain areas of country were now ruled by de facto power groups of 
regional caudillos that had fought in the revolutionary movement and that now 
claimed institutional positions. Thus, the law of the State was not generally respected 
and the law of the strongest still predominated.
48
 The political division was only 
stabilised by organising the different de facto forces in highly inclusive political 
party (with authoritarian, presidentialist overtones) that served to arbitrate the pacific 
distribution of quotas of national and local political power. The plurality of social 
groups was absorbed by internal committees, and the conflicts between them were 
decided by the political institutional framework of the party, which excluded the 
operation of law when solving essentially political or politically related conflicts in a 
manner that deeply resembled the dictatorship of Diaz.
 49
 In fact, the law appeared to 
exist in a state of significative subordination to the political will, and this was 
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reflected in the frequent additions, suppressions and modifications to the constitution 
and legislation, and the debilitation of the party.  The government applied or rejected 
the application of laws with unrestricted freedom and arbitrarily. This was the status 
quo prevailing during most of the twentieth century and that constituted the 
framework providing order and certainty to social interaction, which in different 
ways resembled the structure of the porfirian system but now using an 
institutionalised corporative form.  
The success of the revolution led to the enactment of the constitution of 1917 and 
new civil, criminal and procedural codes. The new constitution and laws aimed to 
expand the scope of the law to social areas that had been excluded by the former 
schemas and recognise a different set of (social) rights for vulnerable groups. The 
‘socialisation’ of the law restructured the relationship of the State and certain areas of 
the social world, but in a sense the approach to the law was not radically changed. In 
a sense, the law continued to be highly aspirational; once again: ‘it was the depiction 
of a nation that imagined itself, than a faithful copy of reality’,
50
 with all the 
problems that this represented.  
The core structure of the legal system, however, was not deeply affected and many 
aspects of the pre-revolutionary legal ideas and practices became entrenched. In this 
sense, this political revolution did not entail an authentic legal revolution. In fact 
during the early decades of the twentieth century Mexican law continued to develop 
following descriptions that pictured it as an enterprise isolated from socio-political 
matters. Nevertheless, intellectuals of the time tried to embrace milder positions 
instead of the philosophical positivism that dominated until the first decade of the 
twentieth century. In this sense, there were some efforts to attend to sociological 
circumstances in which legal orders were incorporated, but they did not manage to 
permeate some fundamental legal ideas and methodologies.
51
 Thus, it is possible to 
observe some continuity with the former emphasis on the textual character of the law 
and the deductive method. 
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In this form, during the first half of the twentieth century, some legal positivist works 
became extremely appealing in the Mexican context, such as the ‘Pure Theory of 
Law’ of Hans Kelsen. The main exponent of the ideas of Kelsen in Mexico was legal 
philosopher Eduardo Garcia Maynez. He translated Kelsen’s ‘General Theory of 
Law and State’ and wrote books on the linguistic dimension of law and deontic logic 
that somehow build over the Austrian philosopher’s ideas. He approached the 
question of the limits of law with regards to morality, as well as that of the difference 
between law and facts. His books are written with methodological carefulness, they 
are full of distinctions and classifications, which seemingly attempt to some sort of 
schematic exactitude. Maynez aimed to show that the law had a scientific character 
by introducing some logical principles (or ‘truths of reason’) ruling all legal systems, 
independent of the will of the legislator.
52
 The impact of Garcia Maynez in the 
current legal mind is so obvious that sometimes is overlooked.
53
 For the past seventy 
years the first approximation to the law of first years students has been the theoretical 
‘Introduction to the Study of Law’ written by Garcia Maynez with the aim of 
offering a general legal perspective to first year students and introducing them to the 
legal method.
54
 In the book, Maynez provides an image of the law as a static, 
logically ordered system of written norms recognised by the authority. In this 
respect, the aim of the book is to help students by identifying authoritative texts and 
arrange them logically according to the different scopes of validity, so as to cancel 
any possible contradiction. The author’s approach to the subject of interpretation can 
be said to be legalist: he emphasises the primacy of the text of the law and proposes 
the use of a set of rational principles to fill the legal gaps left by the legislator. This 
form of understanding and practicing law, arguably consonant with ‘dogmatic 
formalism’, has been reflected in other core texts used to form legal professionals in 
that context.
55
 Jorge Witker has, in this respect, has argued that: 
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The model of traditional legal education presupposes the Law as a set of norms that 
regulate the conduct of men in society. Therefore, these are the starting point for the 
learning of the law. The norms prefigure the desirable reality and the former must adjust 
to it. In this form, the Law is reduced to self-sufficient norms that integrate a system and 
that design a duty that ought not to be confused with the [factual] being. A neutral 
dualism, a-historical, that separates sharply forms and content.
56
  
Additionally, the legal education has been characterised by the method of magisterial 
class in which the lecturer provides a series of contents that can oscillate from 
doctrines to the exegesis of legal rules. The student plays a passive role, where he is 
the recipient of knowledge and there is no effort to engage the learner into the 
development of critical and argumentative skills. This form of pedagogy may 
actually contribute to a practice where legal practitioners seldom engage in the 
construction of new interpretations and substantive arguments. This educational 
approach, validated by a set of historically built ideas and facts, facilitates the 
consolidation of a general legal establishment, which as we shall see has lead to a 
peculiar approach regarding legal precedents. 
2.3 Developing the Judiciary and the System of Precedents 
The discussion of how law in Mexico has developed and what constitutes the general 
establishment is key to an analysis of what is considered as legal precedent in this 
context. Herein we will explain the emergence and historical development of an 
official system of precedents legal precedents, aiming to unveil the circumstances 
that shaped their contextual operation. However, Mexican precedents have an 
intrinsic connection with the organisation and operation of federal courts, especially 
that of the Supreme Court, as well as with the action of amparo. Thus, herein we will 
present a brief historical account on these matters, in connection to the set of broader 
circumstances and understandings about the law that we have previously introduced, 
and that altogether shaped a particular viewpoint regarding legal precedents in this 
context.  
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2.3.1 The Emergence of the Federal Judiciary 
Before the independence there were audiencias that mixed judicial and executive 
functions. It was not until the constitution of Cadiz that the idea of separation the 
judiciary as an independent power emerged, however it was not possible to 
consolidate it due to the problematic circumstances of the time. Since the last days of 
the Spanish colonial regime there was big confusion about the laws, and the organs 
in charge of their application. The colonial audiencias subsisted after the 
independence and until the federal judiciary was established, but the fact that a wave 
of colonial officials decided to leave Mexico and others decided not to collaborate in 
the independent institutions, left the offices with reduced functional capacity. The 
new institutions were still under debate, thus it was not possible to appoint new 
officials, but also there was not enough money to pay them. Around 1823 the 
administration of justice was deplorable, additionally to the absence of codes and 
unified laws, there was no Supreme Court, there were only two second instance 
tribunals and there were really few and poorly paid learned judges.
57
 The federal 
constitution of 1824 established a Supreme Court of Justice with certain exclusive 
functions but also operating as a court of third instance for the cases solved by 
district judges and collegiate tribunals, following the Spanish model of 
administration of justice.
58
 Since its creation, the Court was devoted to establish the 
system of administration of justice by trying to organise the district courts and 
tribunals, and providing opinions to unify decision making. During its first days 
(1825-1847) the Court was cautious not to get involved in political conflicts, 
although it often had frictions with the executive. However, the Court protested 
strongly against the ‘orders foreign to the (legal) system by which the Nation is 
governed’ coming from the executive
59
 and the arbitrary acts of the legislative.
60
 
Despite the conflictive situation, the Court was a relatively stable and autonomous 
organisation: the justices generally lasted for long periods of time and they were 
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respected in their positions regardless of their decisions.
61
 Even the change of regime 
from federalism to centralism in 1835, which destabilised the organisation of the 
federal district courts and circuit tribunals, barely affected the Supreme Court.  
During these early times the professional knowledge of the judges of the Court could 
be basically identified with the Spanish heritage. At the time the influence of the 
North American system and the resolutions of that Supreme Court were barely 
relevant for its Mexican counterpart.  It was after 1840 that the works of Tocqueville 
started to be widely known within the Mexican political and legal community, thus 
reviewing and quoting legal literature coming from North America became more 
frequent.
62
 As mentioned by the historian of Supreme Court, Lucio Cabrera, the 
judges of that time had a vast culture and flexibility reflected in using multiple 
sources in their reasoning: ‘either quoting Hamilton or [the Spanish legislation of] 
Las Partidas.’
63
 In the political discussion the influence of the American judicial 
organisation starts becoming more apparent, as the model of Supreme Court of the 
northern republic was frequently used to present the idea of strengthening the 
constitutional attributions of the Mexican Court.
64
 The Court was going through a 
time of prosperity, which reflected into the attributions in was conferred.  
2.3.2 The Introduction of the Writ of Amparo  
The development of the institution of precedents in Mexico is closely connected to 
the evolution of the constitutional thought and the writ of amparo created to protect 
civil rights and the division of powers. The exhaustion of the constitutional models 
tried by different regimes in Mexico lead to a permanent search for legal and 
political models proved elsewhere – developing in the second half of the nineteenth 
century a special sympathy for the institutional structures of the United States. The 
group of liberals and federalists often looked to the institutional development of 
North America, a neighbouring former colony embracing the same liberal values and 
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which federal structure helped devising the Mexican federation.
65
 The filiations of 
certain aspects of the triumphing Mexican constitutional and political organisation 
led to a constant study of its parental model so as to understand how problems were 
solved in that jurisdiction. Thus, further American-inspired ideas and legal 
institutions penetrated the Mexican system, giving rise to a Supreme Court more 
active in the vigilance of constitutionality and in the construction of the 
constitutional doctrine, by means of a system of judicial review: amparo.
66
 
The institution of amparo was first drafted in 1841 in the local constitution of the 
state of Yucatan as means to review the constitutionality of statutory laws and acts of 
the executive, granting judicial protection to the affected party. It later became a 
federal action incorporated in the provisional Act of Constitutional Reforms of 1847 
following the intervention of Mariano Otero, who pleaded for ‘elevating to a high 
status the federal judicial power, giving it the faculty to protect all habitants of the 
Republic in the enjoyment of the rights stated in the Constitution […] against the 
attacks of the executive or legislative […]’ as in North-America ‘where this saviour 
power came from the Constitution and has produced the best effects.’
67
 However, 
Otero introduced an important clarification, which constitutes one of the main 
characteristics of amparo until our days: the resolutions granting amparo against 
statutory law do not constitute a general declaration about its constitutionality; 
instead they benefited exclusively the claimant. 
The amparo, as envisaged by Otero, was finally included in the federal constitution 
of 1857. However, bringing into life the institution of amparo represented a 
challenge for Mexican jurists as it was foreign to the traditional line of legal ideas. 
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Therefore, the first Amparo Act of 1861 that pretended to give practical existence to 
the revision of the constitutionality of statutes and acts of authority by federal courts 
emerged from an intense reflection regarding the role of the federal judiciary and the 
effect of its resolutions. During one of the sessions held by the Federal Congress to 
discuss 1861 project of Amparo Act, (distinguished jurist and politician) Ignacio 
Mariscal expressed the difficulties that the legislative commission was experiencing 
while attempting to regulate a matter alien to that context and the importance of 
understanding and finding guidance in the similar institution of judicial review of the 
United States, he commented that: 
The main difficulty that the commission has found is that of leading with an entirely 
new subject without antecedents. It is only in the United States where a thought similar 
to that of our current Constitution is held. For a long time we had looked with eagerness 
for the statutes that regulate the proceedings on this subject, until we were convinced 
that there existed no general statute regulating further their constitutional thought. This 
might appear strange for those not acquainted with English and American customs, 
where a judicial decision has the same force as statutory law and from which their 
deeply embedded legal costumes arise.
68
  
The new institution also found opposition by certain members of the parliament for 
considering that the judicial review had nothing to do with Mexican legal tradition 
and that it would create chaos and confusion in the legal system.
69
 Nevertheless, the 
legislative did not have the option of withdrawing the discussion of amparo since it 
was a constitutional command entrusted by the constitutive assembly, therefore the 
view of Mariscal made its way through the final Amparo Act of 1861. 
In general, the legislative discussions of the act of 1861 mirrored the twofold 
influences of the Mexican legal mentality.
70
 On the one hand, the weight of the 
European doctrines (especially French) prescribing a strict division of powers, the 
supremacy of the statutory law, codification and a passive judicial function, which 
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had actually permeated during the last years of the colony. On the other, the appeal 
of the American constitutionalism and judicial review derived from their 
acquaintance with foreign newspapers, judicial resolutions, the works of Justice 
Joseph Story and second-hand descriptions of the American judicial system, 
remarkably Tocqueville’s ‘Democracy in America’, even if them seemed more 
distant from the prevailing legal ideas.
71
 One and the other have been present in the 
initial and developmental stages of various legal institutions such as amparo, causing 
an interesting phenomenon of ‘hybridisation’ in the attempt to attain the best of both 
worlds. 
2.3.3 First Judicial Precedents 
One of the issues that concerned most of Mexican jurists was that of the effects of 
the amparo resolutions. In fact it was a very delicate matter because it was thought 
that if resolutions had general force similar to statutes and a single judicial decision 
could invalidate legislative acts, this could risk the equilibrium of powers, political 
stability and, consequently, the subsistence of the writ of amparo in the long run. 
Therefore, the effects of amparo resolutions were consigned to the particular case, 
that is, judicial decisions were the law only for the parties intervening in the 
constitutional proceeding without implying any general pronouncement about the 
statute law in abstracto. In this manner, the doctrine stating the relativity of amparo 
resolutions, known as ‘formula of Otero’, became a self-understood pillar of amparo; 
a doctrine that is said to have avoided rough confrontation of the federal judiciary 
with the other federal and local powers and secured the survival of the institution 
even in years of higher political turbulence.
72
 However, even if unconstitutional 
previsions remained legally untouched, there was an expectation that this would 
create a politico-moral deed motivating their legislative reform or derogation. The 
institution of amparo was expected to function just as the frequently quoted 
representation of the American system of Tocqueville, where unconstitutional rules 
fell by ‘the repeated hits of judicial decisions’,
73
 though in a more subtle way than 
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derogation. In this subject Supreme Court’s justice Ignacio Vallarta mentioned that 
‘the legislator has a duty to [revoke a statute] when the judicial power has declared 
its unconstitutionality in several resolutions, because the legislator ought to respect 
the decisions of the supreme interpreter of the constitution when he issues statutes 
and he would rebel against this code if he insists in issuing or supporting statutes 




Nevertheless, in the idea of amparo as a means to build a constitutional doctrine and 
a way to influence the legislator’s acts it was implicit that amparo resolutions could 
not just be confined to the private parties of the trial, but that they had to achieve 
publicity and, in a sense, that they could have wider effects than those consigned by 
the formula of Otero. Accordingly, Vallarta, following Ignacio Mariscal, these 
resolutions had two aims, one direct and another indirect. The first one consisted in 
solving a case and the second one in the establishment of public and constitutional 
law.
75
 Therefore, since the beginning of the writ of amparo relevant resolutions 
where unofficially published in order to develop the constitutional doctrine, to settle 
some controversies regarding the use of amparo and to keep the unity of decisions. 
The increasing availability of judicial resolutions and the recognition of their role in 
building legal doctrine gave rise to an early unofficial system of precedents. 
The first Amparo Act of 1861 on the one hand helped the diffusion of legal 
resolutions as it ordered their publication in newspapers, but on the other denied the 
character of precedents to court decisions and prohibited its use as reasons for 
disregarding statutes.
76
 The Amparo Act of 1869 also denied the character of 
precedents to amparo resolutions, but as the publicity of judicial decisions increased, 
the practice of quoting resolutions as interpretative guides became widely popular. In 
1870 Supreme Court’s president Jose Maria Iglesias established an official means for 
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publishing federal judicial resolutions, recognising the ‘need of systematically 
publishing the resolutions of federal tribunals […] with the purpose of unifying the 
criteria of all tribunals in the Republic, giving “certain authority” to the legal 
interpretations contained in these resolutions.’
77
 During its first years (1871-1885) 
the publication did not achieve the practical success that it looked for, since the 
resolutions were not well systematised and it was difficult to revise them – but, it 
actually helped acknowledging the importance of having access to precedents and 
creating the habit of reading them.
78
 
Thus, legal resolutions became relevant for practice, they were frequently quoted by 
judges and lawyers to support their reasoning in new cases and they were recognised 
as de facto binding.
79
 Between 1875 and 1880 – due to the temporal suspension of 
the official publication of judicial resolutions – important amparo decisions were 
published in ‘El Derecho’ and ‘El Foro’ (nonofficial newspapers of law and 
jurisprudence). Eventually this practice extended to the publication and analysis of 
previous cases from both federal and local courts, following the idea that the law of 
the books was only developed in practice which is clearly outlined in the following 
statement published in El Foro: 
[…] it is true that judicial resolutions are not legal truth but only in their dispositions 
and for the parties of the trial; but it is also true that resolutions motivated and founded 
in legal principles and deductions […], have the character of reasoned and rightful legal 
interpretations, they concretise our understandings of statute-law, they execute the 
theoretical speculations of legal science in the sphere of practical facts.- There is a 
common background of juridical truths, of solutions adopted, that are traditionally 
preserved in the forum, and that can only be studied in judicial resolutions. The good 
judgment, the right choice, the precaution to manage the cases, to select the actions, 
recourses, to reveal in advance the results, what would come from this or the other 
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mean, all this cannot be studied neither from statutes nor from books, but only and 
exclusively from the applications contained in judicial decisions.
80
 
The publicity of legal resolutions was indeed considered of real importance for a 
legal development upon experience. Thus, one of the 1879 issues of El Foro 
contained a call to all magistrates and judges exhorting them ‘to send copy of the 
resolutions that in their opinion are of positive interest’ just for ‘their love to [legal] 
science’.
81
 However, one of the major contributions to the publicity of the amparo 
resolutions was that of Judge Ignacio Vallarta, who improved the systematisation of 
resolutions in the Official Judicial Periodical and introduced clear explanations of the 
reasoning behind of the resolutions. Additionally, Vallarta published his decisions as 
president of the Supreme Court of Justice in 1879, 1980, 1982 and 1985, giving 
detailed explanation of the reasons leading to the conclusions, with the deliberate 
intention to create a system of precedents.  
2.3.4 Early Problems of the System of Precedents: Handling Contradictions 
The increasing availability of amparo resolutions made evident that there were 
contradictory interpretations on the same legal subjects. Contradictory resolutions 
were perceived as a major problem that had to be solved. Therefore, creating a 
system free of contradictions was the main concern addressed by the project of 
Amparo Act of 1869 proposed by Ignacio Mariscal, who considered that 
contradictory judicial interpretations had left legal questions without a clear answer 
and that this would lessen the constitution and the institution of amparo. He 
expressed concern regarding the fact that: 
 […] neither repetition [nullifying certain cases] could occur, nor the uniformity of 
constitutional understandings, if their interpretation corresponds to isolated tribunals, 
such as district and circuit courts. It is natural that they disagree in several points as 
differences of opinion […] However, a political charter of which interpretation is 
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variable, uncertain and mutable, according to places and times, hardly deserves the 
name of constitution […]
82
  
Mariscal concluded that to avoid contradictions district judges should just prepare the 
amparo trial and all final resolutions should be emitted by the Supreme Court – ‘this 
way, judicial resolutions will achieve not only respectability, but also the uniformity 
of spirit that, as it has been shown, is so essential for the public good.’
83
 These 
suggestions were taken into account, but it was decided that this would overload the 
Court and that other alternatives should be found. Finally, article 3 of the Act gave 
district judges the power to pursue the trial and provisionally suspend the execution 
of the alleged unconstitutional acts. Article 13 authorised them to pronounce 
definitive resolution on the amparo matter, but ordered the remission of the files to 
the Supreme Court of Justice for its revision.
84
 This way, the Amparo Act of 1869 
made the Supreme Court of Justice the definitive interpreter of the constitution, 
avoiding the dispersion and contradictions that the legal system was experiencing. 
However, the contradictions subsisted even after the new statute. The comments 
made in 1877 by the famous lawyer Jacinto Pallares illustrate the perception of this 
problem:  
The Constitution of 1857 has been, in the hands of the Supreme Court, the same as 
sacred books are for sects, that is, an arsenal of ideological disputes. […] The national 
Supreme Court that until now has not known how to create a jurisprudencia (so big is 
the number of resolutions in contradiction), has completely discredited this source of 
law that is formed from the custom of the forum […] In a short time, this Babel tower 
called ‘constitutional law’, will turn an inexplicable labyrinth.
85 
Therefore, the desire to avoid contradictory resolutions remained present in the 
treatment of judicial precedents (i.e. the so called jurisprudencia). For example, this 
can be seen at a later stage in the discussions of the unapproved project of Amparo 
Act presented by Protasio Tagle in 1877, where he argued: 
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[…] it is proposed that it [the Supreme Court of Justice] is divided in chambers […] the 
second and third chambers will each have three magistrates and are of amparo […] But 
it is necessary to avoid the inconvenient of a contradictory constitutional 
jurisprudencia,  because being both chambers in charge of solving amparo recourses, 
this could happen […] This is why it is proposed a cassation that does for constitutional 
jurisprudencia the same as it does for civil jurisprudencia, that is: to establish the 
uniformity of the interpretations of our political code, to form the precedents that set up 
a solid and reasoned constitutional jurisprudencia, and to avoid that the constitutional 
prescriptions become a chaos of unintelligible sophisms.
86
 
The project was objected precisely because the division of the Court would 
inevitably lead to contradictions. Correspondingly, senator Couto argued that amparo 
aimed ‘to uniform the understanding of [constitutional] articles, […] and this is only 
achieved giving jurisdiction to the full Court for solving amparo actions; because 
there are more probabilities that the constitutional jurisprudencia is uniform when 
they are resolved by the full court [...] and this way contradictory resolutions are 
avoided’. Similarly senator Pacheco expressed that ‘when a single corporation is the 
one that has to apply a law constantly […], it is much easier to achieve the 
uniformity of jurisprudencia and there will be fewer divergences […].’
87
 
2.3.5 Limiting the Functions of the Judiciary 
The system of precedents was to a certain extent affected by the political context. 
During the 1870’s the Supreme Court of Justice actively protected civil and political 
rights. However, the protagonism of the Supreme Court was the cause of increasing 
hostility with the other political powers. The highest point of tension was reached in 
1876 when the Court, following the precedents that held competence to review the 
election of the members of the political parties and nullify all acts and laws of 
illegally elected authorities, it decided that the re-election of President Lerdo de 
Tejada was illegal because of fraud. This important incident destabilised the country 
and brought a new armed conflict that ended in the establishment of the dictatorship 
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of Porfirio Diaz and the later deposition of the ministers of the Supreme Court that 
were not loyal to the new regime.
88
  
The Supreme Court of Justice was the target of criticisms claiming for its de-
politicisation and for a new Amparo Act on these grounds. After five years of 
legislative process the project of Amparo Act drafted by Vallarta was accepted in 
1882; it attended the critics to the Supreme Court redirecting its political turn into a 
more technical function. The following years the Supreme Court played a less 
relevant political role but presided as it was by Vallarta and including notorious 
jurists, it was still a centre of legal development. However, as years passed the 
judiciary seemed to experience a period of lethargy. Porfirio Diaz had decided to put 
an end to the protagonism of the Supreme Court and the ‘vallartist’ influence. 
Vallarta, not comfortable with the executive and the new members of the Supreme 
Court that favoured the executive, opted for resigning in 1882.
89
  
During the dictatorship the judiciary entered into crisis: the resolutions of amparo 
were frequently disregarded by the authorities, the ministers of the Supreme Court 
and federal judges were appointed and removed by the president in the most arbitrary 
ways, counting with the support of the Congress. The members of the Supreme Court 
often received letters from the executive requesting compliance with its lines of 
action, though these requests really meant imperatives to be achieved by force.
90
 
Diaz is considered the responsible of eroding the judicial independence that the 
Court had enjoyed during the previous independent, opposing the permanence of 
justices in their function and deliberately controlling the election of the Court 
ministries and district judges.
91
 As the constitutionalist Emilio Rabasa commented: 
the mobility of the Court’s members had ended with the possibility of stability in its 
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 Jacinto Pallares denounced the lack of independence of the judiciary as 
one of the problems of the administration of justice in the porfirian times: 
The truth is that the judicial power depends from the executive practically and legally, 




As the dictatorship advanced in time, Mexico seemed to depart more from the 
American line of judicial development, where the Court had actually assumed a 
strong political role, reflected, for example, in the acknowledgement of the power to 
review of presidential elections. Subsequently, American reception was regarded 
with scepticism and Mexican jurists started to develop a renewed sympathy towards 
French legal culture. French legal developments were more suitable for the current 
Mexican reality, specially the droit administratif that proved very useful to 
strengthen the executive. Thus, new comparative studies of French and Mexican 
institutions were performed; remarkably a comparison of amparo against judicial 
decisions and cassation arguing their almost absolute similarity and suggesting the 
conscious and precise imitation of more technically developed French cassation. The 
writ of amparo moved from its original purpose, that is, to control constitutionality, 
to function along the lines of cassation, so as to guarantee the correct application of 
the recently enacted legal statutes and codes, that is, to serve as a means to control 
legality. It is therefore understandable that the resolutions published within January 
of 1890 and December 1897 show development in the procedural and technical 
aspects of amparo, filling it with the technicisms of cassation, even though it still had 
a modest role in the protection of civil rights.
94
 Jacinto Pallares also complained 
about this matter, arguing: 
Judges and magistrates tend to kill the substance of the law due to the formulas, terms 
and other scientific machinery suited for a cheap science.- Instead of directly grasping 
the moral substance of the matter debated before them, they see it through the 
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technicism and the formulas, which they handle with fake erudition […] This is 
revealed even more clearly in the more technical recourses, especially in  cassation, 
where the respective chamber has adopted a metaphysic more or less serious, so far 
from reality and social facts, of the interests that palpitate in the judicial life, that is 
impossible to make it feel the necessities of the litigants, their votes of justice, their 
complaints, their protests […] But this fact is not exclusive of [the chamber] and 
everyday there are cases in which, because of a formula, a solemnity or any chicana, 
entire trials are nullified […] The tribunals consummate their work by means of a 
simple decree, a word, and they do not know, or they do not want to acknowledge, that 
behind it there is life, that the formulas serve to guarantee the law, not to kill it.
95
 
An important stream of the precedents of the Court of that time tended to interpret 
the division of powers, and granted amparo for formal violations with regards to 
matter of competence of the authorities. This represented an oxymoron as the 
evaluation of constitutional competences was formal matter without foundation in 
the actual power arrangements.
96
 However, the concern for matters of competence, 
as well as those of procedure and form, remained a characteristic of the decisions 
making of future Courts. 
2.3.6 Towards an Official System of Binding Precedents 
Possibly one of the last signs of the former judicial splendour during the dictatorship 
was the enactment of Vallarta’s project of Amparo Act of 1882. But in a sense this 
project suited well the triumphing coup, as it removed any trace of political activity 
from the Supreme Court of Justice and technified the amparo action. However, the 
act attempted to strengthen the ordinary judicial functions defining procedural 
aspects of the amparo action and made improvements to the roughly outlined system 
of precedents. The new act established that all resolutions from district judges, the 
Supreme Court of Justice and dissident opinions had to be published in the official 
newspaper of the federal judicial power. It recognised the importance of the Court’s 
opinions for giving the correct interpretation to the constitutional text
97
 and also 
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imposed a binding character of the Court’s constitutional interpretation held in five 
definitive resolutions to all federal judges, under sanction of removal from their 
position, imprisonment or suspension.
98
 Previously, Mariscal had been an important 
supporter of attributing judicial precedents with general binding force, that is, that 
they should have these effects for all administrative departments and society. 
However, Vallarta discarded general bindingness for the sake of political prudence, 
limiting the compulsory character of precedents to the federal judiciary.
99
 He 
attempted provide precedents with bindigness in a strong sense, thus he adapted the 
prevision of the decree of the Spanish Courts of 1813 (in force until 1872) that 
sanctioned with suspension of functions and a year’s salary fine to judges that solved 
against the law. 
Nevertheless, the system of binding precedents was highly criticised for several 
reasons. First, precedents of this type were suspected to have a political function and 
to intrude legislative functions, something that was not completely according with 
the trend of transforming the judiciary into an apolitical institution. Second, the 
binding (and coercive) effect of judicial precedents had created an insecure 
environment for judges that were afraid of risking their position or going to prison 
while deciding against the binding precedents of the Court. Third, judges and 
practitioners complained about faulty quality, unavailable and heterogeneous 
resolutions that made difficult for judges to commit with following the 
jurisprudencia. One of the main contemporary critics of the system of binding 
precedents was Judge Fernando Vega, who thought that jurisprudencia had not 
clarified statutes, but it was equally obscure; it was too changeable, volatile, complex 
and vague to oblige judges in the terms of the Amparo act of 1882.
100
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Therefore, jurisprudencia as a binding source of law was abandoned in the new 
Federal Code of Civil Procedures of 1897. The code established that the amparo 
resolutions had to be according to the Constitutional text, omitting the mention to 
judicial precedents contained in the former statute.
101
 It also repeated the formula 
followed in the previous amparo acts, stating that resolutions only benefited the 
parties of the trial, and they could not be quoted in other trials.
102
 The official 
explanation for this shift was the invasive tendency of the judiciary against the 
legislative and the reestablishment of the division of powers as understood in the 
civilian tradition. 
2.3.7 Revolutionary Discontinuities and the Building of a Model of Judiciary 
The revolutionary movement of 1910 represented another challenge to the Supreme 
Court. During the first years of the revolution the Supreme Court of Justice kept on 
operating with relative normality, but as the revolution moved forward, the members 
of the Court, identified with the regime of Porfirio Diaz, could see that their place in 
the judiciary would come to an end. Around 1914 the intensified revolutionary 
movement and the North American invasion caused the closure and relocation of 
many federal courts of first and second instance. Additionally, judicial adjudication 
was disrupted by the suspension of individual rights in 1913 and the removal of the 
capacity to grant amparo.   
As a result of the triumph of the revolution, a new political constitution was drafted 
and enacted in 1917. The main objective of the constitution was to incorporate a 
catalogue of social rights into the already existing body of individual liberal law. 
Additionally, the institutional framework was redesigned and certain competences 
were redistributed. The members of the constitutional assembly discussed 
extensively the role of the Supreme Court and worked towards bringing it back to its 
best times. The constitution reorganised the Supreme Court in order to provide it 
with a wider degree of independence from the executive, but it was also reiterated 
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that the Court should not have an active role in solving political conflicts. The role of 
the Supreme Court as a tribunal of cassation was also widely discussed. On the one 
side it was considered that it was an institutional fail to allow the federal revision of 
local judicial resolutions due to argued vices in the fulfilment of statutory legal 
requirements, but on the other it was accepted that since ‘the [local] judges are 
converted in the blind instrument of governors, that openly get involved in matters 
out of their attributions, it is precise to have a recourse, before the federal judiciary in 
order to repress all these excesses’ and that ‘the people was already used to amparo 
in civil matters, so as to get rid of the arbitrariness of the judges, that […] it would be 
not only unjust, but impolitic, to deprive them from this recourse.’
103
 Finally, due to 
this considerations, the competences of the Court as a tribunal of cassation remained 
unchanged.  
The performance of the Court during the first two decades after the new constitution 
has been an object of controversy. Often it has been argued that the Supreme Court 
was submissive to the executive even after the revolution. However, more recently it 
has been argued that during the years immediate to the triumph of revolution the 
Court operated as an independent organ. Recent research has shown that the first 
Supreme Courts after the revolution appeared to have operated autonomously and not 
according to the will of the other powers. However, the first Courts seemed to have 
been driven by the legal inertia of the porfirian times, even holding back the 
operability of the revolutionary reforms. Their attachment to certain doctrines 
regarding separation of powers, and their preference to discussing legal technicisms 
represented and impasse for the reforms supported by the other powers. Actually, the 
Court appeared to still be adhering to the features distinctive of porfirian law: its 
doctrines and the formalist-proceduralist approach to adjudication. In this manner, 
the Court practically obstructed the realisation of the social constitutional reforms by 
attaching to the former doctrines and reasoning patterns, placing more attention to 
matters of form and procedure to the content of the revolutionary law. As mentioned 
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by a member of the Congress at the time ‘there was nothing that opposed more the 
revolutionary conquers than the spirit of old lawyers.’
104
 
Consequently, the Supreme Court was reformed in 1928 with the aim of removing 
the ministers and securing its future affinity with the executive’s policies. The 
appointments of the members of the Court was put into the hands of the executive 
(which at that time had already evolved into the centre of the political system), 
beginning the era of subordination of the Court to the executive that remained 
essentially unchanged until 1994.
105
 The process of appointment was loosely linked 
to the professional of judicial merits of the candidates, but more close related to their 
political affinities, loyalty or friendship.
106
 The Court (and the judiciary in general) 
functioned within the hegemonic party’s logic, becoming one more block of the 
corporatist state structure consolidated in 1930.
107
  
After the 1930s the Supreme Court assumed a passive role, distancing from 
politically sensitive issues and rarely challenging the executive. Arteaga Nava 
described the members of the Court as follows: 
‘While judges, especially in other countries, have the reputation of being conservative, 
the truth is that in Mexico, except on rare occasion, we cannot say the same. It does not 
follow from this that they are liberal or revolutionary; rather that the highest magistrates 
are simply colourless, and follow the ideas of the highest members of the ruling group 
of the moment, especially those of the president of the republic, be they revolutionary, 
conservative, or whatever else is in fashion […]’
108
 
Amparo actions of a high political content were often declared inadmissible, and 
from those studied by the Court only few were ruled in favour of the plaintiff under 
exceptional grounds of political opportunity. For example, in deciding a case in 
1933, a member of the Court disclosed: 
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 We have ruled in favour of the plaintiff only because the country is at peace: if the 
circumstances were different, nothing would stop us from declaring that the dismissal of 
a military man is a political act that cannot be protected by the amparo suit.
109
 
Regarding the writ of amparo in politically unimportant matters, the Court appeared 
to be more autonomous and to hold a more or less successful role in protecting 
individual rights. Actually, in some litigious areas, the administration of justice was 
to some extend effective.
110
 However, the increase on caseloads seemed to have 
intensified the historical formalist-proceduralist reasoning pattern, and many of these 
cases were solved on these grounds. This trend seems to have lasted for decades. In 
this respect, the statistics of 1992 point that 77 per cent of amparo actions were 
dismissed on procedural grounds.
111
 
2.3.8 Towards an Established System of Precedents 
The official system of precedents known as ‘jurisprudencia’ was reintroduced in the 
Federal Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 after it was recognised that precedents were 
in any case ‘a useful source, maybe indispensable for the correct understanding of 
the law […] when their foundations are according to reason.’
112
 A more ordered 
practice of precedents was aimed by introducing different, but at the same time strict 
rules regarding their creation and use. The new code established that only the 
Supreme Court could form jurisprudencia regarding constitutional and federal 
ordinary law
113
 when the decisions where reached by at least nine judges and 
reiterated in a line of five decisions without interruption by a contradictory 
criterion.
114
 The statute shows a tendency to mitigate the strong sense of bindingness 
contained in the former act by removing the sanctions for disobeying the 
jurisprudencia. Decisions were considered binding for inferior judges and the Court, 
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but the Supreme Court could disregard the established line of decision just by 
expressing its reasons.
115
 The citation of precedents was set on the side of the parties 




From there on, the official treatment of jurisprudencia has remained more or less the 
same, having just small variations, even after the promulgation of a new Constitution 
in 1917. The Amparo Act of 1919 practically reproduced the articles of the Federal 
Code of Civil Procedures, except for the fact that the new statute expanded the scope 
of bindingness of jurisprudencia to local state tribunals. Even if the formal handling 
of the system of precedents remained the same, after the revolution, there was an 
expectation of a substantial break with the legal past; consequently all the judicial 
precedents from the times previous to the new constitution were declared ineffective 
and were attributed the status of non-binding ‘historical precedents.’ 
In 1936 a new Amparo Act (which operated until 2013) was enacted, establishing 
that the definitive resolutions of amparo and the dissident opinions of the judges 
would be published in the weekly publication of the Federal Judiciary, when 
necessary to constitute jurisprudencia or contradict it, and when agreed by the Court 
working in full or in chambers.
117
 A similar rigid rule for the constitution of binding 
precedents as that of 1908 was included in the new act, establishing that five 
consecutive definitive resolutions, not interrupted by other contradictory and 
approved by at least eleven judges, when dictated by the whole court and five for the 
case of chambers, constituted jurisprudencia.
118
 The main modification to the system 
of precedents introduced by this act was the expansion of the precedent creation 
faculty to the chambers of the Court, which was predestined to increase the problem 
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of contradictory precedents. This problem only became worse in time with the 
further widening of tribunals authorised to create precedents.  
After the revolution the judiciary was left with an important backlog of court cases. 
Thus, the organisation of the Supreme Court of Justice was reformed to create three 
specialised chambers of five judges in 1928, and a fourth one in 1934. In 1951 the 
constitution was reformed to consolidate the collegiate tribunals as instances of 
amparo, so as to help alleviating the backlog cases. Collegiate tribunals would be in 
charge of deciding the amparo cases that did not require a ‘direct interpretation’ of 
the constitution. The creation of collegiate tribunals increased the number of 
contradictory criteria. Therefore, the Constitution established that ‘[i]f the collegiate 
tribunals of circuit hold contradictory theses in the amparo trials of their competence, 
the ministers of the Supreme Court, the General Prosecutor of the Republic or those 
tribunals could report the contradiction to the Supreme Court, who will decide, as a 
whole, which thesis should be observed.’
119
 In this way a new modality to constitute 
jurisprudencia was conceived besides the system of reiteration mentioned above: the 
so called jurisprudencia by contradiction of theses, which also operates nowadays.  
With respect to the publication of the precedents, it can be observed that the 
unofficial legal publications that were initially active making available and reviewing 
judicial resolutions faded away. The official judicial weekly publication became for 
long time the only means were precedents were available. Nevertheless, the form of 
publishing judicial resolutions after the revolution varied from that introduced by 
Vallarta. The explicatory summaries of resolutions, first created to clarify and make 
easier the understanding of precedents, went through a process of formalisation. The 
text of the ‘jurisprudential theses’ published by the judiciary went from their early 
argumentative form to impervious rules or principles resembling a statute. In this 
manner, the summaries started having a life of their own and acquiring more 
relevance that the full-resolutions, which were rarely published.
120
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2.4 Final Notes on the Mexican Legal Mind and the System of Precedents 
As we have seen, the Mexican legal system since its very early days evolved along 
the lines of the civil law tradition. The roots of the laws of the colonial times 
elaborated by the Spanish regime are mainly identifiable with Romano-Canonical 
tradition. However, the interaction of this type of law with the indigenous laws 
created a peculiar high level of complexity that exceeded the heterogeneity 
characteristic of European feudal systems. 
Additionally, Mexico as an independent State followed closely the political and 
juridical developments of countries of the same tradition with which legal drafters 
were acquainted, such as Spain and France. This close intellectual affinity 
encouraged the borrowing of ideas such as nation-state, constitutional separation of 
powers and codification of law. In this manner, Mexican law followed the trend of 
aiming to rationality by creating comprehensive and systematic codes with abstract 
and general formulations of uniform application. This set of rational laws could only 
find its source in the State, and more concretely in its legislative branch, leading to 
the classical civil law emphasis on statutory law and the correlated deductive legal 
method, although showing some contextual particularities. However, in the first 
years after the independence, it also became common to revise the legal models 
developed the United States and to experiment with some common law legal 
features. Nevertheless, some aspects of the civil law inheritance appeared to 
dominate strongly, even those common law inspired institutions.  
The Mexican legal community, as almost any civilian legal community, has been 
traditionally one that values uniformity and generality in law. In this way, the main 
and most valuable form of law has been positive law enacted by the legislative 
authority. Positive law is written law with a high level of generality and that must be 
applied syllogistically. In this sense, there seems to remain a strong connection with 
the text of the law, which denotes a certain ‘cult to legal text’ that is often associated 
to practitioners of the civilian tradition. The enacted law, participating on different 
rationalist elements, is considered to be almost scientific and of logical application. 
In the Mexican context, this rationalist dictates were held commonly associated with 
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the civilian mind with particular strength. As we have seen, after the independence of 
Mexico, the attachment to the ideas prescribing the unification of law was so strong 
that there was little space for negotiating the inclusion of different relevant areas of 
the complex societal life, even if this meant further difficulties. Since its early days 
of existence and until the end of the twentieth century, the ideas over which the 
Mexican legal system was built developed in a tense and conflictive relationship with 
different areas of the social world. The law did not seem to find a balance between 
the complexity of factual reality and the reduced scope recognised by the official 
law. Thus, this unresolved conflictive relationship between the wider society and the 
legal framework strongly marked the development of legal ideas and practices within 
that context. 
The imbalance between the legal concepts and beliefs over which the legal system 
was built, and the factual reality often lead to a practice of negotiating the institutions 
(but outside any formal institutionalised framework) and looking for alternative 
routes to guarantee order. In some sense, the pluralism and flexibility of the old 
colonial laws that apparently suited best the social structure had to be incorporated, 
but this time they were not achieved by means of the law. That does not mean that 
the actual legal system was obsolete, but that its operation was sometimes subject to 
cryptic exceptions and private negotiations,
121
 which actually contradicted the 
universalising tendency of modern legal ideas. The constant negotiation between law 
and reality forged the legal mentality, imprinting it with a distinctive pragmatism.
122
 
In this scenario many considerations external to the law are often analysed, playing a 
fundamental part in deciding about its operation, even if these deliberations remain 
undercover or are disguised. In fact, the Mexican legal culture is often portrayed in 
legal and non-legal literature as one characterized by ‘lie and inauthenticity’
123
 and 
allowing many inconsistencies between the law and the factual practices.
124
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However, the panorama described above should not be interpreted in an absolute 
manner, drawing upon conclusions of a definitive inoperability of the law. Pilar 
Domingo has noted that ‘[a]lthough there was no even application of the law, by no 
means was the Mexican state lawless, and a modern system of law operated, 
channelled through the court system, and also through the parallel system of special 
tribunals or administrative courts.’
125
 When the law is in operation, it is usually 
depicted as a very strict dogmatic structure often identified as an extreme kind of 
legalism (which is often called positivism within the context),
126
 which represents an 
exacerbation of the civil law distinctive traits. In other words, when the law enters in 
function tends to be rigid, legalistic and formalist, prescribing a mechanical 
application that pre-empts the development of some aspects of legal reasoning.
127
 In 
this legal system, reliance to the rules has been possibly taken too far, which often 
leads to the prioritisation of matters of form and procedure over substance, and the 
settlement of legal cases under those grounds. In a sense, the Mexican legal system 
appears to have realised the ‘formalist fiction’, by frequently isolating the law from 
foreign considerations, creating something that resembles a closed system – 
although, with the aid of the system of informality described above that allows non-
legal considerations in decision making.
128
 Through that way of performing, the law 
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acquires a high degree of certainty and objectivity, but also it becomes immutable 
and risks of ossification.
129
 
The model of law in this context has been perpetuated by the process of education 
through which legal practitioners have been formed for generations. As we have 
explained, the civilian bias, parallel to a set of particular socio-political 
circumstances, favoured the development of certain image of the law, which has 
circulated in the law schools for a long time. Through the educational process a set of 
concepts and beliefs about what the law is and how it functions (i.e. propositional 
knowledge) are delivered, but also concordant methodologies (i.e. procedural 
knowledge) are learned. In this context, legal professionals have been formed under 
the idea that the law is a set of written normative enunciates that must be applied to 
matching factual scenarios following a logical syllogism. For this reason, special 
attention is given to learning normative legal text, and there is no tendency to 
generate interpretative and argumentative skills. Legal enunciates are seen as 
forming a scientifically structured system. In this sense, conflicts between laws 
(known commonly as legal antinomies) are thought to be regularly ‘dissolved’ by 
determining their scope of (spatial, temporal, material and personal) influence.  
As we have seen, this has been the framework under which the law and different 
legal institutions, such as the judiciary, have developed. Herein we provide a 
representation of the concepts and ideas that form the core of the Mexican legal 
mind, which follows the methodology explained in our previous chapter. This 
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revolution of 1910. In some sense the history of Mexico and that of every Mexican is the struggle 
between the forms and formulas that try to enclose our being and the explosions with which our 
spontaneity takes revenge. […] Our legal and moral forms, instead, frequently mutilate our being, 
preventing our expression and the satisfaction of our vital appetites.’ Paz (n 123) 60-1. 
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particular schema has also influenced the form of understanding particular legal 
features, such as precedents, and the popular legal methods within the context. 
 
2.1 Cognitive-Affective Map of the Traditional Legal Mind and Apprach to Precedents 
The creation of a system of precedents in Mexico came precisely in the formative 
period of the legal system; when some American ideas about the law were receiving 
special attention. The necessity of unifying the interpretation of the constitution, 
codes and statutes, and contradictory resolutions helped introducing the common law 
idea of giving publicity to judicial decisions and granting them with authority. The 
idea of having a system of precedents was not precisely natural in the Mexican 
context, and probably it would not have acquired so much resonance if it was not 
supported by two of the most influential legal personalities of the XIX century: 
Ignacio Mariscal and Ignacio Vallarta. Thus, the manner in which the system of 
precedents was structured in this system is then closely linked to the way these jurists 
understood the institution.  
It can be attributed to Mariscal the creation of the Mexican system of precedents and 
influencing Vallarta’s ideas on the subject. Mariscal had first-hand insights about the 
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American legal system from the time he was serving as a diplomat in the United 
States, and, with the common-law system of precedents in mind, he argued against 
the ‘formula Otero’ and held that judicial resolutions should have general effects 
emulating the northern judicial review. Even though his ideas in this matter did not 
prosper, Mariscal insisted that amparo resolutions should have effects not only 
between the parties, but that they also determine the law for all. His plea gained force 
when it was understood that only in this form constitutional interpretation could 
remain uniform and, thus, he became the main inspiration on creating a system of 
precedents for this purpose. He argued that the Supreme Court’s amparo resolutions 
ought to be obligatory for the Court and the lower hierarchy tribunals, similarly to 
stare decisis. In his view, first, the Supreme Court ‘shall neither contradict nor 
change its opinion except in very rare cases where new foundations are argued or the 
facts that intervene are exceptional’
130
 and, second, ‘[i]ts interpretation, thus, 
becomes obligatory and conclusive for all departments of the federal government and 
the people.’
131
 Mariscal argued for an interpretative uniformity coming from the 
recognition of the gravitational force of the judicial decisions, to which further 
interpretations and practice had to circumscribe, but without considering the 
necessity to ‘stand to what has been decided’ in terms of a strict legal duty.  
On the other side, Vallarta had a more distant connection with the common law 
system of precedents, which he mostly learned through Mariscal. Although Vallarta 
has a genuine attraction towards the model of judiciary and precedents presented by 
Mariscal, he seems to start pushing it away of the original proposal and merging it 
with the understandings operating in the context. Vallarta thought that the 
precedential value of consecutive resolutions had to be objectivised and granted 
stronger binding force – thus, he articulated a model in which five resolutions in the 
same sense with no other in contradiction would become a binding precedent but 
only to the judiciaries. The strong binding force of precedents was conferred by 
providing criminal punishments to justices in case of inobservance. In this manner 
Vallarta formulated a system of precedents that would seem more according with 
civilian tradition and the requirement of judicial prudence that the complex political 
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context demanded. This form of precedents was finally included in the Amparo Act 
of 1882, also called Vallarta Act, defining the model of precedents in the whole legal 
system and until nowadays.   
Despite the fact that the system of precedent was integrated to the legal system, 
Mexican practitioners showed some problems adapting to the ideas behind them and 
to the sort of practice they suggested. In the making of the system of precedents 
Mexican jurists evidently were motivated by their impressions of the American 
system of precedents. However, the ideas about the separation of powers, the codes 
and the deductive method seemed to be more accurate to them. In this form, the 
common law inspired system of precedents suffered several modifications in order to 
be more coherent with the highly-valued continental ideas. Precedents were reframed 
along the lines of legislative legal sources. Thus, precedents were reputed binding in 
a strong sense similar to legislative-made rules, and a set of strict rules of application 
were enacted. The phenomenon of hybridisation caused some peculiar eccentricities 
in the system of precedents, which Emilio Rabasa noticed describes as follows: 
The federal code [of 1908], heir of all the wrong things found in the preceding laws has 
a section dedicated to the formation of precedents. This is as extravagant as attempting a 
common law established by statutory law! […] Is the artifice of the lay valorising the 
respectability of resolutions to establish the customary, the spontaneous, that which 
sprouts from nature itself. Something similar to an industrial procedure to falsify old 




This understanding of precedents was set and perpetuated not only by the particular 
legislative rules defining the way of functioning of judge-made law, but also, and 
most relevantly, by way the legal community has been taught to think about and use 
precedents in practice. As we have seen, despite the fact that in the Mexican legal 
system precedents have had a long lasting official recognition these legal sources 
were generally overlooked. If we analyse legal education, we will find, as we have 
already explained, an extreme emphasis to legislative legal sources and to the 
deductive method. Legal precedents are insufficiently approached by the legal 
curriculum – f.e. García Máynez influential book introduces precedents in less than 
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ten pages, where he mainly explains the statutory law that gives rise to the federal 
system of precedents. The author, following his general understanding of law, uses 
the language of all-or-nothing bindigness, validity and applicability to describe the 
operation of legal precedents. He argues, that precedents have ‘scopes of validity’ 
determining their application in analogical form to legislative legal source.
133
 In law 
schools, generally, there is no action directed to create competence with regards to 
the use of legal precedents. Precedents are not presented as legal sources requiring 
different skills than (the very narrow) methods taught for using statutes. These 
factors, in a way, might help explaining the problem of precedents reported by the 
legal community – especially, if we take into account the current wave of legal 
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3. Challenging Legal Minds: The Rule of Law Project in Mexico 
 
“Our knowledge is not like a house that sits on a 
foundation of bricks that have to be solid, but more like a 
raft that floats on the sea with all the pieces of the raft 
fitting together and supporting each other.” 
Paul Thagard, Coherence in Thought and Action 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Legal minds are not finished products. They can always be challenged by changes in 
the environment or, most commonly, in the relevant social communications. Our way 
of thinking about the law or concrete legal tasks is permanently jeopardised by 
possible change. These frameworks may remain more or less unaltered for periods of 
time or they may be subject to a linear evolutionary dynamic, but there is no 
guarantee that a more radical change will not happen. The cognitive-affective 
predispositions of the subscribers of a legal tradition could be strongly challenged by 
changes in the relevant legal communications, be that rules, doctrines, theories, and 
so on. Referring to change in legal traditions, Patrick Glenn once pointed out that: ‘a 
small initial variation of wind direction, multiplied many times over in effect by 
other causal factors in weather development, may mean the difference between a 
local storm or a hurricane.’
1
 Glenn mentions that, as in the meteorological metaphor, 
it is uncertain ‘what will happen to a minor doctrinal variation, seen as ingenious, 
interesting and benign at the time of its formulation, once its full implications are 
realised over several generations.’
2
 Glenn is right that legal changes of any sort 
might unleash further reconfigurations, some of them arising as strong storms with 
the capacity of washing away deeply engrained traditions. 
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Yet what Glenn and most of comparativists are missing is that changes of this sort 
also call for cognitive changes. The legal rules, doctrines or theories operating in a 
legal system can change, and with them the concepts, beliefs, ideas and ways of 
practicing law may also suffer modifications. In this sense, legal changes might 
translate into a challenge to the subjects’ minds, which ought to introduce new 
knowledge features. Thus, legal changes might be perceived as a more or less 
aggressive intrusion into the cognitive life of the members of a legal community, 
which might as well trigger a set of revisions and modifications in the operating 
corpus of knowledge. The effects that legal change has on the cognitive-affective 
structures of the legal community can be of different magnitudes, and need to be 
assessed in a case by case basis. 
This chapter looks into the phenomenon of legal change and its effects on knowledge 
structures in a particular scenario. It explores the chain of changes that the rise of the 
idea of the rule of law in the early 1990s unleashed in the Mexican context, focusing 
mainly on the cognitive-affective implications for the local community. This chapter 
broadly explains the rise of the global idea of the rule of law (as comprised in the 
development promotion programs) and the way it has been communicated to a 
number of jurisdictions around the world. It attempts to identify the key ideas, 
concepts, beliefs and values behind the complex rule of law reformation program and 
the way they have challenged Mexican legal practitioners. It aims to account for 
some collateral changes, such as the ways of understanding the role of judicial 
resolutions or legal reasoning style, and to account for the cognitive problems these 
modifications involve. It will be argued that the rule of law ideal, and the chain of 
changes it unleashed, can be properly considered as the prelude to the problem of 
legal precedents experienced by the Mexican legal community. 
This chapter rehearses the most representative approaches used by comparative legal 
studies to account for the changes derived from the introduction of foreign legal 
features into different contexts. Therefore, it analyses the suitability of legal 
comparatists’ understanding of travelling legal features as ‘legal transplants’ or as 
‘legal irritants’ to account for the dynamics of change unleashed by the introduction 
of the ‘rule of law’ in the Mexican context. Additionally, it analyses how the 
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circulation of a new discourse involves the reconfiguration of prevailing knowledge 
structures, and might develop into a cognitive problem for the members of the legal 
community. Consequently, herein we will need to expand the comparative approach 
with some insights from the cognitive sciences in order to account for changes 
happening at the level of the knowledge structures held by legal practitioners. As we 
shall see, only by looking at the cognitive dimension of legal change can we account 
for the magnitude of the transformations mobilised by the rule of law ideal and 
reflect on the practical problems that the Mexican legal community is experiencing 
with tasks as precedent-based reasoning.  
3.2 Legal Change and Cognitive Change 
The rule of law movement worldwide has had the deliberate aim to influence the 
legal, political, social, and economic setting in recipient countries. Donor-agents 
have channelled significant amounts of money and other resources for countries to 
adopt the framework previously described, and many recipient countries, some more 
eagerly than others, have attempted aligning to it. However, the instrumentalism of 
the reformation efforts has marked their further analysis with a profound evaluative 
tendency. As different parts of the rule of law packages have been implemented, the 
response has usually been that of assessing its success according to specific purposes, 
which could be identifiable with a certain way of institutional performance (e.g., 
independent functioning of the judicial branch or fast and efficient processing cases), 
or the more general objectives of strengthening democracy and achieving economic 
prosperity. 
This type of analyses seems to be overly attached to the teleology of the reform 
program. Nevertheless, focusing on the expected outcomes of certain reforms might 
be making us miss the woods for the trees, in the sense that the search for very 
specific effects might be making us blind to a set of unexpected changes unleashed 
by the introduction of ideas such as the rule of law. The reformation undertaken in a 
legal system in order to adapt to the rule of law framework might entail 
reconfigurations even though they might be somehow different from those that were 
foreseen. While looking for the accomplishment of an ideal legal performance or an 
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extra-legal agenda, we might be missing what is actually happening within the 
recipient legal system – that is, the real effects of the introduction of foreign features, 
even if they are not the desired ones.  
This research moves away from the evaluative tendency permeating the rule of law 
implementation studies. Thus, it does not aim to evaluate the rule of law agenda or 
the means used to accomplish it, it does not look towards analysing the particular 
institutional designs introduced in the Mexican legal system. Finally it does not aim 
to assess whether determinate (mediate or immediate) reform objectives have been 
accomplished. Instead, our objective is to understand the dynamics of change that a 
complex foreign legal feature like the rule of law program, both as an abstract idea 
and as package of concrete reforms, set into motion.  
Either willingly embraced by the recipients or imposed by external forces,
3
 the rule 
of law reformation program entails a set of foreign features that might not converge 
with the pre-existing framework. Foreign features developed by international 
institutions or foreign governments rest on a set of beliefs, ideas, values, etc. that 
might seem alien to the recipients.  The rule of law as an abstract idea carries a set of 
understandings and values regarding the legal, social and political order, but also the 
particular foreign institutions designed under this general ideal might be sensed 
unfamiliar in the new context. In this respect, foreign features are likely to challenge 
the cognitive-affective framework held by a given group, and consequently produce 
a set of changes (even if they were unexpected) in the local knowledge structures.  
Comparative legal studies have for a long time attempted to understand the 
dimension of legal change, especially that deriving from the borrowing and transfer 
of legal features from one context to the other. In this endeavour, comparatists have 
often taken recourse to metaphors to explain the dynamics of change experienced by 
the recipient legal context and the travelling legal features. The most widespread 
explicative metaphor is that of ‘legal transplants’, which is often adopted as the 
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default language to talk about travelling legal ideas, patterns, institutions, and so on. 
Thus, herein we will start by questioning the helpfulness of this way of thinking 
about legal borrowings and transfers in order to understand further discursive and 
cognitive changes. Then, we will explore Teubner’s alternative metaphor, which 
characterises travelling legal features as ‘legal irritants’. We will assess the capacity 
of this metaphor to provide us with a better understanding of change, including 
change at a cognitive level. Additionally, we aim to complement these 
understandings by introducing certain insights developed by the cognitive sciences 
regarding changes in complex knowledge frameworks.  
3.2.1 Legal Transplants  
Alan Watson first used the term ‘legal transplants’ to describe the ‘moving of a rule 
or a system of law from one country to another or from one people to another.’
4
 He 
uses the medical metaphor of transplanting body organs as an analogy of what 
happens with cross jurisdictional transposition of legal features. He argues that ‘a 
successful legal transplant – like that of a human body organ – will grow in its new 
body, and become part of that body just as the rule or institution would have 
continued to develop in its parental system’
5
 adding that ‘[s]ubsequent development 
in the host system should not be confused with rejection.’
6
 In essence, for Watson, 
legal features are easily transferred between jurisdictions without significant 
adaptations.  
The work of Watson has deeply marked the language and interest of comparativists 
with respect to the transposition of foreign legal features. In a way, the popularisation 
of the use of the metaphor of transplantation has led to a particular reading of the 
process of transferring legal features. The main concerns of the literature regarding 
transplants are the conditions in which they take place, and the chances of success or 
failure to assimilate foreign legal transfers. Thus, law (comparable to body organs or 
tissues) can be transplanted to a new body, which can accept or reject it. This 
approach has turned into a debate about the possibility or impossibility of 
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transplants; a question that has been tightly linked to the discussion on the 
connections between law and society. Thus, the discussion about the (im)possibility 
of legal transplants occurs in a continuum on whose one end are located those that 
argue the weak connection between law and society and the possibility of successful 
transplants, and on the other those that argue in favour of a strong connection 
between the legal system and its context that precludes any chance of success. 
Firstly, there is Alan Watson, who, after analysing the legal history of the Western 
world, has concluded that legal transplants from one context to another have been 
relatively frequent, successful and the main motor of legal evolution. For him legal 
features travel with relative ease from country to country regardless of the context, 
proving wrong the theories that claim that all law mirrors society. He argues that law 
is out of context most of the time: societies change and the law remains the same, 
law is sometimes imposed to conquered countries, or voluntarily introduced by 
legislators, jurists or practitioners into foreign territories without this representing a 
real threaten for the transplanted law.
7
 In this a-contextual legal view law is said to 
travel easily across jurisdictions, becoming rooted disregarding the conditions of the 
body into which it was implanted.  
On the other end, we find Pierre Legrand, who, in what probably is the most 
sustained critique of Watson, pictures law as contextually engrained. Legrand’s 
major criticism to Watson is his reductionism of the legal phenomenon, which 
arguably narrows down the life of the law to rules and leads to misleading 
conclusions about the connections between law and society, and consequently, about 
the  possibility of legal transplants. He argues that anyone agreeing with Watson’s 
position must accept the rather simplistic model of ‘rules-as-bare-propositional-
statements’, because only bearing this in mind it would be possible to argue ‘that 
“the law” […] is somewhat autonomous entity unencumbered by historical, 
epistemological, or cultural baggage.’
8
 Instead, Legrand reminds us that the rules are 
never self-explanatory, but that ‘the meaning of the rule is, accordingly, a function of 
the surrounding epistemological assumptions which are themselves historically and 
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 Any rules that enter a specific legal system are processed by 
an epistemic community, which is immersed into a specific historically and 
culturally constructed mentalité. Thus, the cultural background of the recipient 
cannot be ignored, as it is the reason for the existence of a particular viewpoint in the 
recipient land, and which will lead to a process of modification of the transplanted 
figure in a manner that it cannot be argued to be the same. Therefore, he concludes 
that since it is impossible to transport socially built meanings from one culture to 
another in a significative way, hence legal transplants simply cannot happen.
10
 In that 
manner, law can never be out of context. 
Watson’s account has received multiple criticisms with regards to the manner in 
which he draws the relationship between law and society,
11
 but Legrand’s seems to 
go beyond them, challenging not only his sociological assumption about law and 
society, but also his epistemological understandings. He reminds us that legal 
features are eventually processed by cognitively ‘loaded’ legal practitioners. Legrand 
does not claim that there is an objective and necessary connection between law and 
society, but that the minds of the recipients of those developments are irremediably 
situated in a context and, therefore, will inevitably reconstruct the ‘transplanted’ 
feature under a completely different light. Legrand’s approach is interesting due to 
the introduction of cognitive considerations into the debate of legal transplants. 
Nevertheless, his argument is built to refute the possibility of legal transplants. 
Legrand does not appreciate that travelling features might have an effect in the legal 
minds that he pictures as immutable or impenetrable.  
The metaphor of transplants could have the potentiality to open the discussion about 
the reactions of the new recipient body due to the introduction of a foreign organ, as 
for example the occurrence of infections or reactions to toxicity. Nevertheless, 
Watson’s lack of interest in this area of research seems to have marked the limits of 
the metaphor – in which case these reactions seem to be considered as signs of 
rejection. As Nelken has pointed out, the frequently used metaphor of transplants 
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somehow leads to the assessment of success or failure of that operation, which 
explains the high number of evaluative studies on this subject.
12
 Teubner also argues 
that the underlying metaphor of transplants is misleading because it gives the 
impression that transposing certain legal features translates into a narrow binary 
alternative: either they are repulsed or accepted, hiding the important evolutionary 
dynamics unleashed when foreign features are inserted into different legal systems.
13
 
As Teubner notes, what happens in a legal system when determinate foreign features 
are introduced is a more complex chain of effects that the metaphor of legal 
transplants tends to hide. 
3.2.2 Legal Irritants 
Teubner suggests that the alternative biological metaphor of irritation should be used 
to describe what goes on when a legal idea, rule or institution is introduced 
elsewhere. In biology or medicine ‘irritants’ are agents or stimuli that cause 
inflammation or discomfort on the body They might be substances or allergenic 
agents recognised as foreign and potentially harmful for the organism and that cause 
some protective reaction. In a similar manner, foreign legal features are irritants in so 
far as once introduced they might cause perturbations resembling an ‘allergic 
reaction’. Teubner argues that ‘when a foreign rule is imposed in a domestic culture 
[…] it is not transplanted into another organism, rather it works as a fundamental 
irritation which triggers a whole series of new and unexpected events.’
14
 Thus, 
travelling legal features are legal irritants that, once introduced in a new context, will 
unleash unforeseen reactions. 
Teubner argues that the irritation produced by institutional transfers in the new 
context happens in two different levels. On the one hand, the foreign rule or 
institution causes an internal irritation; i.e. it causes imbalances in the legal discourse 
and ‘it […] irritates the minds and emotions of tradition-bound lawyers.’
15
 On the 
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other – and this is the core of Teubner’s thesis – legal transfers may act as external 
irritants, causing discomfort of the law’s binding arrangements. The foreign feature 
acts then as ‘an outside noise which creates wild perturbations in the interplay of 
discourses within these arrangements and forces them to reconstruct internally not 
only their own rules but to reconstruct from scratch the alien element itself.’
16
 In his 
view, foreign elements may create disruptions in the other social system and trigger 
the reconstruction of the social discourses to which law is closely tied, and this will 
eventually act back irritating the legal scope of the institution in a co-evolutionary 
dynamic leading to a new point of equilibrium.
17
 For this reasons Teubner concludes 
that ‘legal irritants cannot be domesticated; they are not transformed from something 
alien into something familiar, not adapted to a new cultural context, rather they will 
unleash an evolutionary dynamic on which the external rule’s meaning will be 
reconstructed and the internal context will undergo fundamental change.’
18
 
According to Teubner, the degree of irritation will be dependent on the strength with 
which the new law is coupled in binding arrangements to other social processes. In 
legal areas loosely coupled with social arrangements the transfer of institutions is 
comparatively easier than when the law is tightly coupled to binding arrangements 
with social processes, due to a lesser resistant response from different social 
discourses.
19
 However, not even in cases of loose coupling does the transfer work 
mechanically or as easy as a transplant. This means that even in situations where the 
law is technical or isolated from social contextual arrangements, legal transfers do 
not operate in a simple manner, but they have to be assimilated to the internal 
discourse and integrated by individuals that form part of a particular legal culture.
20
 
As Teubner himself notes, the internal dynamics of irritation of the legal discourse 
recalls Legrand’s culturalism, whereas the contextual knowledge, legal reasoning 
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Still, Teubner implicitly acknowledges that travelling legal features have some 
effects on the cognitive-affective structures held by legal practitioners – something 
that Legrand does not seem to admit in his one-way process of acculturation.
22
 Thus, 
legal transfers are expected to generate irritations of different degrees depending on 
the level of challenge they pose to the pre-existing structures. Conflicting legal 
transfers are then expected to have an irritating effect in the recipients’ minds that 
will push them towards reconfigurations. As noted by Teubner, this kind of ‘internal’ 
irritation seems inherent to the process of transferring legal features from a context to 
another, regardless of their relationship with wider social arrangements. 
Nevertheless, the author does not provide a full exploration of the dynamics of 
internal irritation as his main concern is to explore the processes of external 
irritation.   
Teubner’s alternative model of transfers as legal irritants is grounded on his 
epistemological approach consistent with systems theory. In this view law becomes a 
closed self-referential system of communication that constructs a discourse of its 
own, although often having some connection with other discourses.
23
 Law has 
achieved autonomy through technification and positivisation, but it still conserves a 
certain degree of connectedness with specific social discourses – something that 
Teubner calls binding arrangements. For Teubner ‘contemporary legal discourse is 
no longer an expression of society and culture tout court; rather it ties up closely only 
with some of its areas, only on specific occasions and only to different fragments of 
society.’
24
 Thus, in this view, society is fragmented – and legal institutions are not 
connected to the whole of society but coupled to specific fragments of it. It is within 
this ‘map’ of the law that Teubner’s builds the mechanics of irritation; a conception 
that accepts the occasional existence of connections between segments of the legal 
and social discourses. 
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The lineage of Teubner’s metaphor has prevented its wider use, since its coming as a 
whole package means that by using it one has to align to the underlying theory and 
description of the law and society connection.
25
 Yet arguably, one need not 
necessarily subscribe to the systems theory framework in order to use the metaphor 
of legal irritants in a meaningful way. Even if the idea of the legal system as an 
autonomous entity capable of experiencing some sort of cognitive irritation is 
abandoned, Teubner’s approach offers some important insights. The idea of legal 
irritants suggests that foreign legal features can challenge or ‘irritate’ tradition-bound 
legal minds. Another important advantage of the legal irritants metaphor is throwing 
light over the Janus-faced evolutionary process that the introduction of legal features 
might entail: one that might involve reconfigurations of the foreign element and the 
internal cognitive-affective framework. The literature about transplants has often 
overlooked the fact that travelling legal features carry a new set of ideas with them, 
which explains the lack of analysis regarding the adaptations required after the 
introduction of a foreign feature. Additionally, only a few approaches take into 
account the existence of a set of predispositions tied to the recipients, which is the 
merit of Legrand’s culturalist model. Teubner’s model stands in the understanding of 
these two premises: that the legal features are not neutral information and that these 
are received by cognitively ‘loaded’ subjects whose knowledge structures might be 
in need of reconfiguration if the new features are active or simply not let to oblivion. 
Acknowledging these points allows one to observe the possible mismatches between 
the understandings travelling with the foreign features and those inhabiting the 
domestic minds, which could produce irritation and unleash an evolutionary process 
until the perturbed stability is finally recovered. 
Teubner’s account focuses more on the so called dimension of external irritation, in 
other words, the irritation of the extra-legal discourse connected to the legal transfer, 
and lesser attention is paid to the dynamics of internal legal irritation. Nevertheless, 
the separation of these two dimensions arguably becomes elusive if one focuses on 
the irritation happening at the cognitive level. Due to Teubner’s theoretical affiliation 
to the language of systems theory, his main objective is to explain the interaction 
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between systems, i.e. the legal, political, social, economical systems, where they 
resemble actual subjects that keep memories, think and communicate. In this sense, 
the irritation that he is more interested in analysing is that of the impersonal systemic 
discourses. However, if focusing on the dimension of human cognition, it becomes 
somehow more difficult to create a clear division between external and internal 
discourses, as members of the legal community posses an entangled set of knowledge 
features. 
Nevertheless, Teubner’s account can also be meaningful and useful if one opts for a 
psychological perspective – that is, if the emphasis in systems of communication is 
relaxed and more attention is paid on the dynamics of change for actual human 
beings. Even if Teubner’s objectives were not to discuss psychological processes, it 
is not necessarily incompatible to do so while using his metaphor of legal irritation. 
In fact, the metaphor of irritation is also helpful to understand the disruptions 
happening at the level of individual cognition due to legal change, as there are 
actually some similarities between the systemic processes described by Teubner and 
cognitive reconfigurations. 
3.2.3 Cognitive Change 
As indicated, legal changes are usually followed by various cognitive-affective 
reconfigurations. Legal practitioners might need to change their beliefs, concepts, 
values, but also the forms of doing certain things. The accounts of Legrand and 
Teubner offer some indications on how legal changes (i.e. the circulation of new 
legal communications) involve not just discursive changes, but that they also have 
cognitive consequences. Nevertheless, their analysis of this subject rather falls short 
due to their central theoretical commitments consistent with postmodernism and the 
systems theory account, respectively. We can, however, expand our understandings 
on the subject if we take into account some insights of the cognitive sciences, where 
the cognitive consequences of change have been more widely studied.  
First, foreign legal features might communicate new beliefs, concepts and values, 
which might or might not be compatible with the cognitive-affective structures of the 
recipients. Second, these recipients are individuals holding a specific cognitive-
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affective framework and that require doing some adaptation in face of the novel 
communications. These cognitive changes or adaptations are, however, of different 
magnitudes depending of the relationship between the above mentioned factors. 
Commonly, in epistemology three forms of epistemic change have been 
distinguished: suppression, expansion and revision.
26
 In suppression, a specific belief 
is removed from the knowledge structure. In law, for example, this could happen 
when a less determinant legal rule is removed from a statute. In expansion, a belief is 
added to the knowledge structure. For example, a legal expansion could be the 
inclusion of a new hypothetical case within the scope of a legal concept. Revision is 
the most intense form of epistemic change as a belief is added to the knowledge 
structure, and simultaneously other beliefs are removed from new knowledge set. 
Epistemology usually works with a narrow understanding of knowledge as 
propositions. This, however, has not deterred the use of this classification by more 
comprehensive cognitive approaches, which are more consistent with the expanded 
perspective on knowledge taken by this thesis.  
According to coherentist theories, especially Thagard’s,
27
 the revision of previously 
held knowledge sets happens when a new belief is added and causes modifications in 
the relations of coherence and incoherence between the new belief and the pre-
existing framework. In other words, belief revision takes place when a new piece of 
knowledge becomes accepted and some previously accepted (but now incoherent) 
knowledge becomes rejected in order to preserve the overall coherence of the 
knowledge structures.
28
 The advantage of Thagard’s framework is that it takes into 
account both ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ factors in change, in so far as it acknowledges that 
legal change might involve both cognitive and affective reconfigurations: ‘a change 
of heart and mind.’ 
Belief revision as a response to knowledge incoherences closely resembles the chain 
of reconfigurations derived from the discursive imbalances that Teubner described at 
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the systemic level, but this time happening at the level of the mind. For example, 
Teubner argued that an idea such as ‘good faith’ would most likely have an irritant 
effect on British law due to its un-connectedness with the set of local discursive 
arrangements. If, however, one focused on the minds of British lawyers, a similar 
dynamic of irritation could be appreciated. The idea of good faith might be foreign 
and incoherent with other of understandings, leading to multiple mental 
reconfigurations. The search for equilibrium that Teubner describes is no more than a 
search for coherence, just as the one that happens within the individual minds in their 
attempt to make sense.   
Nevertheless, not all belief revisions are the same. They are of different magnitudes. 
Thagard has acknowledged a psychologically realistic approach to belief revision 
must account for the fact that some revisions are harder to make than others and that 
some revisions have more global effects.
29
 When describing scientific belief 
revisions, Thagard notes:  
Scientific belief revision comes in various degrees. A new proposition describing 
recently collected evidence may become accepted easily unless it does not fit well with 
accepted views. Such acceptance would be a simple case of expansion. However, if the 
new evidence is not easily explained by existing hypotheses, scientists may generate a 
new hypothesis to explain it. If the new hypothesis conflicts with existing hypotheses, 
either because it contradicts them or competes as an alternative hypothesis for other 
evidence, then major belief revision is required. Such revision may lead to theory 




While arguably the nature of the legal enterprise is quite different from that of 
science, several of Thagard’s observations equally apply. The magnitude of the 
revision of the legal knowledge structures caused by a new feature depends on the 
level of conflict it engenders in the established framework and the consequent 
amount and magnitude of the reconfigurations it entails. Adding or removing a rule 
that is consonant with the established ideas might not be a difficult task for legal 
practitioners – and in this case, Alan Watson might seem right to argue that legal 
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changes are generally uncomplicated procedures. Nevertheless, adding a principle as 
‘good faith’ in a common law context might not be as easy as the above. This process 
might actually lead to incoherence between different legal ideas, values or concepts, 
and a stronger reframing of the local knowledge. Some other changes, such as the 
introduction of the idea of codification back in the Enlightenment, might however 
involve even a stronger challenge and reconfiguration of vital ideas about the nature 
of law and legal practice.
31
  
Radical changes are fairly exceptional, but when they happen they involve a radical 
gestalt shift. Restructuring the cognitive-affecting maps used to navigate through life 
cannot be expected to be an easy and automatic task. Thus, single individuals or 
groups experiencing such a revolutionary conjuncture might struggle for some time 
before they produce new coherent mental structures, and learn to think and act 
accordingly. In legal studies it is uncommon to attend to the cognitive dimension of 
legal change and how legal practitioners transit from a cognitive-affective framework 
to another. Even if it is not uncommon to find the acknowledgment that ‘[a] drastic 
change could reduce the most experienced practitioner almost to the level of a 
beginner’
32
, a detailed account of how change is experienced by practitioners at a 
cognitive level is missing. 
This underexplored subject in legal comparative studies represents a gap in our 
understanding of legal transitions. However, some valuable insights of how changes 
involve cognitive reconfigurations can be found in the history of science. The history 
of science has often pointed at several examples of revolutionary cognitive changes 
and the problems and difficulties that scientific communities experience while 
restructuring their knowledge framework. For example, in ‘The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions’, Kuhn conveys an image of the acute confusion that 
paradigm shifts can bring about in scientific communities. He explains how 
Copernicus complained about the inconsistency of astronomical investigations 
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following the shift from the Ptolemaic model, and Einstein explained that the 
quantum revolution created the sense of losing ground and any firm foundation.
33
 
Nevertheless, Kuhn portrays these transitions as happening without mid-steps. Nancy 
Nersessian, who has attempted to capture the dynamics of conceptual change in 
sciences at a cognitive level, has noted that the process of conceptual change in 
science does not happen abruptly.
34
 As Nersessian indicates conceptual change does 
not happen ‘with the last act’ or when ‘the pieces fall together’ – it is something that 
happens to the relevant community over an extended period of time.
35
   
Revolutionary change at a cognitive level is lived as a revision and replacement of 
different fragments of complex knowledge structures. This radical change cannot be 
expected to happen instantly. Revising, substituting, reorganising and, finally, 
finding a new coherent balance between one’s belief and ideas is time consuming. 
The process entails an approximation to a new knowledge that at first might appear 
fairly unfamiliar, and replacing segments of the pre-existing knowledge framework.
36
 
Paul Thagard notes than during conceptual revolutions individuals need some time to 
create new mental nodes and links that allow them to replace or reorganise their 
ideas, but also it might take some time for the new structures to become socially 
shared.
37
 Thagard shows that in conceptual revolutions individuals are likely to 
merge old and new ideas for some time until they attain full conversion.
38
  
Nevertheless, not only scientists suffer due to major reconfigurations. Any single 
individual or member of a community that sees his mental structures challenged will 
experience confusion. In these revolutionary moments it is not surprising to find that 
individuals hold mismatching concepts and beliefs, that they might possess some 
explicit understandings that are not fully developed, or that they lack the necessary 
tacit knowledge. In the same form, legal practitioners experiencing a ‘legal 
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revolution’ are likely to hold a set of incompatible ideas or, even having replaced 
some of their former concepts, they might have not mastered the necessary practical 
competences. In fact, strong changes of this sort might cause legal practitioners not 
only to become conceptually confused, but also to lose their expertise regarding 
practical matters.  
When legal change involves the fundamental restructuring of both conceptual and 
procedural knowledge, an emergence of diverse knowledge problems between 
tradition-bound legal practitioners can be expected. In this sense, when legal changes 
represent important reconfigurations, they can genuinely ‘stun’ legal operators, who 
will face problems to adapt to the new circumstances. When deeply embedded legal 
ideas change, they arguably lead to a different way of thinking about and operating 
within the law. Legal practitioners, then, may need to ‘reinvent’ themselves to 
function in the new circumstances.
39
 Thus communities would take some time to 
adapt to the new circumstances, sometimes displaying their attachment to fragments 
of older viewpoints and forms of operation.  
Glenn uses a sound example to talk about this delay in adaptation by recounting the 
story of a group of British soldiers during Second World War. The soldiers were 
watched by a time-motion expert that searched towards improving procedures. The 
expert was particularly puzzled by a couple of soldiers of different gun crews who, a 
moment before firing, came to a rigid attentive posture for a three second interval, 
extending throughout the discharge of the gun. He showed the pictures to a colonel 
searching for an explanation. The colonel was also puzzled but at the end he said ‘I 
have it. They are holding the horses.’
40
 In a similar manner, foreign legal features 
and the wave of changes that they introduce have the potentiality to irritate 
cognitively legal practitioners to the point that they might keep on ‘holding the 
horses’ in the times of fast-speed cars.  
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This could be precisely the problem of the Mexican legal community. Legal 
practitioners are experiencing a strong challenge into their deepest assumptions about 
the legal enterprise, causing increasing confusion regarding several aspects of 
practice, and most relevantly for this thesis, about the role and use of precedents. In 
what follows,  the form in which the rule of law as a foreign feature was introduced 
in the Mexican context is taken up for discussion: it can be shown that it engendered  
conflict and activated the reconfiguration of various pre-existing structures, thus 
causing the problem of precedent that is under study.  
In Mexico the legal changes taking place during the past years have represented 
authentic revolutions for the knowledge of the legal community. The rule of law 
reform activated a revolutionary reconfiguration. Overall, the change has entailed a 
transition from a rigid understanding of the law towards one that allows more 
flexibility. This change does not only affect an isolated belief or concept, but the 
entire understanding of the law. Consequently, the community of professionals in 
that context has been forced to reconsider several aspects of their practice, including 
the value of features like legal precedents and their practical role.  
As the transition is still being experienced, contradicting knowledge fragments are 
likely to be coexisting close to each other. It is also possible that new cognitive tools 
have not yet been mastered. Therefore, in these conditions we may expect the 
emergence of several inconsistencies and problems. The reported doubts about the 
form precedents should be used in practice and the different problems that the legal 
community senses when engaging with these features ought to be understood as 
happening in this context of major cognitive restructuring. In other words, the 
problem reported by the legal community is the consequence of being ‘trapped’ 
between two knowledge frameworks and not having yet built the necessary practical 
competence to perform under the new conditions. The Mexican legal community is 
experiencing a strong revision of its cognitive-affective structures, including the 
understandings about judicial precedent. As the process is not yet completed, legal 
practitioners display inconsistent ideas and do not seem to have built the necessary 
practical expertise required under the new conditions. Let us then explore the 
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problem that precedents are creating in the Mexican legal system in connection the 
ongoing revolutionary change introduced by the rule of law ideal.  
3.3 Towards the Rule of Law Ideal 
At the beginning of the 1990s the world witnessed the rise of the new global 
framework: liberalism, democracy and the rule of law became the mantra that 
resounded all around the globe. Although not genealogically connected, these three 
ideas seem to have been enclosed together in their contemporary expression, 
constituting the global framework of operation. Tamanaha reminds us that despite 
the fact that ‘the rule of law, liberalism, and democracy are often thought to make a 
happy triumvirate’,
41
 their relationship is filled with tensions. Nevertheless, the 
tensions and contradictions between these three ideas have not stopped them from 
‘travelling’ together and creating tighter links, a process which, in some sense, has 
redefined their historical meaning. While the focus here is on the rule of law, to 
understand it in the context of promotion programs it is important to address it as part 
of that tripartite ideal, and to acknowledge the relationships of causality drawn 
between them.  
3.3.1 The Global Development Framework: Liberalism, Democracy and the Rule of 
Law 
Since the late 1980s the world was under the impression that there was a clear 
consensus about what developing countries should do to achieve prosperity, and the 
answer appeared to be in developing a market economy, strengthening democracy 
and the rule of law – that is, following the so called Washington Consensus. Some 
people rushed to announce ‘the end of history’ stating that in the universalisation of 
Western liberal democracy we were witnessing marked the end of humanity’s 
ideological evolution.
42
 The belief on the rightness of this path caused a strong global 
mobilisation – on the one side developed countries created offices, aid programs, 
drafted value statements, and on the other, developing nations commenced to adopt 
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the new global values and carried on a series of reforms aiming to alter their local 
structures and align them to the global framework. Since the 1980s, but more 
intensively in the 1990s, Western states and international institutions embracing 
these ideas prescribed to less developed countries a set of economic and political 
reforms that aimed at the liberalisation of trade and foreign investment, deregulation, 
privatisation of public assets, redirection of public expenditure, protection of 
property rights, enhancing democracy and the rule of law. 
The idea of liberalising the economy was the first to start rooting at a global scale. 
The economic crises experienced by many Latin American countries operating under 
the model of ‘import substitution industrialisation’
43
 and the fall of the communist 
bloc helped situating economic liberalism as the new global establishment. Thus, 
countries all over the world, some willingly and others in response to pressure, 
started a process of reformation in order to privatise state-owned enterprises, 
liberalise financial and commercial markets, and change labour and tax policies, 
which reflected into the drafting and performance of economic legal institutions. At 
this early stage of this global wave, the role of international organisations, such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, was to incentivise economic 
development in third world countries by providing economic aids conditioned to an 
‘apolitical’ reform agenda with strict economic aims. 
However, the economic development project eventually took a ‘political turn’ after 
underdevelopment started to be attributed to bad governance in the World Bank’s 
report on Sub-Saharan Africa.
44
 The idea that a country’s political life could have 
implications for its socioeconomic development became a common ground of donor 
nations and institutions in the 1990s. Thus, many of the members of the donor 
community incorporated democracy to their developmental agendas, although other 
preferred to continue acting under the less political connotation of good governance. 
Supporters of democracy assistance initiatives often found an organic connection 
between the economic and political agenda: on the one hand, economic reform would 
strengthen democracy by increasing economic wealth and shrinking the scope of 
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influence of the state, and on the other, democracy would help the market economy 
by increasing transparency, accountability, the operation of the rule of law, 
strengthening a system of rights and institutional limits.
45
 
This was not the first time in recent history that democracy received such attention 
and promotion, but the magnitude and reach of this wave of democratisation was 
unprecedented. The first (1960s and 1970s) and second (1980s) waves of 
democratisation, responding to the aim of eradicating communist regimes, did not 
achieve the same level of acceptance and global reach as the third democratic wave 
(1990s). The end of the cold war and the breakup of the Soviet Union brought what 
was called the ‘worldwide democratic revolution’, and by the early 1990s democracy 
had turned into a global cause and the core priority of policy makers. Democracy 
assistance programs proliferated fast, and by mid-1990s democracy aid had expanded 
all around the developing and ex-communist world. A mix of factors intervened in 
the strengthening of the wave: many countries joined the global inertia due to the 
exhaustion of their domestic economic and political models, but also due to 
international pressure or persuasion. Democratisation also became a necessary 
precondition for membership in international organisations and participation of 
economic aids and programs, which pressed non-democratic countries towards 
democratic conversion. However, the embracement of democratisation effort by 




The ideas of economic liberalism and democracy were later on connected to the rule 
of law ideal, which was understood as the means to implement them. The rule of law 
became central to this enterprise; on the one hand, it was conceived as the necessary 
means to secure legal predictability, to protect property rights and the enactment of 
contracts – basic elements of the market economy – and on the other, it was seen as 
compulsory to provide the system of civil and political rights, and to limit the 
operation of governmental institutions typical of a democratic regime. These 
relationships might have not proved to be clear-cut, but the rule of law aid providers 
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were confident of the existence of a direct causal connection between the 
strengthening of the rule of law and the improvement of democracy and economic 
development.
47
 Following this line of thinking, in the beginning of the 1990s, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund added as a condition for granting 
loans that the recipient countries establish the rule of law, presenting it as an 
economic safeguard rather than an action based on political grounds.
48
 In fact, the 
instrumentality of the rule of law in pursuing substantive political and economic 
objectives was not always stated, and often it was claimed that improving the 
institutional operability of the rule of law was an end in itself. The apparent 
detachment of the rule of law from the binomial liberalism-democracy helped it 
gaining high levels of global acceptance. Thus, the rule of law acquired the quality of 
universal good, facing almost no criticism or opposition. According to Thomas 
Carothers ‘[o]ne cannot get through a foreign policy debate these days without 
someone proposing the rule of law as a solution to the world’s troubles. The concept 
is suddenly everywhere – a venerable part of Western political philosophy enjoying a 
new run as a rising imperative of the era of globalization […].’
49
 Tamanaha also 
points out that ‘the rule of law is the dominant legitimating slogan of the world 
today’ and, ‘[e]ven governments that reject, or express reservations about, 
democracy and human rights as Western cultural and political inventions not suitable 
for their own societies, nonetheless claim that they abide by, or are working toward 
achieving the rule of law.’
50
 
In spite of the apparent consensus in favour of the rule of law, this notion is arguably 
highly problematic as there is no agreement on what it actually is. In legal and 
political theory the discussion of what the rule of law means is extensive and 
divergent. However, the different lines of arguments presented at the theoretical level 
reflect onto the more practical grounds of policy making only to a certain degree, 
which means that while some features of the historical theoretical debate might 
‘filter’ into the contemporary policy discussion, ultimately the idea of the rule of law 
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at this pragmatic level seems to acquire a life of itself. Carothers has claimed that the 
rule of law aid providers acted being more or less confident of knowing what the rule 
of law looked like – they seem to understand it as ‘law applied fairly, uniformly, and 
efficiently throughout the society in question, to both public officials as well as 
ordinary citizens, and to have law protect various rights that ensure the autonomy of 
the individual in the face of state power in both political and economic spheres.’
51
 
Nevertheless, it has not proved difficult to find different rule of law concepts 
merging into the discourses of donor institutions and creating a very broad and 
diffuse policy making scope.
52
 
According to Humphreys, the rule of law promotion actually deviates from the 
traditional concept of the rule of law (grounded in theory and history) and introduces 
a concept dependent on certain assumptions about the optimal role of law with 
respect to politics, economics and society. Humphreys finds that the conceptual 
variation of the rule of law program is given by its association with different public 
goods that accommodate themselves, precisely, in the rule of law’s indeterminate 
scope. He argues that the openness of the vocabulary and the ambiguity of the 
various narratives reassured that different groups made their own associations with 
different public goods through the rule of law idea – e.g. ‘lawyers and judges will 
think of procedural rights and the public good that the law itself represents; 
economists will focus on property rights and contract; bankers, investors and other 
donors, who rely on [World] Bank contracts and guarantees for investments in 
developing countries, will be reassured that steps are being taken to protect their 
assets. Human rights advocates and other potential critics of the [World] Bank may 
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recognise its rule of law goals as valuable to their own goals and advocacy.’
53
 But for 
him the very fact that the rule of law ‘contains’ all these numerous and dissimilar 
claims tells us something important about it: the existence of a contest that unsettles 
the possibility of something like positive law and suggests that law is always loaded 
with unsettled goods.
54
 Actually, the ambiguity in the aims behind the rule of law 
and the judicial reform has allowed certain dynamism in the ideas encompassed in 
the programs delivered by foreign governments and international organisations 
through time. In this way, the general discourse of the rule of law reform has 
sometimes been adapted to target some local problems of the recipient countries. 
Significatively, this indefiniteness of underlying goods permeating the rule of law 
project seems to have had yet another effect on the law. It created a ‘thin’ version of 
law, entangled with a specific type of meta-law (identifiable with relevant public 
goods). In other words, law became a function of other higher level goods. In this 
manner, the traditional liberal emphasis on the ‘closeness’ of the law as a source of a 
predictable framework of action changes towards a version that stresses ‘openness’ 
and the possibility of finding contested versions of the law regarding diverse values 
or public goods. Law, then, seems to become even more dependent of other 
discourses that seem to capture its formerly attained autonomy. Tamanaha has posed 
a similar argument with respect to the evolution of the American legal system during 
the twentieth century. He notes that there is a tendency of departing from the idea of 
law as an end in itself with the implications for autonomy that this represents, and 
abiding by the idea that law is a means to fulfil different goods. Tamanaha alerts that 
this displacement does not mean the disappearance of one image of the law for the 
other, but just the most common use of the second picture in detriment of most 
traditional understandings about the law.
55
 Similar observations can be made about 
the idea of rule of law as understood by reformation programs, which seemingly 
contain both narratives about the law, although apparently posing more emphasis on 
its instrumentality. In this way, the idea of law as a close, predictable, formal body 
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continues to circulate, but losing strength in favour of a more open-ended version. 
Thus, the recipients of the rule of law narrative will most likely come to face a form 
of law that appears as a vessel containing different discourses, which they will be 
forced to interpret and prioritise according to concrete regional needs. 
Nevertheless, apart from the circulation of a fuzzy rule of law discourse, 
developmental agents drafted concrete checklists of actions to be undertaken by the 
recipient countries. In this manner, judicial reform became one of the medullary 
points of the rule of law project checklist. The rationales leading to the primacy of 
the judiciary in this enterprise are various and often unclear.
56
 Building upon 
different understandings and assumptions, well-functioning judiciaries were linked 
with the major objectives of enhancing economic performance, democracy and 
human rights.  Broadly speaking, on the economic side it has been argued that only a 
well-functioning judiciary would be able to assure low transaction costs associated 
with the enforcement of contracts, to secure the right of investors and build a 
predictable scenario by holding the other two branches of government accountable.
57
 
On the political side, the judicial reform was seen as indispensable for consolidating 




Donor institutions did not agree totally regarding the reforms that would help 
building the appropriate judiciary; however, the core of the typical judicial reform 
program was basically the same. The measures generally have aimed to strengthen 
the judicial branch by securing its independence through an efficient system of 
appointments and discipline, guaranteeing a minimum budget, increasing the judicial 
competences to declare legal and constitutional violations, and speeding the 
processing of cases by enhancing procedural laws and introducing of IT and 
managerial training.
59
 Nevertheless, by enhancing the judiciary, the rule of law 
program placed a lot of weight on this institutional branch as the guarantor of legality 
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and, often, of constitutionality. The judges then became a key piece in the 
administration of law contested meanings, which tended towards creating active 
courts that depart from the traditional depiction of judges as ‘no more than the mouth 
that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating 
either its force or rigour.’ In this way, judicial reform has often brought over the 
judicialisation of the social and political life,
 
which represents an important 
expansion of the judicial function, especially for those jurisdictions with a 
traditionally less active judiciary.
 60
 
3.4 The Rule of Law in Mexico  
As we have previously seen, the global spread of liberalism, democracy and the rule 
of law that took place during the 1990s, caused a lot of mobilisation at the interior of 
several countries, challenging the traditional form of dealing with economic, political 
and legal issues. As it will be explained here, that global background unleashed a 
strong wave of changes also in the Mexican context, supported at the same time by 
the circumstances of the internal setting.  
After a relatively long period of economic isolation and a more or less stable way of 
dealing with legal and political issues Mexico’s internal order underwent a profound 
crisis. Following the collapse of the oil prices in 1981, Mexico, defeated in its 
extensive foreign borrowings, entered a phase of economic crisis, which also 
intensified the existing legitimacy crisis of the political system. Thus the main 
objective of governments since then and until the mid-1990s was to substitute the 
economic model of import substitution industrialisation with a model of free market 
economy. The economic agenda was driven by the domestic elite, who found the 
global framework to be coinciding with their own policy preferences, but also by 
leading institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, which played a major 
persuasive role during loan negotiations and assisted further in the implementation of 
the reforms with technical advice and financial support.
61
 The economic reforms, 
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aiming towards liberalising trade, privatising public goods, and deregulating 
economic activity and the operation of financial markets, were carried out during the 
term of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), affecting extensively the 
economic institutions of the country. These steps were taken in order to stabilise the 
oil crisis, but also for the country to join definitively the international commercial 
community and to establish more commercial partnerships around the world. 
Following, Mexico carried on negotiations to sign the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) that finally went into effect in 1994; the Economic Partnership, 
Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union, signed 
in 1997; and bilateral agreements with different Central American countries that all 
together had reformative effects on the internal economic framework. However, 
failures on the implementation of the new economic model and increasing internal 
political conflicts
62
 drove Mexico into a new, deeper economic crisis in 1994, 
essentially realised through the massive migration of capitals of scared investors 
following a great deal of speculation about the risk of investing in the domestic 
market. In order to overcome the crisis, Mexico borrowed around 50 billion US 
dollars from the US and international institutions, and was thus bound by further 
externally imposed recommendations towards modifying the economic system.
63
 
As Mexico’s connection with the economic international community deepened, the 
global ideas about the operation of political and juridical institutions penetrated and 
acquired increasing relevance,
64
 especially since they represented an alternative to 
the highly deteriorated juridico-political establishment. In a sense, the local 
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momentum was found in conjunction with the global tendencies: thus the ideas of 
democracy and the rule of law became highly influential models within the local 
context, placed in the centre of the agenda of political and legal reforms. In this way, 
as noted by Dezalay and Garth, Mexico became a ‘full participant in a growing 
global industry promoting the import and export of the rule of law.’
65
 
From the beginning of his administration, President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), 
showed a clear commitment with continuing the neoliberal economic project, but 
also a strong inclination to carry on an integral reform of the political and legal 
system. In his inauguration address, Zedillo argued that now more than ever Mexico 
needed to be a country of laws, where the Constitution and the laws are fully 
observed and the authorities act accordingly, so as to provide the certainty in 
contractual relationships that is central for economic growth and securing the 
operation of civil rights. He added that for this purpose he would present an initiative 
of constitutional reform to strengthen the federal judiciary, which from then onwards 
would also guarantee the democratic equilibrium between the political powers.
66
 
Zedillo also argued that the political power had to be (re)distributed, that the 
traditionally strong powers attached to the presidency had to be reallocated and 
subjected to the legal framework. In an interview to the international press, the 
former president explained: ‘Presidents in Mexico have historically accumulated 
overwhelming de facto power. This was part culture and part practice of presidents 
themselves. I have said I will limit my power to those clearly stipulated rights and 
obligations contained in the constitution. In Spanish, we have talked of the limited 
presidency. Some people in Mexico have interpreted that as a weakness, but it’s 
basically a constitutional exercise of power and that’s what Mexico needs.’
67
 
Similarly, on the ‘National Plan for Development of 1995-2000’, drafted by every 
presidential administration, Zedillo set as a policy axis of his government the 
establishment of the rule of law. Therein it is possible to appreciate that the rule of 
law is used as a wide and diffuse concept that is meant to limit the political powers, 
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to secure certainty of economic transactions and, also, to enforce human rights – all 
this seemingly following the broad scope of the rule of law discourse of development 
institutions.  
In this manner, the global idea of the rule of law permeated the local context, 
becoming the paradigm of progress. The rule of law discourse, as embraced by local 
political actors, denotes a message of change with respect to the political order, but 
also a different daily operation of the law and the judicial apparatus. In this sense, the 
new discourse had always the potential to reach the legal community and challenge 
their legal understandings. The new model relied on a strong judiciary to secure the 
operation of the legal framework; something that was at odds with the role that the 
judiciary played during the past decades.
68
 Although the discourse resounded 
strongly in the political sphere, at first, it didn’t seem to be acknowledged by the 
legal academic and professional circles of Mexico, and in this manner there was no 
profound technical discussion about the way to implement it in positive law.
69
 
Nevertheless, the attention of the legal community was finally attracted when the 
abstract discourse consolidated in a package of reforms to the constitutional order.  
A few days after taking office, Zedillo undertook an initiative of constitutional 
reform, which looked towards modifying the structure of different juridico-political 
institutions. The initiative would finally attract the attention of the legal sector and 
the public opinion, yet the haste with which the reforms were approved did not allow 
for proper discussion on the subject neither in the congress nor outside it.
70
 The rule 
of law and democracy discourses, then, commenced to concretise through a set of 
constitutional reforms that, in general, aimed to build a more balanced relationship 
between the three political branches, to decentralise the power towards the states and 
municipalities, to create electoral system that allowed actual political competition, 
and to improve the administration of justice. The legislative discussion of the 
presidential initiative for constitutional reforms showed the conviction that the rule 
of law was the biggest demand in contemporary Mexico, and that the judiciary was 
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central in this endeavour. In this discussion it is also possible to see how the idea of 
attaining the rule of law starts merging with that of securing the constitutional 
regime, and how the federal judiciary is elevated to the guarantor of different kinds 
legal and constitutional of values.
71
 
The package of reforms was published on the Official Diary of the Federation on the 
31st of December of 1994, concentrating highly in restructuring the federal judiciary. 
The reform consisted on 27 amendments to substantive articles of the constitution 
and 12 amendments to transitional articles, which represented important changes to 
the form of operation of the federal judiciary. The reforms aimed to secure the 
independence of the judiciary, turn it into a more specialised organ and to expand its 
scope of influence. Thus, the structure of the Supreme Court of Justice changed, by 
means of reducing the number of ministers from 24 to 11 in order to convert it into a 
professional organ in charge of the most relevant cases. The term of the ministers of 
justice changed from a 6-year period matching the presidential term to a 15 years 
term so as to reduce the influence of the executive in their performance. Following 
similar reasons, the procedure to appoint members of the Supreme Court of Justice 
was changed in order to assure higher involvement of the Senate; also the 
requirements for the Supreme Court’s nominees were modified to clearly state that 
the aspiring minister should not have served in high rank public positions at least a 
year before the nomination. Additionally, the time consuming administrative tasks 
that the Court was in charge was passed to the hands of a new administrative organ 
dealing with the career service, monitoring corruption and enforcing sanctions. But 
also, the scope of operation of the Court was widened with complementary 
constitutional review actions additional to the writ of amparo that augmented its 
political power and profiled it as a Constitutional Tribunal.
72
 
The new constitutional actions, the so called constitutional controversies and action 
of unconstitutionality, gave the Court a more active role in the national politics. 
These actions were based on the (continental) European model of constitutional 
control, characterised by the concentration of these functions in a specialised 
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constitutional tribunal. These actions did not substitute the already existing 
American-based model of judicial review incarnated in the amparo action that still 
kept operating, but they complemented the scope of constitutional revisions adding 
new legitimised subjects and circumstances where (un)constitutionality could be 
discussed. However, they had a more political connotation than that of amparo, as 
they are exclusive of political organs and the resolutions solving them could achieve 
general effects (contrasting with the particular effects that amparo was attributed 
with). The so called constitutional controversies are actions pursued by the 
legitimised political organs from the three levels of government (federation, state, 
and municipality) against the presumed unconstitutional acts or general norms (laws 
and regulations) of other organs.
73
 On the other side, the actions of 
unconstitutionality legitimise the political minorities, the political parties, the general 
Prosecutor of the Republic and the Human Rights Commission to challenge general 
norms that are considered to be against the federal constitution.
74
 
In order to secure the end of an era, all ministers of the Supreme Court were sent to 
early retirement, and a new group of judges was appointed to integrate the renovated 
organ. Also, the renewed Court distanced itself from the previous organ by deciding 
to start a new ‘epoch’ of the Judicial Weekly of the Federation.
75
 Additionally, the 
constitutional reforms were helped with material aids to improve judicial operation. 
Thus, the reform translated also into an increasing budget, modernising information 
systems, improving judicial managerial skills, and increasing transparency.  
The multiple actions implemented to carry out the rule of law reform had important 
effects over the judiciary and the legal system in general. As a product of the reforms 
the new Supreme Court’s discourse denoted a break with the past by frequently 
mentioning a change in its way of operating and its duty to put upright the 
administration of justice. This can be observed in the Annual Informs of the Court – 
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for example, in that of 1995 the President of the Court, describing its first year of 
function, noted: 
We did not allow hesitations, we never eluded responsibility and firmness in our tasks, 
we did not spare efforts to achieve the purposes that animated the judicial reform of 
1994, because our compromise with Mexico was and still is to recover the lost 
confidence in the federal tribunals, as initial goal, and, later, to put upright the 
labyrinthine path of access to justice. A lot has been said about this human right [of 
access to justice], but few has been achieved, because the efforts of parts and justices 
get lost in the tangle of procedural traps that nest in rancid and suffocating laws.
76
 
Similarly, in 1997 he stated that: 
In attention to the changing environment in which we are living, this Supreme Tribunal 
of the Republic has taken in the clamour of granting the citizens an effective access to 
the Tribunals in charge of administrating justice, and under this tone it intends to break 
stereotypes and stiff interpretations and application of the laws of the federation, states, 
federal district and the municipalities […]
77
 
In general, the reform of the judiciary reinforced the idea that the rule of law was a 
matter that ought to be taken seriously, and that the judiciary had to play a major role 
in this transition. In this way, the reform emerged not just as a change in legal rules, 
but also as a shift in the general discourse about the law shared by the legal 
community. It has been noted that new centrality of the judiciary meant a ‘silent 
revolution’ of great magnitude,
78
 which on the one hand overturned the traditional 
understandings about the relationship between the judiciary and the other powers,
79
 
and on the other changed the self-understanding of judges and professionals of law. 
Still, the rule of law also involved a profound change regarding the very idea of how 
law should function in practice, adding elements of dynamism that were absent in the 
Mexican discourse and knowledge establishment. This wider change was bound to 
resonate strongly with all members of the legal community.  
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The overall message first sent by the reforms, was reinforced by a great amount of 
academic research and conferences about the rule of law and the judicial reform, 
which mostly subscribed to the message of (good) change and the necessity of 
further modifications to complete the reforms.
80
 In this manner, the idea of extending 
the reforms to secure a widened rule of law and a stronger judiciary became 
paradigmatic. Therefore, this tendency was expanded and reflected in further 
statutory and constitutional reforms. For example, the local state judiciaries also 
carried out different constitutional and legal reforms introducing new actions 
(comparable to the federal actions of constitutionality and constitutional 
controversies) and provided the economic and technical means in order to secure the 
new framework. The rule of law reform became a positioned objective of the 
following administrations of Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderon (2006-
2012). Nevertheless, in the latest years, the shape-shifting rule of law ideal seems to 
be mostly associated with the guarantee of human rights and a good-functioning 
administration of criminal justice,
81
 something that is also in consonance with the 
current global trend.
82
 This latest understanding of the rule of law in Mexico has 
eventually led to the embracement of new ideas, such as the importance of 
subscribing to oral trials and the adversarial system.
83
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3.4.1 The Rule of Law Project as a Legal Irritant 
The opacity with which the global import-export of the rule of law was made, in 
addition to the diffused nature of the rule of law idea, that is, its capacity to adapt to 
several utterances, make it difficult to trace back the genealogy of the Mexican rule 
of law reform and its precise content. Despite these difficulties, it is possible to 
conclude that, either a recommendation of foreign donor institutions or a borrowing 
of politicians and scholars, the rule of law idea behind different reforms entailed a set 
of beliefs and values that were extraneous for the Mexican context. As such, the rule 
of law, indicating (at least broadly) a set of assumptions of its own, caused irritation 
to the minds of legal practitioners.  
Additionally, that the rule of law discourse was enthusiastically embraced in Mexico 
or the fact that it happened to fit the social-political conjuncture, does not take away 
the irritating potential of this legal feature, in the same way that appreciating spring 
does not take away the possibility of developing seasonal allergies or irritations. It is 
true that the preceding reconfiguration of the political system helped the local fast 
spread and survival of the rule of law discourse and the ideas related to the role of the 
judiciary. The weakening of the presidential institution, the debilitation of the 
hegemonic party with its corporatist organisation of society (that even reached the 
judiciaries) and the more active participation of other political forces seem to have 
created a fertile ground for the discourse of the widened judiciary and the 
juridicisation of more areas of the social life. According to Domingo, the redefinition 
of the political system in fact not only aided the survival of the idea of a more active 
judiciary, but somehow drafted it: as the foundations of the relationship between the 
executive and the judiciary eroded, the judiciary was meant to be transformed to fit 
the new exigencies.
84
 Yet one must partly disagree with Domingo’s statement as it 
gives the impression that the new ideas with respect to the law and the judiciary had 
a bottom-up origin. In fact, as discussed above, these were the product of global 
tendencies. In our view, the reformation movement of the 1990s represented the 
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introduction of a new discourse about the law and the judiciary that precisely due to 
the political momentum of the context, was found appropriate or at least convincing. 
Thus, this apparently welcoming environment for the reform should not obscure the 
magnitude of the challenge posed by the new set of ideas. Legal practitioners seemed 
to be convinced that the new legal path was the right route for development, and 
therefore were very positive about the introduction of further reforms. The positive 
affective inclinations of the legal community towards the rule of law do not change 
the fact that the novel ideas contradicted the pre-existing discourses, which 
eventually involved difficult cognitive reconfigurations.  
As explained in the previous chapter, the traditional manner of thinking about the 
law as a subsidiary order disclosed a proceduralist and formalist nature when in 
operation. The idea that the law had to be flexible and connect to more areas of the 
social world meant something new. In part, this meant the inclusion of more disputes 
under the scope of the law. At first this was materialised by the creation of new legal 
actions for the resolution of political and electoral conflicts, and later on by the 
expansion of actions to protect human rights. Nevertheless, this shift eventually 
involved the reconsideration of the way some extralegal considerations are included 
into the law, that is, the revision of the traditional (formal) legal method. Moreover, 
the idea of strengthening the judiciary, to the point of becoming the central 
institution for the administration and enforcing the legal framework was also a 
meaningful change to the remarkably weaker and more passive power that the 
judiciary was assigned in the past. The change was first suggested by the reforms to 
the federal judiciary, but this soon expanded all over the system, encouraging new 
material reforms in different states of the federation. In this form, the wave of 
changes also involved a tacit revision of the theoretical framework behind the 
judicial function and the reconsideration of the value of judge-made law.  
The reformative impulse of the rule of law can be thus seen as affecting the formal 
institutional setting in different areas: from the reform of human rights to securing 
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the separation of powers.
85
 Nevertheless, there seems to be a core regarding the rule 
of law: the expansion of the legal scope and the judicial function. Arguably, it is this 
core that emerges as a big challenge for local legal practitioners, and not necessarily 
the individual rule reforms that somehow reflect it. Legal practitioners had to make 
sense of the new functions assigned to the law and the judiciary. Therefore, in recent 
years it is possible to observe an increased recurrence to new theoretical approaches 
dealing with legal decision making and constitutional theory in search for answers. 
These theories have been discussed in specialised academic forums, but also have 
been ‘translated’ to the less technical language in books and seminars for legal 
professionals. The questions that the new legal framework seems to be triggering are 
directed to understand the role of the constitution, the figure of the judge and the 
model of legal reasoning. The search has been concentrated in certain theories of 
wide circulation within the context: Ferrajoli’s garantismo, Dworkin’s rights theory, 
and Neo-constitutionalism. Also circulating, but within narrower circles, is the 
economic analysis of the law. We will briefly explain them as understood in this 
context. 
The theoretical model of garantismo articulated by Luigi Ferrajoli has been 
welcomed and widely spread in the Mexican legal context.
86
 For Ferrajoli the rule of 
law should be framed in the light of a substantive democracy, where fundamental 
rights rule at its core. This perspective denies intrinsic value to law for the simple 
fact of being enacted – it calls for the revision of optimal legal performance (or in 
Ferrajoli’s words, validity) on the grounds of constitutionality rights, creating a 
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strong link between (statutory) law and the constitutional values.
87
 This theoretical 
account also has important consequences for the model of judge, which becomes 
crucial in the permanent improvement of the legal order by taking into consideration 
fundamental rights into their function of adjudication.
88
 The influence has been 
strong, to the point that ‘many resolutions of the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico 
have been based explicitly or implicitly in the texts of Luigi Ferrajoli.’
89
 
The idea of neo-constitutionalism consists on the expansion of the constitutional 
provisions to the whole legal system. In other words, this theory prescribes the 
omnipresence of the constitution, especially constitutional rights, that irrigate the 
entire legal order. The constitutional principles condition the validity and 
interpretation of the lower hierarchy laws. In a sense, neo-constitutionalism is similar 
to garantismo, as they both appeal to the principle of constitutionality, instead of that 
of simple legality as the basis of a democratic State. In this view, the judge becomes 
the guarantor of the constitutional order, by interpreting infra-constitutional 
provisions through the glass of the constitution. This theory prescribes a model of 
legal reasoning that leaves behind the mechanical syllogism associated to positivism, 
and moves towards the consideration of constitutional values and principles in every 
interpretation of the law.
90
 
According to Dworkin, legal practice is in nature interpretative. In this sense, the law 
is subject to interpretation and reinterpretation according to the moral and political 
values of the practice, that is, to the shared principles of the community. Dworkin 
also notices that the law is not only composed by rules that work as all-or-nothing 
mandates, but also by principles that respond to the dimension of weight or 
importance.
91
 Thus, the function of the judge has been understood as interpreting the 
law according to relevant principles, and balancing them when they seem to clash. It 
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is precisely the idea of having a law that is reinterpreted through principles what has 
been very attractive in the Mexican context, challenging strongly the pre-established 
idea that law is a matter or enacted rules. However, an important part of Dworkin’s 
theory appears to have been lost in translation, that is, the fact that the interpretative 
practice should be justified and guided by the aspirational value of integrity. Law as 
integrity holds that interpreters should identify legal rights and duties assuming that 
their only author is the community personified. It requires that rights and duties flow 
from past collective decisions that not only contain narrow explicit contents, but also 
implicit principles and values that justify the practice.
92
 In that sense, the idea of 
integrity is the one that hold backs the interpretative power of the judges generating 
an overall coherence. Thus, the way the Dworkinian approach to law has mainly 
been understood by the Mexican legal community as a license to take into account 
matters of value in the interpretation of the law, without the important restraint 
proposed by this account.
93
    
The economic analysis of the law is an approach that introduces economic 
considerations to assess the efficiency of legal institutional design or policy making, 
but also to guide the judge in decision making. As noted by Roemer and Valadés 
‘[i]n the academic community there are few Mexican universities that show any 
interest in economic analysis of law. Among them we can mention the Autonomous 
Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM), Center for Economic Research and 
Teaching (CIDE). Likewise, a certain interest has been detected in the Law School of 
the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM)’,
94
 but also organisations 
like the Mexican Academy of Law and Economics (AMDE) show an increasing 
interest in studying and extending the correlation economy-law. This perspective has 
implications also for a model of judge and legal reasoning. According to this theory, 
legal decision makers have to be receptive to cost-benefit economic considerations 
while reasoning and deciding about the law. In this respect, as in the other 
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perspectives the law starts to be open to a broader range of considerations, although 
in this case the gate is widely open to (economic) consequentialist reasoning.  
Although essentially different, these theories (and especially in their received 
versions) seem to touch some common elements: their flexibility and the possibility 
of including different principles or values at their core, especially, by means of 
judge-made law. In this manner, we can see that the discursive change introduced by 
the reforms of 1994 has led the Mexican legal community to a search for a new 
model of law and legal reasoning along more flexible lines. The idea of law as 
interpretative practice, where the legal order is understood through constitutional 
values, fundamental rights, economic utility or other kind of goods, seems to be a 
popular option. In this respect, Jaime Cárdenas notices that this chain of changes 
seems to be forcing a reconfiguration of the national legal culture. He suggests that 
the system should transit to a dynamic model of argumentative law, no longer based 
on rules but on the interpretation of principles and values.
95
 In fact, it has been noted 
that countries like Mexico are living a ‘turn to interpretation’ which overall ‘presents 
additional elements for legal reasoning, such as the application of neutral principles; 
the utilization of past facts of a legal, social, or historical nature; and the introduction 
of consequentialist thinking.’
96
 Nevertheless, the turn to interpretation seems to be 
lead more by naïve idealism, rather than by conviction derived from a full 
understanding of the new model.
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The new theoretical framework also had important consequences for the model of 
judge and the value given to judge-made law. These theories were first received by 
the federal judiciary (which has developed the habit of citing interpretativist 
theories), but they seem to be spreading across the legal system. In this manner, the 
model of judge that plays an active role in establishing the direction of the law 
through its interpretation is becoming widespread, challenging the past perspectives 
that indicated a more passive judicial function. There have been many attempts to 
expand the operation of the judiciary by formal institutional reforms. The rise of 
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constitutionalism, the human rights discourse and the concern of guaranteeing 
effectively the constitutional charter and the system of national and international 
rights have pushed towards the reconfiguration of the long-standing amparo action. 
The amparo action, for a long time was a highly technical means to contest the 
unconstitutionality of acts and laws as we indicated in the previous chapter; but due 
to the ongoing chain of legal revisions it also has undergone gradual reform to make 
it more flexible. In fact in 2011 the Federal Constitution was reformed to extend the 
reach of amparo and to leave behind formalisms and technicisms that affect the 
extent of its protective scope. Additionally, a new Amparo Act was enacted by the 
Congress in 2013, with the aim of modifying the amparo action and adjusting it to 
the new legal viewpoints. The initiative for a new amparo statute compiled an 
important part of the ideas that have been circulating in the legal system after the rule 
of law reform. The initiative states: 
It is important to notice that the successful democratic transitions have been supported 
by the judicial powers (generally, constitutional tribunals) to achieve a reading of the 
constitution and the laws that is according to the democratisation of the institutions […] 
The inexorable cultural, political and social transformations that the country has lived 
during the last decades, make it necessary to harmonise and adequate the laws and 
institutions so as to guarantee that these changes subscribe the rule of law framework. A 
relevant case where we can notice the importance of harmonising the institutions and 
the laws is that of the amparo trial. The amparo, as we have indicated, is the most 
transcendent juridical instrument in the Mexican State and it is because of this that it is 
imperative to engage into a series of changes and modifications to the Statute that 
regulates it, in order to modernise it and, in consequence, strengthen it. In consequence 
of the international logic that has extended the protection of human right and due to the 
necessity to build a new and more efficient amparo trial to control the acts of public 
authorities, it is pretended to widen the scope of protection.
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As discussed above, the legal changes were strong and meaningful, affecting deeply 
the way the law and certain institutions were understood, and pushing towards 
further reconfigurations in an attempt to fully join the new trend. The legal change 
propelled not only the revision of isolated beliefs, but an authentic revolution 
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involving core legal concepts. In this way, it is, to a high extent, expected for a legal 
change as the one described to produce an important degree of ‘cognitive irritation’ 
in the recipient legal community. In view of a change of this magnitude, legal 
practitioners not only need to change their conceptual understandings, but also they 
need to develop different practical knowledge in order to respond to the new 
environment. Thus, it would definitively be understandable if the legal community 
has problems to adapt to the new requirements of legal practice. 
In response to the changes that affected widely the Mexican legal system, the legal 
community has been forced to move away from different traditional understandings. 
One of the major changes has been the acknowledgement of law as something more 
complex that the logical application of statutes. Thus, legal practitioners have given 
place to a picture of the law as an interpretative an argumentative practice, where 
there might encounter important disagreements. In this moment of the ‘gestaltswitch’ 
it is only possible to observe a general sense of having encountered a new path that 
nobody realised was there before. A great amount of communications circulating 
among Mexican legal practitioners show their increasing interest in legal 
argumentation and interpretation, and these legal subjects seem to be now identified 
as the core of the professional practice, but somehow they do not seem to be part of 
the legal community’s tool-box. In this way, it is frequent to find courses of legal 
interpretation and legal argumentation organised by academic and judicial 
institutions that usually give an overview of relevant theoretical approaches to law as 
an interpretative practice. These courses surely help reinforce the new legal ideas, 
but they are poor in delivering practical competences.  
 




3.4.2 Revaluating Legal Precedents 
The importance acquired by the judiciary has led to another reconfiguration: the 
historical role attributed to precedents. Judicial resolutions have acquired increasing 
relevance for legal practice. As the judiciary acknowledged the new role of legal 
precedents, it has created new institutions to compile and publicise the information – 
for example, the General Direction for the Coordination of the Compilation and 
Systematisation of Jurisprudential Thesis and the Institute of Jurisprudential 
Investigation, Promotion and Diffusion of Judicial Ethics were created to help in the 
drafting of precedents, their compilation and publicising. When these organs were 
created the Supreme Court Stated: 
Due to the transcendence the judicial resolutions held by the Supreme Court of Justice 
of the Nation and the Collegiate Tribunals of Circuit […] it is necessary to establish an 
organ in charge of the careful analysis of the jurisprudential and isolated criteria held by 
this high tribunal and the Collegiate Tribunals […] which will involve different benefits 
to the administration of justice, including the wider diffusion of the sense and reach of 
these criteria by means of the organisation of forums of analysis and the publication of 
research and studies on the subject, and the early detection of contradictions […]
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These organs have periodically organised publications for the diffusion of the 
relevant criteria of the Supreme Court, and seminars about jurisprudencia aimed at 
legal practitioners. For example, in the description of one of these seminars the 
Institute of Jurisprudential Investigation states: 
The interest that the study of jurisprudencia provokes is a general feeling. The role that 
the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation has been fulfilling as the legitimate 
interpreter of constitutional norms has awakened an increasing interest from the parties, 
the public opinion and the experts in law towards the judiciary. Additionally, legal 
research and legal education prefer, more and more, the practical analysis of the law that 
develops from judicial controversies, as it is more fertile and dynamic that the legalist 
model. It is not strange, thus, to experience a boost of essays, conferences and books 
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supported on the criteria of the tribunals, or the analysis of jurisprudential issues in the 
light of theoretical principles to collaborate in the construction of the ratio iuris […]
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The increasing use of precedents was also supported by the automatisation of judicial 
criteria. Since the early 1990s the Supreme Court started working on a database and a 
search engine to make jurisprudencia easier to retrieve. Previously, federal 
precedents were only available on the paper version of the Federal Judiciary’s 
Weekly, which made them more difficult to be accessed by judges and legal 
practitioners. The system, released with the name of IUS, has been available for sale 
on CD and for free on the Supreme Court’s website, making easier the search and 
quoting of these legal materials. The IUS is not a friendly system, but it has 
definitively helped legal practitioners to be informed about the legal criteria held by 
the federal tribunals in a more simple way than during the paper print days. In this 
sense, the increasing necessity of being informed about the activity of the tribunals 
was also possible thanks to the technological advances of the previous years that 
brought closer judges and practitioners to past judicial resolutions.  
Nevertheless, the increasing use of precedents did not derive from their availability 
in electronic format, but mainly from the change of perception regarding the 
relevance of judge-made law derived from the chain of modifications above noted. 
Nowadays precedents are searched and invoked in trial because they are considered 
to be important legal constructions. Legal precedents seem, however, to be especially 
important at this specific historical moment – since the role of the law and the 
judiciaries was otherwise in the past, the legal precedents of the past couple of 
decades seem to be of high importance for the construction of the law. In a sense, 
many of these legal resolutions are not only a link of a chain novel, but the first link 
of that specific story. Many precedents appear to provide the first interpretation on a 
legal subject or are actually expected to overturn the line followed in the past.  
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3.4.3 The Problem of Legal Precedents 
In short, the rule of law reformation program involved the diffusion of a new set of 
ideas about the law, which picture it as a more flexible and arguable enterprise. As 
the judiciary was being repositioned as a decisive institution that settles legal 
meanings, legal precedents were also being repositioned as important sources of law.  
These ideas were warmly received despite the fact that they clashed with the pre-
existing framework. Mexican legal practitioners have praised the argumentative 
character of the law, the active role of the judiciary, the importance of precedents for 
the development of the law. Yet arguably that does not mean that they fully 
understand the implications of these ideas or that they have acquired and mastered 
the necessary know how to perform in new circumstance. Accepting an idea is by no 
means the same as learning to think and act according to it. The fact that the legal 
practitioners acknowledge that the new ideas are important does not mean that they 
have fully changed their minds and hearts. They are still in transition. 
In this form, the new legal ideas coexist with older understandings, which are still the 
base for forming legal practitioners in this context. In the Mexican setting the rigid 
image of the law still plays a major role, and permeates the way of thinking about 
certain legal features, even if other ideas have started to circulate. Actually, the use 
of certain new ideas in the current communications or discourses often denotes the 
sense of coming into terms with something foreign. These circumstances make it 
more likely for legal practitioners to hold conflicting ideas or to attempt interpreting 
new ideas according to the pre-existing knowledge framework.  
With regard to legal precedents, legal practitioners had to relocate precedents into 
their legal tool box, that is, they had to start thinking of precedents as important for 
legal practice. However, the legal community does not necessarily know how to deal 
with precedents in this new context. Thus, this fundamental change in ‘legal style’ 
has not been problem-free for the legal community. Faced with massive changes 
across all aspects of the legal profession (and indeed wider society and politics) in a 
short period of time, practitioners in Mexico haven’t had the time to conclude the 
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transition, clinging to some previously learned knowledge features. To come back to 
Glenn’s example, they are still holding the horses. 
The emergence of knowledge problems in these circumstances is by no means 
surprising, but that does not make them less disrupting. A change like the one that 
has been described in this thesis is likely to cause a plurality of knowledge 
mismatches. Nevertheless, herein we will focus on the problems that the legal 
community is experiencing with respect to a particular matter, i.e. the use of judicial 
precedents, which have been expressed by the legal community in various occasions.  
3.4.3.1 The Legal Community’s Complaint about Precedents 
The members of the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice, immersed in the reformatory 
inertia explained above, felt empowered to continue the path towards constructing ‘a 
new judiciary for the twenty-first century.’ The judges of the Court were willing to 
open a dialogue with the internal legal community and the wider society, which 
would set the judicial function under public scrutiny from different perspectives. 
They aimed to understand the problems of the local and federal systems of justice, in 
order to design and carry on an integral reform of the Mexican judiciary. Therefore, 
in August of 2003 the Supreme Court of Justice decided to undertake a ‘National 
Enquiry about the Integral and Coherent Reform of the System of Impartation of 
Justice in Mexico’, searching for the necessary reforms for the judiciary. The 
Supreme Court called for documents describing observed problems regarding the 
administration of justice, as well as proposals to solve them. The documents could be 
presented by ‘any person with interest’ from the 27
th
 of August of 2003 and until the 
31 of August of 2004.
101
 The Supreme Court compromised to organise and analyse 
the information collected, so as to elaborate a draft for the integral reform of the 
judiciary and present it to the federal legislative and executive powers.  
As a result of the enquiry, the Court received 5,844 documents containing around 
11,709 proposals to reform the administration of justice in Mexico. Due to the open-
ended nature of the enquiry, the documents approached the most various subjects and 
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reflected the wide scope of concerns regarding the performance of the judiciaries in 
Mexico. The examination, evaluation and presentation of the data gathered from the 
documents were performed in several stages, happening over the following three 
years. First, the problems and proposals of reform were classified by a group of 
researchers, who also elaborated a diagnosis of the participants’ perception. Later on, 
the themes from the submitted documents were discussed by different ‘reflection 
forums’ integrated by academic experts. Simultaneously, the forums generated 
statistical information about the concerns emerging from the enquiry and the type of 
participants behind the presented documents. In a further stage at the end of 2005, 
the Court organised the first meeting of administrators of justice with the objective of 
discussing the results of the reflection forums and to compromise with the 
continuous improvement of the judicial function. Finally, an interpretation of the 
information gathered from the documents and the discussing forums was published 
as ‘The White Book for the Judicial Reform.’
102
  
According to the statistical information published as an appendix of the book, the 
thousands of entries were produced in different local states across Mexico, for which 
the perception of the participants system-wide is well represented.
103
 More than 80% 
of the participants in the enquiry were members of the internal legal community, that 
is, practicing lawyers, members of legal associations, local and federal judges and 
legal academics.
104
 In this respect, the national enquiry can be considered to capture 
a good sample of the problems perceived by the legal community in Mexico. The 
original papers submitted by the members of the legal community have, however, not 
been kept in the archives of the Supreme Court of Justice despite their value and 
potential utility.
105
 Still, the problems reported by the legal community can be 
observed from the working documents and the final book derived from the national 
enquiry. 
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The researchers systematising the information identified thirty four core themes from 
the documents, one of them directly addressing ‘the problem of federal 
precedents.’
106
 In the working papers the researchers noted that the participants 
recurrently reported doubts regarding the role and use of the Mexican legal 
precedent: jurisprudencia.  They also reported some problems regarding the use of 
precedents and offered possible solutions. They frequently expressed concerns about 
the lack of clear rules for the use of jurisprudencia. According to the researchers, this 
situation seemed to cause confusion among the participants, who also argued that 
precedents had harmed the possibility to predict the outcomes of judicial 
adjudication. In general, the working group found concerns regarding the diversity, 
multiplicity and contradictions between judicial precedents, as well as the lack of 
rules of application of jurisprudencia.   
The participants considered that in the past years more federal precedents had 
emerged, making it very difficult to know them all and use them in practice. They 
argued that many precedents were repetitions of previous criteria, which seemed 
somehow unnecessary. In their view, the plurality of precedents only added on the 
bulk of criteria to keep track of and created practical difficulties. To remedy this 
situation, a ‘depuration’ of the databases containing precedents was suggested, that 
is, the deletion of old precedents or those that have been overcome by more recent 
judicial criteria.
107
  Additionally, a common concern expressed by practicing lawyers 
and members of the judiciaries was the increasing existence of contradictory 
precedents. The participants considered that the existence of contradictions between 
precedents was one of the main problems affecting legal practice and an important 
source of uncertainty. Therefore, a recurrent suggestion was the creation of new 
institutional mechanisms for the dissolution of contradictions. One of the proposals 
to face the increasing contradictions was creating a new type of intermediary body in 
charge of dissolving contradictions, that is, deciding the decisions that should 
prevail.
108
 Similar proposals suggested convening meetings between the magistrates 
of collegiate tribunals – where most contradictions derive from – to identify, discuss 
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 Another suggestion was to limit the ‘territorial 
validity’ of precedents to the circuit to which they belong.
110
 Also, the participants 
also complained about the lack of clear and explicit rules for the application of 
precedents. Legal practitioners requested rules defining the scopes of validity of past 
legal resolutions in analogy to the scopes of validity recognised for statutes – that is, 
determining if precedents are valid when referring to a different territory or subject-
matter.
111
 One recurring suggestion was to limit the scope of territorial validity of the 
jurisprudencia issued by the collegiate tribunals of circuit to the circuit where they 
were issued – as this would also serve limiting contradictions.
112
  
In relation to these concerns and solutions, the group of researchers in charge of the 
enquiry included a suggestion on how to improve the system of precedents in the 
White Book. Their recommendations read as follows: 
The clarity and systematisation of jurisprudencia is a matter that generates legal 
certainty and directs the action of the agents that intervene in judicial processes, which 
influences the whole legal system. The Supreme Court of Justice must implement a set 
of short term actions to improve the systematisation of precedents. The above 
mentioned with the object of simplifying the search of precedents, and reaching a better 
understanding of their scope and effects. This systematizing effort will help the 
depuration of precedents to avoid contradictory theses issued in different historical 
moments and to secure the congruency with the strategies of the judicial reform. This 
reform requires the joint work of the members of the Federal Judicial Power. In the 
medium term, an additional effort must be made to improve the quality of the theses of 
jurisprudencia, in their creation, their content and composition. Additionally, it must be 
explored the possibility of limiting the scope of territorial validity of the jurisprudencia 




In 2007, in a much smaller enquiry about the problems related to the judiciaries 
organised by the Senate of the Republic, legal practitioners expressed similar doubts 
regarding the use of jurisprudencia and what to do with conflicting and repetitive 
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legal resolutions. The number of participants in this enquiry was not as representative 
as in the Supreme Court’s study. Nevertheless, the problems experiencing when 
using precedents have been expressed repetitively ever since by different means, 
from official judicial communications to masters theses and blog entries. A look at 
some of these communications usefully yields a fuller image of the doubts, concerns 
and problems perceived by the Mexican Legal community.   
One of the main concerns of legal practitioners has been that of contradictions. They 
have particularly highlighted the harm that contradictory precedents do to legal 
certainty and the importance of expanding the resources available to bring unification 
to the system. In this respect, there have been several proposals with respect how 
legal contradictions can be dissolved. For example, the Tribunal of Justice of the 
State of Tabasco has published on its website a proposal to expand the actors that can 
request the Supreme Court of Justice to decide about contradictory resolutions in the 
following terms: 
The function behind unifying the applicable laws is to guarantee legal certainty, this 
function is clear and requires no further comments […] In an effort to provide legal 
certainty to society, we must enlarge the actors with legitimacy  to denunciate the 
contradiction of precedents, with the aim to provide an erga omnes legitimacy, that is, 
to all members of society […]
114
 
Similar indications can be found in legal opinion blogs as in the following entry:   
[…] we must take into account that the thesis of jurisprudencia are delivered by a 
diversity of judicial entities, such as the two chambers of the Court or the different 
Collegiate Tribunals of Circuit that exist in the country, which in face of the diversity of 
subject matters and regions in which these Tribunals are located, commonly emit 
different interpretative criteria, namely isolated thesis or jurisprudencia, that contradict 
themselves, and which to a certain extent can lead us to believe that there is legal 
uncertainty in the scope of amparo, in the sense that we do not know which of the 
diversity of existing criteria, is the one that can be adopted by the Judge to solve the 
legal problems in which we are involved as parties or legal representatives […] This 
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problem can be solved by creating an organ depending from the Supreme Court of 
Justice of the Nation, with regional jurisdiction, directly in charge of reviewing the 
theses held by the Tribunals of each circuit, in order to inform the possible 
contradictions between theses to the Court, so that it decides about the criterion of 
Thesis or Jurisprudencia that should prevail.
115
 
Actually, some official actions to solve the reported problems, especially the 
existence of contradiction, were taken recently. In this respect, the new Amparo Act 
of 2013 created a new instance (that is, the circuit plenaries) to carry on the 
unification of the legal precedents of the different federal circuits. In the discussion 
of the constitutional reforms previous to the emission of the new Amparo Act the 
legislative established: 
[… ] the reform of the articles 94, 100 and 107 of the constitution provides judicial 
circuits with relative autonomy to give more homogeneity, precision and specificity to 
the criteria and precedents created in each circuit […] This will contribute to generate a 
broader sense of legal certainty, value which this reform aims to promote and secure.- In 
this way, the contradictions between precedents that arise within the same circuit will be 
resolved by a new organ – the circuit plenary […] These organs are formed by member 
of the collegiate tribunals, as they have firsthand knowledge of the problems in their 
own scopes of decision. This will allow the homogenisation of legal criteria and avoid 
that different tribunals solve differently in similar cases. 
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The new homogenising institutions started to function in June 2013. Therefore, 
it might still be too soon to assess the success of this measure. Nevertheless, 
the creation of these organs might just provide a temporary relief to the 
problem of precedents. Arguably the solution is not grounded on a complete 
analysis of the problem of precedents. For example, the drafters of the reform 
do not seem to take into account the fact that plurality and, to a certain extent, 
disparity is an unavoidable trace of a system with different decision-makers. 
Despite homogenising actions like the one taken recently in the Mexican 
context, there will always be a moment where legal reasoners will have to carry 
                                                          
115
 Víctor Gómez Álvarez, ‘La Jurisprudencia y su Unificación de Criterios’ (Travesía Metodológica, 
2011) <http://travesiametodologica.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/la-jurisprudencia-y-su-unificacion-
de.html> accessed 25 January 2014. 
116
 Analysis to the project of Amparo Act. 




on their practice in face of multiple and even contradictory choices. This is 
even more pronounced in a system of law where different actors introduce a 
diversity of interpretations and arguments. In this sense, building the system of 
law that the legal community has been reportedly attempted to build, that is, 
one that takes law as an argumentative practice and not as a set of completely 
fixed certainties, requires learning to deal with different sorts of complexities. 
Looking for the constant unification of legal resolutions by legal officials 
seems to still show some traces of the traditional way of thinking about the 
law, whereas the aim to secure a high degree of (fixed) certainty led to the 
narrowing of the legal enterprise to discussing procedural formulas. In a way, 
the concerns, and even the solutions, posed by the Mexican legal community 
still seem to reflect the well- learned ‘Garcia-Maynez legal perspective and 
methodology’ explained in the previous chapter; that is, presuppose that legal 
reasoning is a (formal) logic operation of mathematical exactitude. 
The circuit plenaries also seem to provide a solution for the problem of feeling 
overload by numerous precedents. These institutional organs will be in charge 
of unifying the system in face of multiplicity. Nevertheless, this measure seems 
to overlook the fact that legal precedents in the Mexican context are not yet as 
numerous. This seems to suggest that this overload is ‘perceived’ and not 
exactly objective. In this case, legal practitioners should probably be 
complaining about the opposite, that is, about an underload of information. The 
acknowledgement of this fact allows us to see with more clarity that the 
problem of legal precedents has to do more with the knowledge held by 
Mexican legal practitioners than with the actual available information. Another 
fact that points towards this direction is that the federal judiciary is often called 
to solve contradictions when, to a closer look, there aren’t actual mismatches 
between precedents.
117
 In this sense, many of requests to solve contradictions 
come from a deficient legal analysis of precedents – or in other words, where 
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contradictions could have been ‘dissolved’ by legal reasoners if they had taken 
into account some other considerations.
118
 
In this way, it can be argued with confidence that part of the transition of the 
Mexican legal community has to do with learning to think differently about 
legal precedents. They need to see precedents in a way that is consistent with 
the interpretative and argumentative form of law that they are trying to attain. 
In the past, the strong commitment to the ideal of codification and the 
deductive method lead to the formation of a system of precedents that matched 
these ideas, even if that stopped it from being really functional. Now it seems 
to be the moment to question these embedded understandings and to see 
precedents under a different light. In this way, legal practitioners need to find 
the certainty that they feel is now lost by too many and sometimes 
contradictory precedents beyond fixed rules provided by authorities. They 
instead need to be able to find certainty in the realisation that they can see 
ordered legal patterns from precedents, even these are eventually defeasible. 
This means that they need to update their conceptual understandings, but most 
importantly, they ought to develop the necessary tacit knowledge behind 
precedent-based reasoning operations. In other words, the problem of 
precedents is of a cognitive nature and, consequently, requires measures that go 
beyond the reform of the system of courts or the enactment of rules to guide 
legal practitioners. Therefore, the measures to assist the transition need to be 
cognitively meaningful – which means that they need to go beyond the 
dimension of institutional and rule reform. 
3.5 Final Remarks  
With this setting in mind let us go back to our initial point. At the beginning of 
this chapter it was said that legal changes, that is changes in rules, doctrines, 
theories and so on, involve cognitive changes of some sort, that is, changes in 
concepts, beliefs, values, forms of doing things and so forth. In this sense, legal 
changes, such as legal transfers, become ‘cognitive irritants.’ Nevertheless, not 





all cognitive-affective reconfigurations call for the same efforts. Some legal 
changes may derive into relatively easy epistemic modifications, but there are 
others that lead to a deep revision of core knowledge features, that is, to 
cognitive revolutions. 
This chapter suggests that the rule of law ideal that has been spreading globally 
has a high potential to irritate the minds of legal professionals in the recipient 
contexts. The rule of law ideal, which operates both as an open discourse and a 
set of concrete reforms, entails certain beliefs, concepts and values that are not 
necessarily shared by the local legal professionals. In this respect, image of the 
law as undetermined and open-ended body that needs to be decided by an 
active court, which circulates with the rule of law discourse is not necessarily 
shared across legal systems and may create irritation. The magnitude of the 
irritation, however, will depend on the interplay between the new framework 
and the previously held body of knowledge. 
In the Mexican context, where traditionally legal practitioners have been 
particularly inclined to think about the law as a static and settled body of rules 
that are ‘applied’ logically, the introduction of the rule of law ideal seems to 
pose an important cognitive challenge. It involves a major revision affecting 
the prevailing conceptual understanding of law and methods over which the 
local legal practice develops. A revision as such involves a broad range of 
reconsiderations, which in the case of study has even reached the 
understanding of legal (re)sources and legal reasoning. This chapter provided 
an exploration of the ongoing discursive and cognitive reconfigurations derived 
from the rule of law reformation enterprise in the Mexican context, but also of 
the problems derived from them. We noted that the problem experienced by 
Mexican legal practitioners regarding legal precedents is properly understood 
as ‘a problem of knowledge’ derived from the a strong epistemic revision, 
which calls for the development of new explicit and tacit knowledge. 
Reaching a new equilibrium from conflicting frameworks, as well as acquiring 
accurate skills by Mexican legal practitioners seems to be taking a long time. In 
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the meantime instability is felt and permeates the whole legal enterprise. 
Therefore, legal practitioners need to improve their knowledge regarding 
precedents, but this does not seem to be taking place from within. In moments 
as such it is particular useful to examine how others devise similar practices. In 
this way, we consider that only by understanding precedents outside the 
Mexican context, we will be able to see precedent-based reasoning in a 
different shape, and actually revise and reconfigure the local practice along 
more functional lines. For this reason we will dedicate our next chapter to 
attaining a better understanding of legal precedents, identifying some lessons 






4. Lessons on Precedent-Based Reasoning 
 
“Through others, we become ourselves.” 
 Lev Vygotsky, Child Psychology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In a moment of radical legal reconfiguration, as the one that the Mexican legal 
community seems to be experiencing, it is highly useful to observe how problematic 
tasks, such as precedent-based reasoning, are generally thought to be performed. The 
problem is where from to draw useful understandings regarding that practice – that 
is, where to find clear and unbiased indications of why and how professionals carry 
on their tasks. This is particularly difficult with regards to precedents-based 
reasoning, whereas the descriptions of how legal practitioners deal with past legal 
decisions have often been permeated by theoretical and ideological partisanship or 
derive from specific contexts. Herein we consider that legal theoretical perspectives 
are a good starting point to gain a better understanding of how precedents work. 
Nevertheless, they need to be complemented with other insights in order to be 
appreciated in the right dimension. Herein we aim to provide an expanded view of 
precedents – that is, a view that takes into account insights from different areas of 
study. We consider that expanding our understanding might help us grasping some of 
the core functions and operations of precedent-based reasoning beyond the 
traditional ways of portraying this activity, and which mainly refer to particular 
doctrines of precedents operating in the common law tradition. 
In fact, according to some segments of the legal scholarship legal precedents are 
characteristic feature of the common law tradition, and not of civil law systems. It 
has been argued for long that the main distinction between the common law and the 
civil law tradition lays on their different treatment of legal precedents. The 
predominant role of precedents has been usually praised as the main feature of the 
common law, as opposed to the rejection of any significant role of past judicial cases 
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in the civil law context.
1
 Common law practitioners are frequently seen as working 
widely with decided cases, while their civil law counterparts as dealing mainly with 
codes and doctrine. The ones are usually depicted as exclusively dealing with case-
based particularities, whereas the others immerse in abstractions.
2
 The following 
extract from John Salmond exemplifies the common viewpoint: 
The importance of judicial precedents has always been a distinguishing characteristic of 
English law […] In practice, if not in theory, the common law of England has been 
manufactured by the decisions of English judges. Neither Roman law, however, nor any 




Even if these general claims contain fragments of truth, they might need to be 
mitigated to describe fairly legal practice in the several corners of the civil law 
tradition, especially as functioning nowadays.
4
 Historical studies have evidenced the 
fact that precedents have not been totally unknown in the civil law world in past 
times. Also, according to recent comparative studies, precedents might not be as 
foreign to several legal systems belonging to the civil law tradition, as it has been 
commonly stated.
5
 Nowadays, it seems that certain international or supranational 
exchanges,
6
 and the spreading of the model of ‘adversarial legalism’ that gives 
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 John Bell notes that many books on comparative law reproduce stereotypes regarding the use of 
precedents in the two major legal traditions. The common rhetoric and presentation of the civilian 
tradition (mainly represented by France) is that it rejects precedents the status of sources of law, while 
the common law tradition takes for granted that precedents are important legal sources. John Bell, 
‘Book Review: Comparing Precedents’ (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 1248. 
2
 John H Baker, ‘Case Law in England and Continental Europe’ in The Common Law Tradition: 
Lawyers, Books and the Law (The Hambledon Press 2000) 108. 
3
 John Salmond quoted in James W Tubbs, The Common Law Mind: Medieval and Early Modern 
Conceptions (Johns Hopkins University Press 2000) 179. 
4
 Zweigert and Kötz have noted that: ‘recently the attitudes of Common Law and Continental Law 
have been drawing closer. On the Continent statute law is losing something of its primacy; lawyers no 
longer see decision-making as a merely technical and automatic process, but accept that the 
comprehensive principles laid down by statutes call for broad interpretation, and have begun to treat 
the jurisprudence constante of the courts as an independent source of law.’ Konrad Zweigert and Hein 
Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn OUP 1998) 71. 
5
 See: Neil MacCormick and Robert Summers (eds), Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study 
(Ashgate-Dartmouth 1997); Ewound Hondius, Precedent and the law. Reports to the XVIIth Congress 
of the International Academy of Comparative law, Utrecht, 16-22 July 2006 (Bruylant 2007). 
6
 For example, the increasing exposure to legal precedents delivered by international and 
supranational decision makers, such as those of the European Court of Justice and the European Court 
of Human rights, has the potential of changing the local style of dealing with precedent, especially in 
the civil law world. See: Allen Shoenberger, ‘Change in the European Civil Law Systems: Infiltration 
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primacy to courts in the production of law,
7
 might be facilitating further intersections 
in the use of precedents in the civil law and common law world. However, it appears 
that certain historical facts (e.g. theoretical commitments) ruled out or reduced the 
open and extended use of precedents in the civilian tradition.
8
 On the contrary, 
historically the common law tradition has expressly allowed, and to a certain extent 
encouraged, the use of past (judicial) cases. In fact, past cases have persistently been 
considered central in the development of the common law, despite the changes in 
doctrine. 
In this way, we might conclude that using legal precedents is not a practice limited to 
common law systems, but that precedents form part of the artillery of both common 
law and civil law practitioners, and that play a more or less important role in the 
construction of the law, legal argumentation and of judicial decision making. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that practice with precedents across the two legal 
traditions is one and the same. Historical facts have shaped divergent discourses and 
knowledge structures across legal traditions, leading to different styles in the use of 
legal information.
9
 In a certain way, these differences seem to have placed common 
law systems in a one way or the other more advantageous position with regards to 
their understanding of legal precedents.
10
 
                                                                                                                                          
of the Angloamerican Case Law System of Precedent into the Civil Law System’ (2009) 55 Loyola 
Law Review. 
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 Jan Komarek, ‘Reasoning with Previous Decisions: Beyond the Doctrine of Precedent’ (2013) 61 
American Journal of Comparative Law. 
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crucial role.’ Neil MacCormick and Robert S Summers, ‘Further General Reflections and 
Conclusions’ in Neil MacCormick and Robert S Summers (eds), Interpreting Precedents: A 
Comparative Study (Ashgate-Dartmouth 1997) 532. 
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of law. Aleksander Peczenik, ‘Scientia Juris: Legal Doctrine as Knowledge of Law and as a Source of 
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(Springer 2005) 1-8. 
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 Komarek has argued that civilians are not unskilful when reasoning with precedents, but that they 
have their own ways of dealing with cases beyond the common law understanding of precedent. See: 
Komarek (n 7). We do not tend to refute the fact that civil-law methods of reasoning with past 
decisions are somehow different to those of the common law, and that, therefore, common law 
theories of precedents might not provide complete insights of practices elsewhere. Nevertheless, we 
do acknowledge that due to the historical development of the civil law tradition past decisions seem to 
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In fact, in some civil law jurisdictions the historical commitments have lead to 
problematic approaches to precedents. In this respect, Siltala has noted that the 
United Kingdom and the United States seem to have a well articulated doctrine and 
tradition on precedents, while the contrary holds for civil law countries such as Italy 
and France. He notes that, for example, in France it is lived ‘a curious divergence of 
the officially expounded ideology of adjudication and the judges own professional 
self-understanding of their role in judicial adjudication’ – meaning that, even if under 
the official ideology precedents lack any kind of official force and deciding present 
cases on the grounds of past decisions is considered as ‘not motivated and illegal’ 
according to the Civil Code, previous decisions are used and considered de facto 
authoritative by legal practitioners.
11
 Additionally, Siltala noted that in countries like 
Italy, there is ‘a mixture of […] conflicting and mutually inconsistent theoretical 
positions’ regarding precedents.
12
 Further, according to Siltala the source of these 
deficiencies lies in the lack of professional self-reflection on how to do things with 
precedents and the absence of proper case-based reasoning tools.
13
  
For certain reasons, that are not possible to deeply analyse in these thesis, most of 
civilian jurisdictions,
14
 despite their explicit ideological and theoretical 
commitments, seem to have managed to develop legal practitioners with a somehow 
better intuition and tacit understanding of precedent-based reasoning than in the case 
of Mexican practitioners. We could only assume that somehow the process of legal 
education in these systems provides practitioners with some general legal reasoning 
tools, which allows them to engage in a form of precedent-based reasoning without 
facing the extreme problems of the Mexican community. This leads to considering 
that perhaps in these legal systems certain ‘theories in use’ overpass the ‘espoused 
                                                                                                                                          
have remained under-explored. Additionally, we consider that it is possible to understand further past 
decisions in the civil law context by analysing precedents in the common law – and at the same time 
to ‘mind the gap’ between the historical decisions of both traditions. 
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 In this way, tacit knowledge, even if not explicitly supported, might still 
be transferred across generations. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the bolder acknowledgement of the practice of 
precedents has provided some advantages for common law practitioners. In this 
respect, it has helped building a stronger theoretical framework, a more developed 
doctrine of precedents, a relatively more open and effective transmission of the 
accepted canons of precedent-based reasoning, and a community of practitioners 
with better knowledge regarding the operation of precedents. Moreover, legal 
systems of the common law tradition have also shown more academic interest in 
analysing different features of the practice with precedents, which has had an 
important impact on the development of legal research. For a long time most of the 
academic investigations into precedents and precedent-based reasoning have come 
from or have been related to common law systems, only followed in bulk by those 
referring to mixed-jurisdictions. It is only in recent times that legal academia has 
exhibited an increasing interest in the amount of precedents produced by supra-
national and international entities, and that the use of precedents in different civil law 
countries has come to considerable attention. 
Legal theorists in the common law world have held a longstanding interest in legal 
precedents, and have produced extensive literature on the broader subject. Reviewing 
legal theoretical perspectives is a very fertile exercise for one who aims to gain a 
general understanding of legal precedents. Nevertheless, one should be very careful 
while pursuing this undertaking, since theoretical conclusions could lead to 
overextended generalisations. Legal theories have the tendency to present themselves 
as free of space and time constraints. Actually, legal theory has the tendency to hide 
that the abstract explanatory frameworks it provides usually derive from particular 
institutional settings. In fact, sometimes the general theories offered only represent 
the law or legal features in a particular context – that is they take some particular 
institutional traits as general characteristics. In this manner, where theoretical 
constructions are not mindful of the fact that legal features develop within particular 
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contexts, we must acknowledge the possible tension between theoretical 
generalisation and contextual particularities.  
The awareness of the law’s contextual character has entirely permeated this thesis. In 
previous chapters we acknowledged the value of Pierre Legrand’s reminder that legal 
styles develop as a product of a historically built context. A culturalist approach to 
law stressing the particularities, however useful, can have important limitations: it 
can reduce the possibilities of communicating relevant developments from one legal 
system to the other. For this thesis, abandoning ourselves to an irremediable 
incommunicability would be strongly problematic, since in the Mexican legal system 
practitioners seem to be experiencing difficulties in finding the solutions for its 
problems autonomously and, therefore, from within. This being the case, it becomes 
important to pose the following questions: Can we communicate insights between 
jurisdictions without making overextended conclusions? Is it still possible to be 
mindful of contextual differences even when we purposively introduce knowledge 
from elsewhere?  
Similar questions have been addressed by Geoffrey Samuel who insightfully 
identifies the advantages – but, in the same respect, also the shortcomings – of both 
generalising legal theories and what he catalogues as contextual post-modernist 
perspectives. He notes that since ‘it is at the level of legal theory that differences 
between legal families become elusive […], then the style of a particular family will 
appear of little relevance.’
16
 It is the function (and probably also the strength) of legal 
theory to transcend legal families or legal systems by making general claims; 
however, as Samuel has noted ‘post-modernist thinking has the great advantage of 
allowing one to escape from this kind of logic and to ask whether a legal theory born 
out of one legal family is appropriate for another family’.
17
 The tension between 
generalisation and contextualism, however, does not seem to dissolve. Nevertheless, 
the (historically developed) particularities and the generalised knowledge claims of 
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legal theory should be in a constant dialogue that may eventually allow finding 
useful intersections. 
In this chapter, we will follow a similar perspective, presenting generalising legal 
theories of precedents, but at the same time use legal history to understand them in 
the right dimension. The legal theories we present mainly derive from the common 
law understanding of precedents, but once reviewed through the lenses of their 
contextual origins we expect to find relevant ‘lessons’ for the Mexican system with 
regards to the use of legal precedents. Herein we shall speak of ‘lessons’ as these are 
associated to learning experiences that recognise the active role of the learning agent 
in reconstructing knowledge and creating associations. By taking foreign legal 
experiences as ‘lessons’, we distance ourselves from the tendency of searching 
across legal systems for all or nothing guidelines; from reducing foreign insights to 
absolutes of the kind that either should or should not be fully adopted. In many 
respects, is this latter inclination has for long haunted legal comparative studies and 
institutional design, which (as analysed in Chapter 3) have succumbed to the 
unyielding language of legal transplants. We argue that in talking about such things 
as ‘lessons’ we recognise that in other systems legal practitioners might have 
developed sharper insights with regards to certain legal features, which might be of 
use knowing in a different context. Additionally, we think that by using this language 
we denote that whoever is receiving a lesson can further interpret or develop it. 
Nevertheless, this thesis will take this learning experience some steps further by 
additionally analysing perspectives on precedents that do not proceed from the legal 
theory background. It is to say that due to the language and epistemological 
paradigm of orthodox legal theory, the interests and questions that theories have been 
asking regarding precedents might be rather limited.
18
  Theoretical constructions on 
precedent sometimes are contracting each other or seem to be leaving some aspects 
behind.  As in this study our aim is to provide a clear image of the use the precedents 
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that eventually can serve educative purposes, and that at some point could orient the 
legal community when using these legal sources, we will recur to the analysis of 
other understandings on the matter, especially those developed in the cognitive 
science and the legal artificial intelligence (hereinafter legal AI) community. These 
understandings are not an alternative to legal theories, but insights that allow us to 
make sense of legal precedents theories and see more clearly which of these 
theoretical constructions seem better grounded than others. 
AI studies are not frequently used for the purpose of understanding how legal 
precedents are approached by legal practitioners. Nevertheless, they should not be 
overlooked, since they may potentially provide us with very useful insights that are 
often not captured by the descriptions and prescriptions of legal theory. As the aim of 
AI has been to recreate human processes by computers they have dedicated a 
considerable amount of effort to modelling different forms of human problem 
solving methods, used both in an out the legal practice. As noted by Rissland, the AI 
community has made important progress in developing techniques, computational 
models, and systems that allow modelling human cognition and building systems to 
get the job done.
19
 The AI community has show special interests in the methods of 
legal reasoning followed by human experts, especially with regards to their handling 
of precedents. Thus, the work of AI provides a quite elaborate blueprint of the 
processes involved when reasoning with legal precedents that draws both on legal 
theoretical understandings and cognitive sciences insights.  
Computer scientists have informed their models of reasoning with precedent with 
insights from legal theory, but also from those more general views regarding 
analogical reasoning and case-based reasoning (hereinafter CBR) provided by 
cognitive scientists. That is to say, these studies take into account the generalities of 
case based reasoning as operating in different disciplines, but – when exploring legal 
practice to the point – they provide an interesting and useful intersection of relevant 
understandings regarding legal precedents. Following this, as AI research has come 
across important findings about the diverse and significant uses of past cases in 
human knowledge construction, classification, evaluation and acquisition, we will 
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take recourse to such knowledge output in order to provide the widened the picture 
of legal precedents that we are aiming at.
20
  
Thus, in this chapter we will, first, analyse some of the main theoretical perspectives 
on legal precedents. The theoretical enquiry regarding precedents is most focused on 
unveiling the justifications lying behind the use of precedents and presenting models 
of precedents ‘anatomy’ and ‘physiology.’ The models included herein derive mainly 
from observations about reasoning with legal precedents in the common law 
tradition. As already observed, it is a common tendency for these theoretical 
articulations to make general claims about legal precedents, often forgetting their 
own contextual origins. Nevertheless, in this work we will approach theoretical 
models not as providing general a-contextual grounds applicable to any jurisdiction, 
but as thoughtful insights about certain legal features that might be transformed into 
useful examples or lessons to be used in other jurisdictions.  
Additionally, we engage into a brief historical overview of legal precedents, focusing 
mainly in the common law context, but also including insights of respective civil law 
developments. Our objective in this exploration is to re-dimension the legal 
theoretical perspectives according to the historical development followed by 
precedent-based reasoning. Both the historical and the comparative perspective are 
two important tools for expanding our vision and achieving a degree of detachment 
from false generalisations. Also, in an attempt to see precedents past this scope we 
will present relevant research in the areas of AI regarding precedent based reasoning, 
from which we will derive further lessons of potential value for the Mexican system. 
There is one parenthetical remark to add at this stage of the discussion, before we 
proceed with examining the theoretical perspectives on legal precedents. The 
following analyses will not make a sharp distinction between precedents as a 
formally recognised source of law (as e.g. in the manner of stare decisis) and 
precedents as an informal reasoning tool, while exploring the practices of reasoning 
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with legal precedents in general. The distinction between the formal authority of past 
decisions (provided by explicit institutional recognition) and the informal authority 
(provided by lawyers consulting and referring past decisions) will, however, start to 
appear more clear after our exploration of legal theoretical models on precedents and 
legal history. Common law systems seem to intertwine both approaches to 
precedents. Civil law systems feature mainly the latter, to the point that they value 
these past instances of reading the law, but they might not consider them part of the 
formal legal narrative. Nevertheless, after our exploration we will find out that this 
distinction might not always be clear or even useful. 
4.2 Legal Theories on Precedents 
Legal theorists have typically discussed two main subjects in relationship with 
precedents. First, they have tried to understand the reasons behind the use of 
precedents, i.e. the justifications for the existence of precedents in a legal system. 
Second, they have attempted to provide an account of how legal reasoners use legal 
precedents. This latest subject has been usually connected to the question of what are 
precedents, which usually leads to providing an ‘anatomical’ analysis of precedents 
that connects to the form of reasoning they entail. However, there are a few accounts 
less concerned with unveiling the true form of precedents and providing a 
‘physiological’ account – that is a description of their way of functioning.  
We consider that inquiring on both the reasons behind the use of precedents, as well 
as the anatomical and physiological portraits of precedents provides us with relevant 
information for the reconfiguration of precedents in the Mexican context. 
Nevertheless, the literature attempting to account for precedents nature and way of 
functioning is extensive and divergent. In fact some of these perspectives seem to 
derive from normative indications, while others attempt to offer descriptions. In this 
sense, once again we need to be mindful with the offered theories and assess them in 
the light of different considerations.  
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4.2.1 Reasons for Precedents 
The reasons that have generally supported the practice of considering and adhering to 
precedents (either when ordered explicitly by a rule or principle or when happening 
without an expressed articulation) have been frequently the values of equality and 
legal predictability, which are considered highly relevant in a well functioning legal 
system.  
Equality justifies the use of precedents on moral grounds since they are instruments 
to attain the moral value of justice, at least in its formal shape. It is difficult to 
conceive of any successful system embracing the rule of law that does not hold the 
value of formal equality. Significatively, the law is currently connected to the idea of 
equality in adjudication, that is, to the application of the same justice to everyone – 
which entails that like cases should be treated alike, regardless of who are the parties 
and who is deciding the case. As noted by MacCormick ‘[f]aithfulness to the Rule of 
Law calls for avoiding any frivolous variation in the pattern of decision-making from 
one judge or court to another.’
21
 In this terms, failing to treat similar cases in a 
similar way it is considered arbitrary, and, thus, unjust. In this manner, the 
prerequisite of guaranteeing justice seems to require that future decisions are in 
concordance with previous resolutions deciding upon similar cases.  
Formal equality is in general at the basis of any legal system’s design and precedents 
are considered a way of achieving it. Codes and statutes have been more generally 
considered as the for excellence manner to achieve formal justice. However, 
precedents usually provide a further reflection on the relations of equality between 
certain legal categories and factual situations that were not considered by more 
abstract aprioristic formulations. Precedents, thus, are more concrete articulations or 
interpretations of the categories that should share a certain treatment according to the 
law. Nevertheless, one of the most complex matters in the use of precedents is 
precisely the evaluation of ‘likeness’ – that is, determining what situations should be 
considered as belonging to the same legal category, and, consequently, treated in the 
same manner. As we shall see, different models of precedent based reasoning 
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propose diverse versions regarding the assessment of likeness: from mere fact 
comparison to concept-based categorisations.  
Another reason for precedents is that they constitute means to secure a predictable or 
certain legal system, which allows subjects to engage in different activities with a 
priori knowledge of the consequences they will encounter. The fact that legal 
precedents are seen as a means to secure predictability seems somehow ironic if we 
take into account that the main problem felt by Mexican legal practitioners with 
regards to precedents was that, in their view, they contributed to the unpredictability 
of law. In this sense, the way precedents are seen to make the law more predictable 
or certain might reveal us something about the problems experienced by Mexican 
practitioners.  
The premise of the value of predictability is the usefulness of being able to anticipate 
the future. Thus, the idea of using legal precedents relies partly in social stability, 
that is, in the creation of a context that supports firmness in social expectations and 
orderly interactions.
22
 In other scopes of life where innovation is at the core, as for 
example in arts, it is likely that consistency with the past is not as relevant as areas 
that attempt to provide stability, such as the law, although of course that does not 
mean that the past lacks meaning for the artistic enterprise. This general quest for 
legal predictability or certainty is fulfilled with different ‘legal devices’, but along 
history it has been claimed that legislation and codes are more suitable than 
precedents for this purpose. Actually, Bentham posed well-known criticisms to the 
common law’s capacity of securing predictability through its system of precedents.
23
 
Contrary to Bentham’s conclusions, others claim that judicial precedents also help 
legal predictability by securing a more consistent decision making. Indeed, legal 
precedents seem to narrow the gaps and ambiguities left by legislative law, reducing 
the space for discretion. As noted by MacCormick ‘the job of the legislation is never 
completed when the text leaves the legislature. […] The final process of 
concretisation or determination […] will still have to take place through judicial 
decision. In future, reliable commentaries on the legislation will give an account of 
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the judicial glosses and explanations or interpretations that now contribute to the 
body of law that the legislation has called into being.’
24
 Thus, judicial precedents 
should be able to reduce uncertainty by building more concrete legal patterns than 
the abstract rules of codes and statutes.  
Nevertheless, the form in which legal precedents contribute to predictability is not 
totally clear. The reasons for this confusion have to do with the historical 
introduction of the doctrine of stare decisis in the common law, which led to the 
theoretical assimilation of precedents with binding rules. In this respect, some 
theorists seem to consider that legal precedents help certainty by lying down rules 
that must be applied in the future (we will later on provide a more comprehensive 
explanation of the model of rules). This understanding is, however, problematic for 
several reasons. First, it seems that the predictable framework delivered in this 
manner is quite narrow, comprising only the area of textual clarity of the rule. 
Second, it does not account for law as an argumentative practice, where new legal 
considerations are always bringing dynamism to the law. Third, focusing on 
predictability of this sort creates a strong tension between the value of legal certainty 




This sort of predictability seems to be close to the expectations of Mexican legal 
practitioners, which expect clear indications of legality in the form of all-or-nothing 
rules. Nevertheless, Dewey suggests that we give up this image of legal certainty. He 
notes that ‘[e]normous confusion has resulted, however, from confusion of 
theoretical certainty and practical certainty. There is a wide gap separating the 
reasonable proposition that judicial decisions should possess the maximum possible 
regularity in order to enable persons in planning their conduct to foresee the legal 
import of their acts, and the absurd because impossible proposition that every 
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decision should flow with formal logical necessity from antecedently known 
premises.’
26
 In that sense, ‘to claim that old forms are ready at hand, that cover every 
case and that may be applied by formal syllogizing is to pretend to a certainty and 
regularity which cannot exist in fact. The effect of the pretension is to increase 
practical uncertainty and social instability.’
27
 In his view, the general legal rules and 
principles contained in past legal decisions are ‘working hypotheses, needing to be 
constantly tested by the way in which they work out in application to concrete 
situations.’
28
 Failing to acknowledge the operation of these mechanics increases the 
‘sense’ of unpredictability. The question is if we can think of a form of certainty that 
is broader and less rigid. Dewey considered that legal certainty should be better 
achieved through considering general principles as useful statements of the ways a 
precedent has been treated. In this way, certainties are better understood as reliable 
expectancies. However, subscribing to the idea of certainty as reliable expectancies 
might lead to consider that legal decision making is a matter of precise quantitative 
legal predictions, as in fact some legal academics and practitioners seem to assume.
29
 
The image of the legal professional as one concerned with statistical regularities 
might not be an accurate or even desirable one. Legal professional can be better seen 
as deriving less technical certainties from the construction of coherent legal 
narratives. In this form, precedents help legal predictability inasmuch they help 
making-sense of the bulk of law and building coherent narratives. Certainty unfolds 
as knowing in advance the strength of certain arguments against other possibilities. 
As noted by MacCormick, [t]his is not an exact science, for it is not a science at all 
but a practical skill, a practical art. Yet it very much depends upon knowledge and 
learning […]’
30
 These certainties are not of the kind that cannot be doubted –even if 
the community of experts shares this view and treats it as axiomatic– instead, they 
should be treated as potentially defeasible certainties.
31
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This version of legal predictability or certainty is a more functional one if we take 
into account the argumentative dynamic character of the law. The arguability of the 
law introduces dynamicity and flexibility into the legal enterprise, making it difficult 
to find indubitable fixed certainties in legal sources such as precedents. In this form, 
it becomes important that legal practitioners are able to detect or ‘see’ certainties 
arising from more or less coherent legal patterns. Understanding legal certainty in 
this form seems to be more useful for legal practitioners when performing complex 
tasks, i.e. where there is a plurality of considerations. This form of operation also 
finds support in some insights from the cognitive sciences, where subjects are seen as 
resorting to coherence-making when facing complex tasks.
32
  
Besides equality and predictability precedents have been justified along different 
lines. Certain views seem to indicate that the use of precedents responds to 
epistemological and cognitive functions. Precedents seem to fulfil an important role 
in knowledge development and acquisition. MacCormick and Summers have argued 
that ‘[a]pplying lessons of the past to solve problems of present and future is a basic 
part of human practical reasoning.’
33
 In this way, precedents play an important role 
for legal reasoners as they constitute lessons to solve current and future problems. It 
has also been noted that ‘[t]he body of precedents available for consideration in any 
legal setting represents, at its best, an accumulation of wisdom from the past.’
34
  
Actually, history seems to indicate that precedents in the common law and the 
civilian tradition, at first, emerged in accordance to the natural process of knowledge 
construction and acquisition. This basic function seems to be performed by past legal 
cases despite their recognition (or lack of it) as sources of law in a strict sense. 
Although the relevance of past cases in this enterprise –against other means of legal 
communication, such as legislation and doctrinal writings– seems to be a matter of 
style of each legal system. 
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Similarly, in ‘Precedent and Tradition’ Kronman also seems to attribute 
epistemological and cognitive functions to legal precedents, although he seems to 
imply that precedents also help sustaining a determined legal identity. He asserts that 
reliance on past experience appears as a normal feature in diverse spheres of life, and 
that the legal past is a repository of information for judges and lawyers.
35
 Kronman 
highlights the importance of the system of precedents in building an internal legal 
history, tradition and even a collective legal memory, as well as the learning value 
that past experience has for further legal practice. We are reminded that the past is 
worth of consideration and that acknowledging precedents is justified by the 
potential of the past to provide us with long standing lessons that prevents us from 
starting afresh. In law, the past is remembered and honoured by taking into account 
past cases. Nevertheless, in Kronman’s view, precedents are relevant not only 
because they are a source of wisdom but also because historical features claim 
authority. He affirms that precedents claim certain authority as a reflection of the 
traditionalist attitude that pervades different areas of human life.
36
 This attitude 
compels future generations to respect the world that precedes them, that prevents 
them from starting life afresh like ‘flies of a summer’, as only in this way it is 
possible for a generation to surpass previous accomplishments.
37
 In his view, the past 
not only provides important lessons, but as it produces the world in which we 
inhabit, it should be honoured. Therefore, ‘[a] failure to honour the past is thus not 
only foolish or imprudent – the stupidly shortsighted waste of its accumulated 
wisdom’, but it is also ‘supreme ingratitude.’
38
  
Kronman’s ideas point out to the epistemological and cognitive functions of 
precedents – i.e. the role of precedents in the construction and development of the 
law, and, in providing templates for future legal reasoners – but he confers a strong 
sense of authority to the past for the sole matter of being the creation of previous 
generations. This reverential attitude towards the past has the potential to become the 
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‘superstitious antiquarianism’ that Kronman actually criticises.
39
 Kronman’s 
perspective is, however, valuable as it highlights a very general aspect of human life, 
that is, the transmission of common knowledge across generations for its future use. 
However, this perspective seems to forget that in law not all legal information is 
equally useful when engaging into the legal (argumentative) practice – that is, that 
there are some fragments of past that are better understood as ‘legal history’ and 
others that constitute sound examples. The form in which legal precedents are further 
used by legal reasoners is something we will discuss next.  
4.2.2 Models of Precedent-Based Reasoning 
In most legal systems with a longstanding tradition of reasoning with precedents, 
legal experts seem to perform diverse complex operation with precedent cases 
without much problem. In fact, they seem to transfer the knowledge of how to deal 
with past legal decisions without trouble. Legal reasoners, thus, have generally 
incorporated certain models about how to do things with precedents that allow them 
to perform within a framework of rational regularity. Unravelling these models of 
precedents has been subject of multiple jurisprudential enquires; however, for legal 
theory, the understanding of what arguing with precedents actually means has proven 
a rather obscure and contested issue.
40
  
In general, legal theories providing an account of precedents have mainly focused on 
unveiling the ontological nature of legal precedents and explaining the type of 
authorities they represent for, particularly, judges. In this section we will present the 
most representative theoretical models of reasoning with legal precedents that have 
discussed the nature and functioning of precedents in legal reasoning – i.e. 
precedents ‘anatomy’ and ‘physiology’. Herein, rather than discovering the nature of 
precedents, we attempt to understand the influence that precedents pose on legal 
reasoners, and the way they make use of past cases. Most of the models to be 
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presented, picture the understandings of precedents in the common law tradition, but 
even then they can be seen as providing useful insights on certain aspects of the 
practice of reasoning with precedents in some civil law countries. The majority of the 
models we present, though, have been built without taking into account empirical 
data on how precedents work in the jurisdictions from which they derive, although 
some of them do aim at explaining legal reasoning as observed in practice. The last 
model to be presented, however, has a different origin; it derives from a posteriori 
empirical observations of legal systems belonging to both the civil law and the 
common law tradition, which grants it a wide explanatory power in different settings.  
4.2.1.1 Natural Model of Precedent 
According to this model courts should give precedents whatever moral weight they 
have in an all-considered process of reasoning and independently of any institutional 
requirement to follow past judicial decisions.
41
 This model has as a starting point that 
courts should not be lying down rules and that the force of precedents results only 
from their role in securing the values of equality and predictability. In this sense, 
courts should take into account precedents and the values they entail just as another 
reason in the evaluation of the best possible decision. Once a court decides a case, 
that decision constitutes just a single reason for future cases to be decided on similar 
grounds, which ought to be evaluated next to the overall morally relevant reasons. 
Since judges perform this wide deliberation every time they reach a decision, 
precedents do not posses legal authority. Precedents alone neither provide relevant 
reasons, nor limit the scope of reasons that should be taken into account in order to 
make a legal decision. Past decisions are only another element to be taken into 
account in a reasoning process that is intrinsically moral. 
Alexander explains this model of reasoning with an example.
42
 Imagine that you 
have two children and you grant one of them permission to attend a concert at the 
age of thirteen. In a sense, this decision remains as a precedent for the other younger 
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child to expect having permission at the age of thirteen. Nevertheless, the parent will 
make a decision not only based on the fact that he has acted in a certain way in the 
past; he has also to analyse what is the best decision in the present case all-things 
considered. In this manner, the parent has to take into account if the level of maturity 
of his child allows repeating the previous decision, if the circumstances of safety in 
both concerts are equally guaranteed. The existence of a past decision is, however, an 
important reason in itself that has to be assessed. The past decision creates an 
expectation that things will be decided on similar grounds and that both subjects will 
be treated with equality. But the values of certainty and equality that following 
precedents entail can be easily surpassed if there are strong enough reasons of any 
nature that point towards a different decision.  
The main criticism against this model has been that it relies heavily in the good 
judgment of the decision maker, who seems able to identify all possible relevant 
reasons and assess their importance. Opposite views argue that judges are not perfect 
reasoners, and therefore, all-things-considered models of decision making would lead 
to uncountable errors in real life and would most likely fail in providing an adequate 
basis for coordination. There are few subscribers to this model of precedent in its 
purest form, as generally legal precedents are seen as giving more than just another 
reason for a legal decision. Nevertheless, this seems to be the theory that most 
models of precedents as binding sources seem to be attempting to distance from. In 
the fact, certain models of precedents assume that an undesirable, free, all-things-
considered process of reasoning arises when precedents are not understood as rules 
that ought to be strictly followed, that is, as formal constrains.  
Proceeding in an all-things-considered manner, or in other words, taking the best 
morally decision entails a pure form of substantive reasoning, which does not seem 
to be a frequent allowance in legal systems. Generally, legal systems seem to permit 
some form of evaluation of precedents in accordance with substantive grounds – that 
is, an assessment of their moral, economic, political, institutional, or social value.
43
 
Nevertheless, the introduction of substantive reasoning is usually performed with 
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more modesty that the one suggested by the natural model of precedent. Substantive 
considerations are generally introduced into the law in a dialogical form – that is by 
testing the scope of the precedent by introducing ‘what if situations’ involving moral, 
political, social or other values. In this sense, considering substantive reasons do not 
always entail overlooking the law, but it might be a form of accommodating these 
considerations into the law. The natural account of precedents, however, does not 
seem to accommodate the flexibility and dynamism that this dialogical process 
entails. In a way, this model presupposes that precedents are fixed rules.  
4.2.1.2 Rule Model of Precedent 
The orthodox view of precedents in legal theory is that they operate as rules which 
bind later courts. In fact, this model, together with the own biases of the local 
community, might also have contributed with the Mexican idealisation of a system of 
precedents that functions following the logic of rules. The model of rules is usually 
presented in opposition to the natural model of precedents, which does not see past 
cases as constraints but as reasons to be taken into account in an all-things-
considered process of decision making. This viewpoint also contrasts with those that 
understand precedents as constraints of a weaker sort, departing from the idea that 
past decisions constitute all-or-nothing binding rules. 
In this perspective, a case in which a particular matter is decided becomes a rule to 
deal with that sort of disputes, similarly to the way statutes lay down rules which are 
applied to later cases that meet certain conditions. Previous cases constitute what 
Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin call ‘serious rules’, that is, prescriptions that 
apply to a range of cases exercising pre-emptive authority over decision-makers.
44
 
The courts are bound to find the applicable precedent rules to the case at hand, 
deduce the consequences, and decide accordingly. Positivist theory understands the 
essence of law to be authoritative guidance by means of source-based, duty-imposing 
rules.
45
 Legal precedents are, thus, seen as announcing legal rules, which are 
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expected to be applied by future courts in similar circumstances, in order to secure 
the certainty of the legal system.  
The primary obligation of judicial decision makers is to interpret, apply and enforce 
pre-existent rules of the system.
46
 The consideration and application of legal 
precedents, thus, constitutes a legal obligation for judges, which are under the duty to 
apply whatever source-based positive rules are recognised in a legal system as 
laws.
47
 Precedents, understood as rules, act as exclusionary reasons issued by 
authority – that is, they overrule any other reasons against rule compliance. In this 
sense, authoritative norms pre-empt any substantive assessment of what are the right 
reasons for an action. At first, legal precedents are produced as an exercise of 
discretion by the courts that, facing a gap in the law, needed to act in the same way 
that legislatures do, creating exclusionary rules for citizens and courts. However, the 
authoritatively enacted exclusionary rules of judicial origin ought to be applied by 
the judiciary in compliance with their judicial obligation. It is only by the adhesion to 
previously enacted rules that it is possible to guarantee the high regularity in rulings 
that is needed to give conduct in the way that is characteristic of a legal system.
48
 
Precedents understood as rules are considered formally binding, thus, they cannot be 
weighed against another: they can only be obeyed or expressly rejected.
49
  
Nevertheless, the strong understanding of judicial obligation and legal bindingness 
that the model of ‘precedents as rules’ appeals to has lead to narrow descriptions of 
what argument from precedent means. In this respect, Frederick Schauer, a strong 
supporter of this theoretical model, has advocated for a distinction between what he 
calls ‘arguments from experience’ and ‘arguments from precedents’ in an effort to 
guard the general conceptual framework.
50
 For him, the main difference between the 
two uses of the past lies on the constraint that the past decision represents for the 
future decision maker. In this form, ‘[w]hen the choice whether to rely on a prior 
decision maker is entirely in the hands of the present decisionmaker, the prior 
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decision does not constrain the present decision, and the present decisionmaker 
violates no norm by disregarding it’, this cannot be called an argument from 
precedent per se.
51
 As we can see, Schauer depicts precedent as a ‘rule of precedent’ 
opposed to ‘non rule-governed choice’ to rely in past decisions. In fact, ‘[a] naked 
argument from precedent thus urges that a decisionmaker give weight to a particular 
result regardless of whether that decisionmaker believes it to be correct and 
regardless of whether that decision maker believes it valuable in any way to rely on 
that previous result’.
52
 In ‘Thinking Like a Lawyer’ Schauer explains that 
‘understanding the idea of precedent requires appreciating the difference between 
learning from the past, on the one hand, and following the past just because of the 
fact of a past decision, on the other.’
53
 Schauer, thus, affirms that learning from a 
previous case or being persuaded by past decisions is not precedential reasoning – 
since the decision to do what the court has done previously is not based on the 
previous case status as precedent, that cannot be considered as relying on or obeying 
precedent at all, it is instead an example of the human capacity to learn from others 
and from the past.
54
  
In his view, thus, using the past as template is not reasoning with precedents, but 
following the command established by the doctrine of stare decisis is. On the one 
hand, vertical stare decisis can be identified with the model of following the 
hierarchical ‘chain of command’ characteristic of military obedience and, on the 
other, horizontal stare decisis appears more like ‘sticking to one’s word’ – but none 
of these types of reasons can be identified with that learning from past experience or 
deciding to use the past as template. In these contexts, present judges should stick to 
binding precedents regardless of being persuaded by them or even disagreeing with 
the decisions. Schauer’s conceptualisation of precedents focuses on reasoning with 
cases when they ought to be followed in virtue of an established command 
articulated in the form of a rule or a doctrine. He seems to attribute the character of 
[binding] precedent to a case that ought to be followed in virtue of judicial obligation 
(derived from the doctrine of stare decisis, both in its vertical and horizontal 
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formulation). Nevertheless, adhering to the conceptualisation of precedents as rules 
leads to a very narrow understanding of precedent-based reasoning that might not be 
very useful to explain the wide scope of possibilities in legal practice. As we shall 
see precedents are flexible sources that often do not stand as clear chains of 
command to which courts are bound.  
This model of legal precedents has been problematic even in explaining the common 
law practice of precedents for several reasons. One of the criticism to this theory has 
been that since the ‘ratio’ or ‘holding’ of a decision are considered binding, and these 
do not stand a priori, but they ought to be constructed by legal practitioner, they 
cannot be considered to be rules.
55
 It has been argued that the model of rules follows, 
in general terms, the rational of statutory rules, which contrary to precedents are 
canonical formulations subjected to more or less stable conventions of interpretation. 
For this reason precedents might appear vaguer or more indeterminate than 
(statutory) rules.
56
 In this situation, it seems difficult to argue that a precedent 
provides a rule that ought to be followed by a court due to the existence of a judicial 
obligation, since the rule is not predetermined but subject to formulation (and 
reformulations). It is true that some precedents are well known to stand for certain 
facts, and in this way they might be similar to (statutory) rules; however, in 
precedent based reasoning there always stands a higher degree of flexibility.
57
 In this 
respect, it has been argued that past decisions do not have a fixed or foundational 
content, that is to say, that they are not a ‘timeless what’, but that what is taken to be 
the content of a judicial precedents is actively and creatively built by the legal 
reasoner.
58
 Nevertheless, in our opinion, this flexibility does not derive from the lack 
of literal articulation of precedents, but to the possibility of expanding and 
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compressing their meaning through processes similar to that of analogy making and 
distinguishing.  
Furthermore, the rule model has been problematic when explaining legal reasoning 
operations such as analogy and distinguishing, which are typically associated with 
the common law practice (but that are also operational in civil law contexts). The 
flexibility of precedents seems to increase by the frequent use of the methods of 
analogical reasoning and differentiation. In fact, in the common law tradition 
reasoning from precedents has been usually depicted as a form of analogical 
reasoning. According to psychologists the basic structure of analogical thought 
involves, first, a retrieval of an analog or base that shares properties with a target 
situation; second, mapping the relevant similarities between the target and the 
analog; and, third, transfer the properties from analog to target.
59
 The question of 
how to assess similarity between past and present cases is medullar for legal 
professionals, and the process often involves selecting an analog or base from a 
variety of candidates. In the process of finding suitable analog options – that is, past 
cases with similar features – the ratio or holding (analog) can be object of 
reformulations, extensions and reductions. 
However, according to Schauer precedents in law are not substantially about 
analogy. He points out that some similarities between the new case and the precedent 
result obvious and inescapable and, consequently, that precedents act as a constraint, 
or, in other words, constitute binding rules that ought to be followed. Any two cases 
can be found to be similar or different, but there are some unavoidable equations. 
Thus, in his view, the most striking distinction between precedential constraint and 
reasoning by analogy is the lack of freedom in the selection of precedents. Schauer 
thinks that these straightforward situations are not uncommon in the practice with 
precedents – for example, there is little doubt that the emblematic US case Roe v. 
Wade extended the right to privacy to a woman’s choice to have an abortion under 
certain circumstances, and consequently a future court would be bound to decide for 
the unconstitutionality of any statute prohibiting abortion no matter the personal 
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opinion of the judges.
60
 Schauer is right arguing that some analogies are more 
evident and compelling than others, but the line of separation between clear and 
contested choices is more blurry than he might like to admit. In fact, his mention of 
Griswold v. Connecticut as a supporting precedent for Roe v. Wade makes us 
wonder if his clear-cut division between precedent constraint and analogy easily 
stands. In 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled that the Constitution protected a right to marital privacy that entitles the 
married couple to decide about their use of contraception. This argument was later 
used to support the existence of a privacy right to have an abortion. However, the 
similarity between marital contraception rights and abortion rights is not as obvious 
and unavoidable as Schauer suggests; in fact, this conclusion is obtained by the 
process of analogical inference which allows to decide on similarities between the 
target and analog cases so as to extend the conclusions of the second over the first. 
Thus, even if precedent-based reasoning might not be all about analogy, the 
extension of the conclusions of a previous case by means of analogical inferences is 
a normal cognitive process used for constructing knowledge. Analogical reasoning is 
based in the human natural ability to form patterns of association. It is in fact this 
capacity to make analogies what allows legal practitioners to group similar cases and 
see more or less clear lines of decision. 
According to cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter, analogy making is a central 
cognitive operation. In his view, analogy making is not just another form of 
reasoning, but the very basis for cognition and categorisation. All our categories 
(including concepts) are nothing else but ‘a tightly packaged bundle of analogies.’
61
 
Thus our thinking process consists in fluidly moving from one analogy bundle to the 
others. Hofstadter argues that experts most likely will unconsciously and effortlessly 
identify situations where their known categories properly apply. Nevertheless, there 
are more complex situations where categorisation might be difficult, or will be in 
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between two different categories.
62
 Hofstadter’s conclusion can help us to further 
understand legal reasoning: when an experienced legal reasoner faces a case, he 
immediately will try to ‘fit’ it in any of the existing categories (some derived from 
precedents). In law, classifying whether a determinate case is a ‘Roe v. Wade’, or 
let’s say, a ‘Marbury v. Madison’ is a basic skill. These cases constitute well know 
legal categories of American law. When precedents categories are applied without 
(much) hesitation as in cases ‘in point’ we could easily believe that there is no choice 
when identifying suitable precedents and that, consequently, precedent based 
reasoning is similar as pictured by Schauer. However, sometimes facts and categories 
might not entirely ‘fit’ or be in the borderline, leading to evident deliberation. 
Nevertheless, in this exercise of fitting facts or hypothesis to categories, the later 
might emerge somehow transformed. In this form, the categories set by precedents 
are not completely fixed – i.e. they are fluid. For Schauer, these matters would rule 
out considering a past case as an authentic precedent, since for him these perpetual 
flexibility does not constraint decision making. Nevertheless, as we have seen, with 
this perspective that precedents ought to perform as rules we could lose much of 
what goes on when reasoning with past decisions.  
In the common law, analogical reasoning is said to happen between facts: 
practitioners compared factual situations to determine their correspondence with an 
already built category that also describes facts extensively. However, it is false that 
in reasoning with precedents practitioners just perform a comparison of facts: they 
draw similarities between precedents around concepts. For example, if while 
drinking a ginger beer (or a soda, an ale, a bottled juice, etc.) in Scotland we found a 
snail (or even a mouse, a beetle or other vermin), we would easily say that this is a 
Donoghue v. Stevenson situation where we can sue the manufacturer for failing to 
meet his duty of care. Now let’s imagine that we hire a financial team to assess and 
investment and they give us a wrong advice that makes us lose important amounts of 
money, are we in a Donoghue v. Stevenson situation too? If we perform a simple 
comparison of facts we might well conclude that one situation is not remotely related 
to the other, however in the legal world they are connected through the concept of 
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 In this manner, in Hedley Byrne v. Heller, the House of Lords 
estimated that you can be liable for negligent statements because ‘if someone 
possessed of a special skill undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, to apply that 
skill for the assistance of another person who relies upon such skill, a duty of care 
will arise.’
64
 In this sense, for the legal world, wrong financial statements are similar 
to snails in ginger beer bottles, and beverage manufacturers to financial advisors. 
This connection, however, does not seem to exist a priori, but it is product of a 
posteriori ‘packing’ different situations under the same label. It is important to note 
that in this process of transferral also some additional characteristics contained in the 
cases might be reported back into the wider category allowing a dynamic enrichment. 
The model of precedents as rules is not only deficient in explaining some 
characteristics of common law precedent-based reasoning, but also the way civil 
lawyers deal with precedents. Even in civilian systems, legal reasoners perform 
analogical inferences to classify new facts and hypothesis into previously existing 
categories.
65
 In other words, analogical reasoning is not exclusive of precedents in 
the common law, but it also operates in civilian systems.  
Similarly to the manner in which precedents are extended by analogical inferences, 
they can also be narrowed down by accounting relevant differences that make a new 
situation different from a previously established category. In the common law world 
this is usually known as the practice of distinguishing. Distinguishing involves a 
precedent not being followed because of some relevant difference between the new 
case and the core of the precedent. Generally, common law countries have 
understood this practice as contrasting the facts of the present case from the facts of a 
precedent case that is similar in appearance. Apparent similarity between cases is 
abated when the legal reasoner argues the existence of important differences. 
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Nevertheless, as in the case of analogy making, reasoners do not proceed to compare 
facts, but they perform their analysis under the shadow of a wider category. When 
certain situations are excluded from a category we can say that the prima facie 
relevant precedent has been narrowed down. In the same way there are certain clear 
analogies, in every legal system there are some paradigmatic situations that cannot be 
easily distinguished. In these clear-cut cases, which cannot be easily distinguished, 
the functioning of precedents might appear closer to that of rules. This, however, 
does not exclude the fluidity of precedents’ content and, thus, the potentiality of them 
experiencing change.  
Another feature of precedents that make it difficult to be assimilated with rules is that 
rules are conceived as a matter of all or nothing bindingness, while precedents appear 
to have a levelled force, that is, they posses more or less authority according to a 
wide scope of factors related to the institutional setting where legal argumentation 
takes place. Precedents can be said to have different degrees of authority that 
oscillate in a ‘high’ to ‘low’ continuum depending on factors such as in-pointness, 
age, hierarchy, reiteration, etc. In this manner, the authority of precedents seems to 
be subjected to more ambiguous and flexible treatment than that of statutes. Thus, the 
positivist understandings of all-or-nothing binding rules run short when facing 
precedents multifactorial nature.  
4.2.1.3 The Model of Precedents as Principles 
A different perspective regarding precedents is that they should be treated as 
evidence of underlying principles. A court analysing a past case should identify the 
principles or reasons that gave rise to the decision. Resulting principles are 
authoritative reasons that determine the outcome of future cases. New cases should 
be, thus, decided in accordance with the principles held in past judicial resolutions.
66
  
According to Lamond, there are two versions of this model. The first approach 
understands principles locally, that is, it considers that the principles of single past 
decisions are relevant to future decision. The second version, instead, takes a global 
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view that compels legal reasoners not to the principles of a single case but to those 
coherently emanating from the legal system.
67
 The second approach seems to be the 
most widespread. It is represented by the Dworkin’s theory of law as a system of 
principles. Dworkin’s perspective presupposes that the law is formed by something 
else than rules, that is, by a set of legal principles that aspire towards coherence or 
integrity.
68
 In this manner, legal practitioners connect former decisions by identifying 
principles that bind them together, although they might also find that there are limits 
to the scope of certain principles. Principles do not operate in the all-or-nothing 
manner of rules and in case of existing contradictions a principle does not overrule 
other, instead they are weighted and balanced as applied to the dispute. Both, the 
identification and balancing of underlying legal principles ought to take into account 
the need of achieving systemic coherence or, in Dworkin’s terms, integrity. Under 
the principle model, the authority of precedents is not absolute, but subjected to 
reconsiderations in terms of their overall coherence. Judges are not constrained by 
the rules of past decisions, but they are not free to decide what is best; instead, they 
have to find the best decision that is coherent with the principles held in previous 
cases. 
As Alexander and Sherwin note, the model of legal principles might appear as 
having several advantages over that of rules. In a sense courts are constrained by law, 
but they still keep some freedom to evaluate the best moral decision supported by the 
system’s coherence. Nevertheless, the authors consider that advantage is illusion and 
actually constitute a negative aspect. In their view ‘legal principles combine the 
worst features of ATC [all-things-considere] moral reasoning and of binding 
precedent rules, while at the same time eliminating the advantages of both.’
69
 On the 
one hand, legal principles are more undetermined, vague and value-laden than rules; 
a fact that potentially increases legal uncertainty. On the other, decisions on 
coherence and pondering conflicting principles are equally unstable, susceptible to 
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controversy and error as in the all-things-considered model of reasoning. Therefore, 
the model of precedents as principles eliminates the certainty provided by rules and 
aims towards judicial decision that are morally inferior to those reached by 
proceeding an all-things-considered manner. 
A different criticism to this perspective comes from the fact that, just as the model of 
precedents as rules, it understands past decisions as a ‘timeless what’. That is, even if 
at a more abstract level than rules ‘there is a fixed or foundational binding core to the 
precedent, or to the pool of precedents.’
70
 Understanding that the authoritative core 
of precedents is given by principles tends to bring a static perspective of precedents 
and legal reasoning that might hide precedents’ intrinsic flexibility. 
4.2.1.4 The Model of Precedents as Examples 
In this view a judicial decision performs as a precedent by being an example for 
officials and the population in general. Barbara Levenbook, the main exponent of 
this model, considers that even if precedents sometimes lay a rule, they are better 
understood as setting examples. Examples, unlike rules, are not aprioristically set by 
the officials; they are stories which meanings are socially determined. This model 
argues that the language of rules used in the case of precedents can be misleading. 
Precedents are more flexible than what the language of rules acknowledges, as their 
scopes are not always specified in advance. On a different level, according to 
Levenbook, precedents are better understood as examples as they have a 
psychological power that rules lack. Examples have a stronger communication power 
than rules; they are vivid guidelines for conduct. As the author reminds us, ‘[o]ne 
picture is worth a thousand words, and so is one example.’
71
 Example matters for its 
effects on conduct guidance and not because of its reasons. This is claimed to be 
particularly true for precedential systems where the description of the case is more 
comprehensive.  
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This account argues that the relevant categories to which precedents refer are worked 
out in later instances.
72
 Precedents are means to test the limits of categories, allowing 
the formation of conceptual consensus. A past decision can account as precedent for 
a small aspect, but the idea of what the precedent accounts for can grow with the 
emergence of shared understandings. The meaning of precedents is socially set and 
socially salient. Thus, its future application is determined by ‘what “everyone 
knows” is the same, what is “plainly the same,” or what is “on all fours.”’
73
 
Precedents’ application is dependent on the assessment of relevant sameness between 
the facts of the past case and the new case, that is, by the determination of the 
circumstances where the precedent stands in all fours. Nevertheless, the meaning of 
precedents is independent of whatever reasons justified them in the first place. In this 
sense, Levenbook understand that the exemplar force of a prior resolution is 
unconnected to its background justification.
74
 In this sense, precedential force is not 
linked to whether the decision is well justified or not according to law. In her own 
words ‘[a] decision may be wrongly decided, may even be without justification for 
any practical purposes, and yet function as a precedent nonetheless; and this entails 




The model of examples has the advantage of recognising precedents’ flexibility, that 
is, their often inexistent fixed content, and their capacity to be changed. This 
viewpoint relies heavily in social consensus, but understands that this consensus is in 
flux. Fluctuations in the social understandings can lead to the extension or narrowing 
of the categories to which precedents refer. Therefore, the examples set by legal 
precedents are not static, they are in constant motion. The recognition of the fluidity 
of precedents is welcomed; nevertheless, the consensus over which the examples set 
by precedents rely appears as a contingent and undirected happening. It seems that 
social consensus can occur on any grounds where there is a meeting of 
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understandings, regardless of the background justification of the precedent. In other 
words, the meaning of precedents in this account is independent from the grounds on 
which the prior decision was taken, that is, their aim or purpose. This allows a high 
amount of flexibility in the future determination of what the decision accounts for 
and on the grounds the precedent is considered to have force. As noted elsewhere, 
this account seems to picture the practice of precedents as a more or less mindless 
and uncreative enterprise, where subjects reproduce or, better said, imitate past 
decisions without considering whether there stands a justification for this action.
76
  
4.2.1.5 The Model of Precedents as Reasons 
This viewpoint, proposed by Grant Lamond, regards precedents as decisions linked 
to particular factual contexts. The ratio of the case indicates the factual features that 
give sufficient reasons for the result.
77
 Case-by-case decision making is the 
evaluation of the differences between the justificatory facts of a past case and a 
present case, in order to determine whether the past case should be followed or 
distinguished. Thus, the determination of a precedent’s similarity is dependent on the 
significant facts that justified the conclusion. Lamond attempts to find a meeting 
point between a model of precedents based on the identification of facts and one 




Lamond explains further his view by giving an example. Imagine that there is a 
precedent case P1 with the F1 = {g1, h1, i1, j1, k1, l1}. The court decided that the 
features {J,K,L} provided the reason to conclude C, which also means that the 
features {G, H, I} do not defeat the reasons for C. In this manner, any future case that 
includes the facts Fn = {jn, kn, ln} will require the consideration of P1. Nevertheless, 
the court should consider if the new case includes new features that are sufficient 
reasons to defeat the justification in P1 for the conclusion C. If the new case P2 had 
features defeating the reasons of P1, the case should be distinguished, otherwise it 
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should be followed. Now imagine the case P2 with F2 = {~g2, h2, i2, j2, k2, l2, m2}. In 
this case G is not present, but the new feature M is present. These differences of P2 
with P1 have to be assessed by the later court, which must determine if they the 
absence of G and the presence of M are sufficient to defeat the reasons given by 
{J,K,L} for the conclusion C. 
According to Lamond, the rule model of precedent is defective and is not capable of 
giving account of the legal reasoning operations that considering past legal cases 
entail. He considers that the popularity of the conventional view of precedents as 
rules derives from the widespread idea that the (common) law is a matter of rules, 
although lawyers do not fully commit to this conception in practice. Lamond argues 
that there are certain circumstances in which the operation of precedent might appear 
closer to the functioning of rules. This seems particularly true in areas of the law that 
have remained uncontroversial for long time, while the rule models appears more 
difficult to hold in areas of greater struggle and with frequent disruptions to the line 
of cases. Additionally, precedents might appear as rules when they are seen 
individually, or when what has been decided in a group of precedents is 
conceptualised in a more or less abstract doctrine.
79
 Nevertheless, the impression that 
case-by-case decision making is equivalent to rule-based reasoning is just an 
appearance. Lamond indicates that ‘[c]ase-by-case decision-making, then, is not rule-
based decision-making, though its operation over a long period can make its 
operation appear similar. Cases are context-dependent and do not purport to settle 
what should be done in a different context. Instead, they exercise an influence on 
later decisions because of the requirement that later courts treat the precedent as 
correctly decided. Once this perspective is taken on the doctrine of precedent, a range 
of features of the common law make much more sense than they otherwise would.’
80
 
The model of precedents as reasons allows certain dynamism that is not possible to 
explain with the model of rules, providing an explanation to certain features of the 
common law practice (i.e. the lack of canonical formulation, reasoning by analogy 
and distinguishing). In this view, each time a new case arises, the court in charge 
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makes an assessment of the relevant facts that justify the conclusion of a past court. 
In this form, the facts relevant for a decision are continuously analysed on the light 
of the reasons for deciding on a certain direction. Thus, future acts of evaluation of 
precedents are not mere applications of past decisions, but actually they add on facts 
to the reasons previously devised. Whether the court decides to follow or to 
distinguish a precedent, it will be elaborating on the case-law doctrine and, in this 
manner, changing the law.  
For our present purposes, this model might be of limited usefulness due to its strong 
focus in the justificatory facts of a decision. Civil law precedents do not give the 
same emphasis to the factual circumstances surrounding a decision as in the common 
law. Therefore, the reduced elaboration on the facts of the case, characteristic of the 
civil law tradition, becomes problematic for this model. Lamond is obviously not 
concerned with this limit regarding his theoretical account, as he explicitly 
acknowledges that his target is to explain the common law practice of reasoning in a 
case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, we consider that the model does not explain well 
precedent-based reasoning in the common law either. As we have seen, the 
dynamism of precedents based reasoning provided by operations such as analogy 
making and distinguishing does not involve necessarily a fact comparison in the 
terms portrayed by this model. In fact, the process of assessing whether a precedent 
should rule in the future might involve a more abstract way of reasoning than mere 
factual analysis. 
4.2.1.6 Precedents as Thick Resources with Dynamic Content 
This is a novel position that does not seem to be concerned with the ontological 
nature of precedents, but with the way they are used by legal reasoners. In other 
words, rather than unveiling the nature of precedents, the focus is to understand how 
they matter for legal epistemology. Nevertheless, indirectly the model offers an 
image of precedents as highly malleable resources that, by means of a posteriori 
construction, might take different shapes.  
This perspective stands in disagreement with the models that understand precedents 
as fixed or static features unchanged by each operation performed by legal reasoners. 
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This account, based in the common law practice of precedents, argues that ‘there is 
no set of rules, principles, reasons or material facts that constitute the fixed or 
foundational content of past decisions (i.e. a ‘timeless what’ that determines its own 
relevance), but rather that what is taken by a judge resolving a particular dispute to 
be the content of past decisions depends on the active and creative construal of 
relevance engaged in by that judge.’
81
 In this respect, precedents are said to be better 




This model puts into question that precedents are ready-made solutions experienced 
by legal reasoners as ‘unavoidably similar’ or ‘essentially identical’ to the cases at 
hand to the extent that the application of the precedent becomes a non-creative 
mechanical operation. It is then argued that what the model of precedents as rules, 
principles, reasons and examples have in common is that they all somehow conceive 
past decisions as timeless features with a fixed content, where the reasoners do not 
engage into any creative operation. It is noted that this form of reasoning does not 
seem to be consistent with the common law form of reasoning with precedents where 
‘the quality of description that characterises common law judgements (this being also 
why they are here called ‘thick resources’) enables common law cases to have 
dynamic content.’
83
 Where having ‘dynamic content’ means that there are no fixed 
rules, principles, reasons or facts constituting the content of prior decisions. Thus, the 
legal reasoner ought to engage into the active and creative task of deciding the 
relevant content of past legal resolutions.
84
  
Nevertheless, the dynamicity described by Del Mar seems to be potentially 
undermined when precedents are written. In this respect, Peter Tiersma has argued 
that the textualisation of precedents might encourage rigidity.’
85
 Tiersma argues that 
due to the textualisation of precedents in the US, lawyers are now paying more 
attention to the exact words of legal decisions than they used to do in the past, and 
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that, in that sense, precedents are not evidence of the law, but rigid law 
comprehended in more or less explicit textual articulations. The argument of Tiersma 
remind us that the format of legal precedents might have important consequences for 
the model of legal reasoning.  
Del Mar is well aware that certain contextual circumstances, such as precedents 
format, might reduce the explanatory power of his model. Therefore, he is cautious 
not to make overgeneralisations that include jurisdictions where matters of legal style 
could prove the model untrue. Nevertheless, we consider that this model actually 
tells us something important about precedent-based reasoning in civil law systems. 
Even if precedents in civil law usually follow a different format, where they give a 
summary of the resolution and do not give a full explanation of facts and reasons, 
full-text resolutions may be later accessed. However, the summaries provided are 
usually enough, especially for practitioners trained in the particular legal system, to 
perform new connections between the relevant parts of previous cases and new facts 
or hypothesis; these connections involve some sort of reformulation of the meaning 
of the precedents, providing it with dynamicity. The reduced information available 
might reduce some of this dynamism, but it will not rule it out absolutely. In this 
form, despite the fact that civil law precedents are usually less argumentative and 
provide a narrower analysis of the facts of the case, it is also possible to understand 
these past decisions as having a dynamic content.  
Another important insight of this account is the way in which this dynamism is said 
to be constrained. The reconfigurations of precedents are not totally free, but they are 
subjected to stabilising practices – that is by the compelling necessity to make things 
‘fit’ with pre-established understandings. In this way ‘[t]he practice of judges is 
constrained by certain resources that they are obliged to relate with, that they are 
obliged to take into account, and this ‘taking into account’ is itself a process that may 
be constrained in all kinds of ways.’
86
 Nevertheless, not only judges are constrained 
by the necessity of making thing fit together, also lawyers try to created argument 
that appear as making more sense or fitting better into the bulk of law.  
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4.2.1.7 Precedents as Features of Various Degrees of Normative Force 
Another account that has been not so much concerned with discovering the 
ontological nature of precedents, but more with understanding what they represent 
for actual legal reasoners is the one presented in the book ‘Interpreting Precedents: A 
Comparative Study.’ The research group known as the Bielefelder Kreis, as a result 
of a comprehensive comparative analysis on reasoning with legal precedents, created 
a framework to explain the normative force of prior cases in different jurisdictions.
87
 
The model provides a terminologically and conceptually sophisticated account that is 
sufficiently broad to explain the degrees of authoritative force of precedents in 
practice across legal systems. One of the most important contributions of this 
comparative study is the articulation of a framework in which the authoritative 
character of precedents is represented in a continuum, rather than in terms of an all-
or-nothing bindingness. The degrees of normative force are given by a combination 
of several factors, from the official treatment of precedents to their strength 
according to a series of institutional considerations. 
The model differentiates between bindingness, force, further support, and 
illustrativeness or other value of a precedent. The first degree of normative force that 
is recognised is (1) formal bindingness. In case a precedent is recognised as formally 
binding, a judgment that fails to respect it is considered unlawful and subject to 
reversal in appeal. Nevertheless this category of precedential force accepts further 
distinctions: a precedent might be (a) formally binding and not subject to overruling, 
being (i) strictly binding in every case, or (ii) defeasibly binding when exceptions 
appear; (b) formally binding but subject to overruling or modification. Secondly, 
precedents can be  (2) not formally binding but having force, that is, that a decision 
not respecting a precedent is considered lawful but subject to criticism, and maybe of 
reversal. Nevertheless this force can be: (a) defeasible in case of exceptions, or (b) 
outweighable in case of countervailing reasons. Precedents can also be (3) Not 
formally binding and not having force but providing further support in which case 
precedent helps strengthening the reasons for a determinate decision showing the 
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harmony between the decision and the past case. Finally, precedents can have (4) 
mere illustrativeness or other value. 
A formally binding precedent, thus, must be taken into account by future courts when 
similar cases arise or, otherwise, their decision would risk being considered 
unlawful. Precedents that are not formally binding but are considered as having force 
should be taken into account. Whenever a judgement does not respect the force of a 
precedent, it might not be considered unlawful; however, it most probably be subject 
to criticism and, possibly, of reversal by hierarchically superior courts. Nevertheless, 
the force of precedents might actually be defeated or outweighed. For instance, 
precedents can be defeated if there are exceptions to what they state or to the doctrine 
of precedents (as in for example, decisions per incuriam); or they can be outweighed 
if countervailing reasons apply. Precedents that act as further support do not render 
judicial decisions illegal when they are not invoked in similar cases; they just make 
decisions not as well justified as if the precedent was invoked.
88
  
The various degrees of normative force indicate the justificatory strength of legal 
precedents. The normative force of precedents is, however, a relative matter, which 
depends on the set of available reasons and their interrelation. Nevertheless, 
assessing the strength of precedents cannot be performed as an exact equation, where 
the relevant factors can be measured. In this respect, a statute is usually considered a 
stronger reason for a decision than a precedent – for which, in case of collision, the 
reasons given by statutes generally outweigh those provided by precedents. 
Nevertheless, the force of precedents is only provisionally determined. Past decisions 
have the capacity to change their strength or weight when cumulating with other 
reasons. For example, it can be said that a relatively stronger high-hierarchy 
precedent might be outweighed by a set of less strong, but cumulating precedents. 
Reasoning with precedents, as in any kind of practical reasoning, involves the 
evaluating of a number of factors. According to Peczenik, ‘the role of weighting and 
balancing reasons is particularly clear when one considers the fact that the process of 
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applying precedents involves an effort to achieve diachronic coherence of the law.’
89
 
The degree of coherence that is attained by following precedents is seen as 
proportional to the support that the legal tradition gives to the precedents’ 
components (rules, principles, judgements, data, theories, and etcetera). Therefore, 
reasoning with legal precedents is rarely a mechanical process; it requires a complex 
assessment or evaluation of reasons for a determinate decision.  
This model of reasoning might be helpful to understand the fact that practitioners do 
distinguish different degrees of force when reasoning with legal precedents. 
Practitioners in different jurisdiction have coined terms to identify legal precedents 
that pose a stronger force than others. For example, certain common law jurisdictions 
have coined the term ‘super precedent’
90
 to denote cases that are so deeply embedded 
in the law and culture that it would be extremely hard to overturn.
91
 The existence of 
precedents and super precedents makes clear that precedents have different degrees 
of normative force according to a broad set of considerations. Even if precedents are 
considered binding because of the principle of stare decisis, they are not considered 
binding in an all or nothing fashion. Legal practitioners, in different contexts grasp 
the fact that the force of precedents depends on a set of considerations. Moreover, the 
force of super precedents derives from their significance within the system of law. In 
the United States, constitutional decisions that have been supported by subsequent 
lines of judicial decisions emerge as precedents with a superior normative power. 
Nevertheless, super precedents lose force when they are subjected to persistent 
reformulations granting exceptions. The power of super precedents, however, is not 
equal to notoriousness, or social saliency. Infamous precedents are those that become 
widely known, regardless of their entrenchment in the legal system, and 
consequently they cannot be considered super precedents. 
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Peczenik reports a variety of relevant factors determining precedents’ normative. 
According to the comparative study in question, the force of precedents is connected 
to diverse aspects such as: (a) hierarchical rank of the court, (b) whether the decision 
was taken by a panel or a full-court, (c) the reputation of the court drafting the 
decision, (d) economic, social or political changes, (e) supporting arguments, (f) age 
of precedent, (g) existence of dissent, (h) branch of law involved, (i) existence of 
precedents’ trend, (j) academic acceptance of precedents, and (k) effects of legal 
change.
92
 Additionally, their force may be given by the precedents’ ‘in-pointness’ 
and their distinctive official status. 
These factors seem to be somehow present in most legal systems when assessing the 
force of precedents. Nevertheless, legal systems might differ in the way they 
consider them relevant. In this sense, it is, for example, possible to observe legal 
systems that privilege the hierarchical rank of the court than any other factor, and 
that consequently attribute a high degree of normative force to precedents coming 
from the highest court of the system, despite the existence factors tending to lower 
the normative force of precedents such as old age or the existence of dissent. It is, 
however, also feasible to find systems not giving so much weight to the hierarchical 
rank of the court where the precedent derives, and instead, giving primacy to 
existence of a trend of precedents.  
4.3 Precedents in History 
History is a useful means to understand legal theories in their right dimension. 
History portraits old standing practices in their most natural shape, sometimes before 
the emergence of certain explanatory biases. Also, studying the past shows us when 
and why some common explanations of these practices emerged, allowing us to see 
them with some form of detachment. In this sense, history helps us move out of the 
establishment and further explore some longstanding practical aspects, to later come 
back and explore how well our concepts and explanations fit in. Herein there are 
certain understandings with respect to precedents that we would like to take distance 
from and demystify: first, the assimilation of precedents use with the doctrine of 
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binding precedents, and, second, the assumption that civilian systems remained 
ignorant of precedent-based reasoning.  
One of the most salient characteristics of the common law according to certain 
comparatists is that it is mainly a system of case law governed by binding precedents. 
Nevertheless, historians generally agree that throughout time the common law 
operated without a theory of binding precedent.
93
 As noted by Simpson, a search 
across the discussions on the nature of the common law will most likely discover 
accounts of the doctrine of stare decisis, which, from the historian’s point of view, is 
unsatisfactory ‘for the elaboration of rules and principles governing the use of 
precedents and their status as authorities is relatively modern, and the idea that there 
could be binding precedents more recent still.’
94
 Historian John Baker has noted that 
dependence on precedent seems always to have been one of the distinctive features 
of the common law.
95
 Nevertheless, it is important to note that this particular form of 
dependence has been subject of important transformations throughout the years, or 
better said, centuries. The contemporary understanding of precedents as binding 
sources in the common law context has not been omnipresent in the history of this 
legal tradition. As we shall see, precedents have been used for diverse reasons, in 
different forms, and outside our currently widespread comprehensions.  
Case-law emerged in medieval times as a by-product of the decisions of the English 
central courts. Judges started keeping records of the decisions reached in court for 
the convenience of the court itself. Even if previous judicial decisions were not 
regarded as binding authorities, recorded cases appeared to be powerful illustrations 
of the forensic custom of the courts or consuetudo curiae.
96
 Dawson argues that the 
fast development of case-law could not be reached ‘if the judges had not sensed the 
virtues of continuity, had not felt reluctance to reopen problems already solved, and 
had not permitted the expectations aroused by their work to become in some degree 
normative for themselves as well.’
97
 This sense of continuity was reinforced by what 
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can be said to be the closest to a doctrine of precedents enounced by English 
medieval author Brancton. He indicated that ‘if like matters arise let them be decided 
by like (si tamen similia erinerint per simile iudicentur), since the occasion is a good 
one for proceeding a similibus ad similia.’
98
 By proceeding ‘from similar to similar’, 
normative force was attributed not to only a singular case but to a set of cases 
creating a practice or custom.
99
 In this sense, the practice of recording and taking into 
account legal precedents seems to have emerged in response to the needs to keep up 
with the case-by-case development of the common law, and to provide a common 
base and continuity to legal decision making.  
As early as 1180’s, precedents appeared as a major feature of the common law; the 
law was already described in terms of remedies introduced by case-by-case decisions 
to which the courts rigidly adhered to.
100
 The first means to keep records of the 
decisions of the central courts were the rolls of the central courts generally known as 
plea rolls. The rolls were considered of high importance as they were the only 
conclusive evidence of what was transacted in courts; however, their content was 
barely more than formulistic statements recording the outcomes of proceedings, and 
unconcerned of the reasons or arguments for the decision.
101
 The idea of reporting 
the law in courts in more detail seems to emerge past the mid thirteenth century, 
expanding the function of precedent records as they were up to that time available to 
the legal community. In this form, the yearbooks – that is the earliest type of law 
reporting – started to circulate, giving more detailed account of the medieval legal 
debates. The first of these yearbooks were mainly private compilations, probably 
based on notes taken by listeners of court proceedings.
102
 Apparently, these law 
reports were introduced as indirect products of the educational routine: they were the 
product of the efforts of students and lawyers who were taking notes of the 
proceedings of the courts.
103
 The yearbooks were not intended to become sources of 
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precedents, but started performing as such due to their more comprehensive contents 
(including facts, reasons and arguments) that complemented the laconic plea rolls. 
Early yearbook cases were treated as illustrations of the law in action or examples 
(exempli or ensamples). Common lawyers recognised that ‘decisions should be 
rendered in accordance, not with examples, but with the laws’; thus, precedents were 
not considered binding or incontrovertible.
104
 It was the general practice of the courts 
and not the specific decisions that established the law. Postema indicates that in this 
context ‘[t]he law emerged from the course of argument exemplified in the cases so 
reported, but it was not laid down by the courts.’
105
 The law was the product of the 
discussion and practice of the forum, which constituted a common learning 
experience. In that manner, arguments from precedents appealed to the collective 
memory of the legal community rather to specific, settled past decisions.
106
 Cited 
precedents, thus, were based on reported or remembered cases without being later on 
referred to in connection with specific chapters or verses on paper; they were recalled 




Nevertheless, early yearbook reports were often imprecise and omitted relevant 
information, possibly due to the fact that they were not intended as collections of 
precedents but mainly as educational materials.
108
 As the years passed, the reporting 
of legal decisions improved progressively. From the Tudor period law reporters 
increasingly asked for reasoned decisions, which were now made available in printed 
form allowing the standard citations across the common law.
109
 The new format of 
past decisions, combined with a more active role of the courts, and the decay of the 
older notion of common learning were important factors that determined the new 
enhanced function of legal precedent in practice. As the medieval routine of common 
learning was no longer in operation, law reports would constitute the main source on 
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the shelves of legal library.
110
 Consequently, case reports seem to have changed; they 
were no longer a set of ill-defined examples of a common legal practice, but actual 
literal formulations claiming the authority of law.
111
 The common law came to be 
what the courts claimed it was, and in the way it was reported.
112
 That did not mean 
that the decisions were binding in the manner of stare decisis, but definitely the 
nature of precedents had changed; they became authorities in a different sense.
113
 
As we have seen, the common law did not develop a system of case law by 
articulating explicit rules regarding the authority of precedents. With the passing of 
years, the doctrine of precedents showed signs of hardening, resulting in the 
formulation of the principle of stare decisis. It is rather difficult to state the precise 
moment in which English courts adopted the doctrine of stare decisis. By the end of 
the eighteenth century there was a clear practice of following precedents, but without 
a clear court hierarchy it was not possible to identify which decisions where more 
authoritative than  others.
114
 By the middle of the nineteenth century the doctrine of 
binding precedent was in the making. During that time, lower courts were already 
taking for granted that the decisions of the House of Lords were strictly binding.
115
 
Additionally, the view that the House of Lords is bound by its own decisions 
emerged.
116
 Nevertheless, it was by the late nineteenth century that the doctrine of 
precedent was finally consolidated
117
 and that a system of ‘rules of precedent’ was 
determined, even if some details and refinements were still to be worked out during 
the twentieth century.
118
 There were, thus, several intersecting factors that 
determined the articulation and development of the doctrine of stare decisis: 
arguably, the increasing availability and the improvement in the quality of printed 
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legal records, the establishment of a clear structure of courts, but most importantly, 
the rise of classical positivism. 
The challenges posed by positivism to the structure, functioning and method of the 
common law courts had important implications for the understanding of judicial 
precedent. Their conception of law was of a set of more precise acts created by 
posited act of authority, not in harmony with the idea of ‘laws coming to exist by 
slow customary acceptance.’
119
 The theory that held that judges merely declared the 
longstanding (common) law was now being persistently attacked, leading to the 
reformulation of the practice of following precedents in the terms more compatible to 
the new theoretical baggage. In this regards, MacCormick points out that ‘[t]he real 
reason for the modern development of stare decisis was the destruction of the 
foundation on which the old attitude to precedent rested.’
120
 The practice of 
precedents was restructured by translating the former understandings into the 
language of ‘commands’ that ‘constrain’ or exert ‘binding force’. Precedents then 
became authoritative for the fact of being issued by a court and not so much for their 
position in the body of common legal experience. With the emergence of the doctrine 
of stare decisis, the authority of precedents started to acquire a formal shade. 
Although the appearance of the doctrine of stare decisis entailed a strict conception 
of the binding authority, previous understandings and methods were too useful and 
embedded in common legal mind to disappear completely.
121
 Actually, this seems to 




The American form of reasoning with precedents (which, as explained in previous 
chapters, served as inspiration for the Mexican system of precedents) followed the 
English practice. Consequently, and expectedly, the American and English 
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approaches to precedents have important similarities. Initially, for American 
practitioners precedents were also considered to be evidence of the law and not 
actual law.
123
 The development of the doctrine of stare decisis in this country took 
place around the mid-nineteenth century, due to the fact that it was only then when 
reliable law reports emerged.
124
 In this form, in America precedents started becoming 
official written articulations of the decisions held by the courts. In other words, 
precedents developed as officially drafted judicial opinions or decisions. 
Nevertheless, as in the case of England, the introduction of the formal doctrine of 
precedent in this context did not encapsulate all practical uses of precedents. 
The historical use of precedents by civil law systems is much more difficult to track 
due to the broad number of systems that are comprised under this label. Herein it is 
not our aim to present a comprehensive account of the use of past cases in each of the 
legal systems considered to belong to the civilian tradition. Instead, it will provide a 
brief overview of some relevant instances in which former cases have been used 
within this tradition. 
Contrary to the common assumption that the civil law tradition is foreign to case-
law, history evidences that use of particular previous cases was not unusual in the 
continent. Actually, the civilian tradition is regarded as a highly theorised and 
abstract body of law, unconcerned by single case particularities, but history shows 
that this is just partly true. Roman law, in which the civilian tradition has its 
foundations, originally was not an abstract and general legal corpus as it is often 
understood. In this regards, Harold Berman notes that ‘[m]odern European law 
students, who study Roman law as it has been systematized by Western university 
professors since the twelfth century, sometimes find it hard to believe that the 
original texts were so intensely casuistic and untheoretical.’
125
 In Roman law 
concrete cases played an important role in legal practice and education; factual cases 
were the ground to discuss the applicability of more abstract legal notions such as 
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blame, damage, possession, ownership and others.
126
 Dawson has pointed out that 
Roman jurists focused strongly in specific cases, which sometimes were real litigious 
matters and sometimes hypothetical.
127
 Jurists were not mainly concerned with 
theoretical articulations, but with treating orderly and consistently a set of particular 
cases, that is, according to the operating tradition.
128
 In this sense, ‘[t]he primary task 
of the jurists as they conceived it was to provide solutions for cases that had arisen or 




In the plurality of orders that ruled the complex medieval society it is also possible to 
observe that a variety of individual past cases played a relevant role. In this sense, 
case law was also widely used during medieval times, including decisions of cases 
not heard in court.
130
 There was a peculiar type of non forensic case law delivered by 
academics, namely consilia, where legal principles were considered in the light of 
specific facts.
131
 Similarly, jurists made use of the decretals dictated by the sovereign 
in respect to single instances.
132
 Past decisions were considered exempla to be used 
as evidence of the forensic costume.
133
 In this way, past cases functioned as evidence 
of the court’s practice, but they were also used as a means to achieve consistency in 
the practice.  
Even in countries considered as paradigmatic civil law, such as France, the historical 
indications we receive point to a considerable role played by past legal cases in legal 
practice.
134
 Therefore, whereas the use of judicial decision did not rest on a theory of 
precedents, court decisions would be mainly used as a proof of custom and as a form 
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of stabilising the fragmentation of local customary laws.
135
 Compiling the customs in 
books was a frequent practice, but there were always gaps left to be completed either 
by courts or schoolmen. With the development of the court system, prior decisions 
were frequently collected for internal use of the courts. By late fourteenth century, 
lawyers of the Parliament of Paris prepared something resembling law reports. These 
did not follow a uniform style, but demonstrated an additional interest in reflecting 
the techniques of court room argument. Nevertheless, these reports were kept as 
accessible exclusively to the courts and the parties, and started becoming widely 
available only later in the sixteenth century.
136
 In the mid sixteenth century the 
practice of publishing private notes and commentary on cases started spreading 
between both judges and practitioners.
137
 By this time, French lawyers accepted past 
court decisions as an important piece of their practice.
138
  
Law reporting was also not unknown within the canonical legal context. In fact, 
important continental developments in the case law practice seem to be connected to 
the practices followed by the papal Supreme Court (known as la Rota de Avignon), 
the decisions of which were considered to be authorities.
139
 The origins of law 
reporting in the Rota are not clear, but it appears that this practice might have 
resulted from the influence of law reporting in the English context.
140
 The reports of 
the Rota recounted the questions submitted to its members by individual auditors 
who had analysed them in different stages; sometimes the reports narrated the first 
instance and the facts in detail, stating on occasion the arising question of law or 
procedure in abstract terms.
141
 The reports captured the disagreements and dissents 
between the deciding members of the papal audience; however, the lawyers did not 
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seem to have had a direct intervention in the process of argumentations.
142
 Later in 
the century the reports became generally available throughout Europe. Following the 
practice of the Rota, law reporting would be widely institutionalised across the 
continent, which allowed the dissemination of the ius commune. By the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries had propagated in Europe even in the secular environments of the 
royal conciliar courts.
143
 Law reporting in both the canonical and secular 
environments of early continental Europe made available the practice of courts in a 
manner that somehow resembled the common law context.  
Despite the early use of precedents, it appears that civil lawyers of the past related 
somehow differently to these sources of law in comparison with English lawyers. In 
part, this seems to be connected to the longstanding continental interest in finding 
general principles and in the tendency to systematise legal knowledge in a way that 
easily led to abstraction. This propensity towards universality and systematisation 
had different manifestations throughout time, but it appears to be constant in the 
history of the civil law – from Roman times until the rise of modernity.  
Romans did not reach a point where they assimilated legal knowledge with rules and 
abstract concepts, but they did notice that important aspects of legal knowledge 
consisted in the interpretation of words and the induction of legal maxims.
144
 
Nevertheless, the strong tendency towards generalisation with which the civilian 
tradition is identified can be observed as emerging in the twelfth century, when the 
scholastic method of analysis was introduced by the glossators. The glossators went 
further than the Romans in the definition and the systematisation of legal notions; 
they aimed to create an a priori world.
145
 The scholastic method emerged over the 
premise that certain books have absolute authority, and that these texts are to be 
comprehended as containing a comprehensive body of doctrine.
146
 The jurists of 
these times were interested in seeking ‘elaborately reasoned justifications’ and 
‘theoretical synthesis’ – that is, they have a tendency to attain a somewhat higher 
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level of abstraction that integrates the more particular laws as a whole.
147
 The 
treatment given to particular cases during Roman times seems to have, thus, changed. 
Romans did not reduce particular cases with broader principles or a deeper set of 
reasons. In other words, the multiple rules and legal concepts of Roman law were 
connected with the specific situations from which they derived.
148
 On the other hand, 
the jurist of the eleventh and twelfth centuries attempted to create a systematic whole 
of law, as well as to derive abstract principles and concepts.
149
 This method helped to 
harmonise the law, as to make possible to begin synthesising the plurality of 
medieval orders, such as canon law, feudal law, and customary law.
150
 The post-
glossators worked on adapting the contents of Roman law to the political, social and 
economic conditions in which they lived, but they also tended towards generating an 
abstract legal framework.
151
 The school of natural law believed that positive law 
could be deduced from principles of natural law, and it consisted of an immutable 
regulae transcending time and space applicable wherever human reason governed, 
just as in the case of mathematical principles. The work of the natural lawyers 
pushed Roman law to a higher level of abstraction.
152
 
The Enlightenment provided new grounds for achieving the unification of European 
law. As noted by Watson ‘[t]he Enlightment led to the belief that law can be 
established on the basis of reason, and this intellectual impetus toward reform, 
married with the civil law tradition, led on to official codes of law.’
153
 Codification 
offered the possibility of conceptually systematising legal propositions in the form of 
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a hierarchical pyramid, without direct reference to the Roman bodies of law.
154
 The 
codes guaranteed a fresh start in law by abrogating former laws. Actually, the 
success of the codes – especially those based on the French model of code civil – 
partly relies in its distancing from their historical roots.
155
 
It is, thus, possible to affirm that civilian legal viewpoint as standing in our days are 
to a great extent built over the rationalist dogma propagated in the times of the 
French Revolution. The rationalist attitude in the continent led to the rejection of the 
old particularistic order and the praising of an abstract codification of legislative 
origin. The methodology prescribed by the rationalist wave was that of the 
application of the precepts of law by means of a logical syllogistic operation. In this 
manner, the theory of the separation of powers, together with the doctrine of the 
sources of law in the civilian legal world, gave overwhelming primacy to the 
legislative sources of law, namely, statutes and codes in detriment of particularistic 
judge made law.
156
 Following this line of developments, the figure of the judge 
became secondary in a system that claimed aprioristic completeness and coherence. 
Consequently, judge-made law became incompatible with the postulates of 
rationalism. In this manner, legal precedents were often erased from the formal 




Nevertheless, civil law practitioners do not seem to have complete abandoned 
precedents as a form of making sense of the law, as well as, novel factual and 
hypothetical situations. History of course had an important effect on the form and 
importance of precedents. Komarek has argued that the Continental historical 
experience created a ‘legislative model of precedent’, which is characterised by its 
formulation in general and abstract terms and where particular facts play a 
considerably less relevant role than in the common law. In this way, practitioners in 
the civil law tradition seem to be historically acquainted with legal precedents –even 
if these don’t look like the ones operating in the common law tradition. 
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Acknowledging that precedents have been in operation in the civil law context 
throughout history is an important realisation, as it allows us to see that precedents 
can exist beyond theories of doctrines that portrait them as formal sources of binding 
character, such as stare decisis.  
Precedents arose in both traditions basically as means to develop a shared custom or 
common reason. In this sense, precedents can be seen as having a major 
epistemological, consisting in the building (or at least aiding in the construction) of 
the common set of legal understandings. Nevertheless, this similarity seems to have 
suffered a major disruption due the rationalist challenge of the Enlightenment. This 
appears as one of the decisive moments in which both traditions seem to have 
acquired a greater distance in their treatment of precedents. The enlightened ideas 
questioned the rationality of guiding human conduct by custom and tradition.
158
 
Thus, as a response to the rationalistic challenge, the law began to be understood in a 
restricted way: as positive law valid due to the potestas legislatorial of the sovereign 
State.
159
 The set of new enlightened ideas created a tension between the 
understanding of precedents as evidence of a shared legal custom (or common 
reason) and precedents as formal sources of law.
 160
 This tension led to modifications 
in the use of precedents in the two legal traditions, but these changes were 
considerably different. On the one hand, in several of the countries belonging to the 
civil law tradition, past legal cases were not recognised as legal sources and, 
therefore, they were no longer considered as legal authorities of any sort. Precedents 
were still used in practice, but this situation did not have official recognition. On the 
other hand, in the common law context, legal precedents were gradually reinterpreted 
through the more restricted concept of legal authority. In this manner, therein legal 
precedents achieved formal recognition as binding sources of law through the 
doctrine of stare decisis.  Despite of the formalisation of the status of precedents, in 
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practice they preserved many characteristics of the former establishment. This seems 
to indicate that precedents serve a very generic epistemological and cognitive 
function, which is fulfilled differently in each legal system, and that goes beyond the 
formalised requests of the legal system.  
4.4 Legal precedent based reasoning in AI and the Cognitive Sciences 
As we have seen, reasoning with legal precedents consists in considering in some 
manner past judicial resolutions. Lawyers and judges are frequently looking 
backwards, searching for relevant prior cases to be used in the present. According to 
the artificial intelligence community, using backwards-looking techniques to solve 
current problems does not seem to be exclusive to the law, but it is a feature of 
intelligence in general. In this sense, solving current problems while using past 
experience seems to be a commonsensical matter.  
If we analyse carefully our surroundings we will probably realise that reasoning with 
past experience is frequently used in several professional contexts, but also in our 
daily life – e.g. we might decide not to take a specific route back home due to our 
past bad experiences with traffic at certain hours, to avoid certain food due to past 
allergic reactions, or to cook our stew for two hours for tender meat as past 
successful experience indicates. In professional contexts we might observe, for 
example, that doctors rely on past similar cases to elaborate a diagnostic. Similarly, 
architects might use past designs to replicate successful solutions relevant to a new 
project, or to avoid previous problems. Nevertheless, the use of the past is much 
more complex than in the previous examples, as it can follow various aims. 
According to the artificial intelligence and the law community, reasoning with legal 
precedents is, to a certain extent, an instance of a wider problem solving technique 
namely case-based reasoning. A reasoner performs case-based reasoning when 
comparing a new problem to a past case in order to draw conclusions or to guide a 
new decision.
161
 In case-based reasoning, a reasoner solves a problem by using the 
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specific knowledge of previously experienced situations.
162
 Kolodner notes that CBR 
is a type of analogy making in the context of solving real-world problems.
163
 CBR 
reasoning can actually be used with different aims, such as, adapting old solutions to 
meet new demands, explaining new situations according to previous similar 
experience, criticising new solutions using old cases, using past cases to understand a 
new situation or building a consensus based on previous solutions.
164
  
According to Kevin Ashley, a legal reasoner uses past cases for a set of quite 
common tasks that can be summarised as follows: (1) legal reasoners often perform 
comparison between past and present cases in order to classify and diagnose the case 
at hand. The comparison of relevant similarities and differences between cases might 
lead to the conclusion that the new case belongs to the same or to a different class. 
Diagnosis operates as a form of classification which goes beyond categorisation by 
justifying the categorisation; (2) past cases are often used to plan or design new 
solutions. Successful legal cases might be used as templates in the future, while 
unsuccessful ones might be avoided or used to bring an action down. Designing is a 
kind of planning but it involves the active adaptation of past templates to meet 
current conditions; (3) experts might draw comparisons to assign value to current 
goods or situations. Lawyers might recur to past settlements to estimate the 
cost/benefit tradeoffs of their chosen plans; (4) reasoners might recur to past 
authoritative cases to justify similar decisions on procedural or substantive matters. 
When domain theories result too weak to support the correctness of a decision, 
arguments by analogy become highly valued. Although the reasoner might often 
encounter that there are a number of competing analogies and outcomes; (5) decision 
makers might try to explain or persuade their audience by using illustrative cases. 
These cases might try to persuade regarding the rightness of decisions; (6) experts 
might use cases to help themselves in the interpretation of rules that are not well 
defined; (7) cases play an important part in learning and teaching. Past cases 
represent useful lessons from which legal reasoners can learn the existing theories in 
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a domain, and that can be used to teach novices a domain of knowledge or certain 
analytical skills; and finally, (8) cases are important in the process of discovering, 
building and testing new domain theories. Legal reasoners derive new categories by 
drawing analogies with past cases, and test the limits of old theories or new 
hypothesis against past cases.
165
  
According to Ashley, the early attempts of the AI community to built computational 
legal experts show that legal reasoning, despite some preconceptions, is not only a 
matter of deducing results from legal rules. A set of possible reasons why logic 
proves insufficient for giving an account of legal reasoning has been identified; the 
existence logical and semantic ambiguity of rules, conflicts among rules and unstated 
conditions of application make problems in the legal domain ill-structured. Legal 




As we can see, the justifications underlying the use of past cases by legal reasoners 
according to the AI community are basically related to the features of human 
cognition. In this sense, this view contrasts most of the justifications provided by 
legal theories, which usually consider that the reasons behind precedent use are 
related to the specific aims of the law (e.g. legal certainty, formal justice, etc.). 
Nevertheless, as we have previously seen, the first use of precedents in both the civil 
and common law tradition seem to have been supported by epistemological and 
cognitive reasons that did not coincide with the particular aims and purposes 
associated to law. The usefulness of precedents for knowledge building and cognitive 
performance might be the reason why historically legal reasoners relied in past 
decisions even if there was no legal imperative to do so. Also, it might be the 
explanation why even the legal systems that do not recognise formally or even 
explicitly despise past legal cases, do show a form of reliance on prior decisions. 
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the aims that the law pursuits and 
that define the rule of law as we currently understand it, might enhance the necessity 
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to draw conclusions consistent with the past and, thus, motivate legal case-based 
reasoning to a certain extent.  
Despite the fact that the research on AI and case-based reasoning seems to mitigate 
the particularities of the law, we consider that this approach is of great use in our 
quest of understanding precedent-based reasoning. The AI community aims to 
understand the ways in which human reasoners draw conclusions from the 
comparison of cases in order to design computer programs that perform this 
operations instead of persons, or assist human reasoners step-by-step in their decision 
making processes. In this manner, the studies on artificial intelligence and case-based 
reasoning in the scope of law aim to generate representations of the operations that 
human legal experts undertake when using past legal cases. Even if there is not a 
consensus on the way these operations are performed, the blueprints articulated to 
represent case-based reasoning provide us with quite useful information about the 
uses of legal precedents. In order to provide a map of the process that CBR 
implicates, the AI community has recurred to the studies regarding human cognition 
scientists to support their computational models.  
AI researchers have observed that case-based reasoning is performed by following a 
general pattern. Ashley provides the following description of the steps involved in 
the process of case based reasoning.  
Start: Problem description. 
A: Process problem description to match terms in case database index. 
B: Retrieve from case database all candidate cases associated with matched index terms. 
C: Select most similar candidate cases not yet tried. 
     If there are no acceptable candidate cases, try alternative solution method, if any, and go 
to F. 
    Otherwise: 
D: Apply selected best candidate cases to analyse/solve the problem. If necessary, adapt 
cases for solution. 
E: Determine if case-based solution or outcome for problem is successful. 
    If not, return to C to try next candidate cases. 
    Otherwise: 
F: Determine if solution to problem is success or failure, generalize from the problem, update 
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Ashley’s steps can be seen as broadly following Aamodt & Plaza’s classic model of 
CBR. The model represents CBR as a “4 R’s” (i.e. retrieve, reuse, revise and 
retain).The process involves: (1) Retrieving previous similar experience, (2) Reusing 
the knowledge provided by previous cases to solve a new problems, (3) Revising the 
solution, and (4) Retaining the parts of the experience that are likely to be useful in 
the future.
168
 From the general steps above described, probably the one that has 
received more attention is the assessment of similarity in the retrieval of past 
experience. There are different models that explain how human reasoners assess 
whether a case is similar or different to another, but it is generally understood that 
the process is not as straight-forward as it might appear at first glance.  The AI 
community has represented the assessment of similarity as a twofold process that 
involves the analysis of surface similarities and structural similarities. Computer 
scientists have noticed that in the assessment of similarity not all features are equally 
important. Also, they have observed that the most similar case might not result the 
most useful one. However, reasoners will experience more difficulties to reuse a case 
that has significant differences with the target case, and they will need to perform 
more challenging adaptations. As a consequence of CBR the system retains new 
knowledge, in other words, it learns – although the manner in which this information 
ought to be retained is also a matter of debate.
169
 
Kolodner suggest a similar model to represent the case-based reasoning cycle. (1) It 
starts with retrieving potentially good cases from a body of memory. Retrieval is 
performed by using certain features of the new case as labels to search past cases. 
The results of the search are narrowed down by selecting the most relevant or in 
point cases. The selection is, however, not straight forward; cases can be compared 
on the basis of particular similarities or in more abstract levels. (2) The retrieved past 
cases or portions of cases serve to propose a ballpark solution. (3) This solution is 
adapted, some of them more straightforward and commonsensical than others. (4) 
The new solution or interpretation is then criticised. In case it does not survive a 
process of criticism, it means that it needs to be repaired, that is to undergo major 
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adaptation. (5) In a further step, the decisions are evaluated in real world situations to 
revise their goodness and draw conclusions. (6) Finally, the new experience is stored 
as part of the body of memory, and becomes available for future problem solving.
170
 
The CBR processes described above help us understanding certain processes that 
legal experts perform when using past cases. When reasoning with legal cases, 
human experts ought to retrieve relevant past experience that respond for a new 
problem. As we shall see, retrieving useful past legal cases involves an analysis of 
relevancy that goes beyond the mere assessment of similarity. That, however, does 
not mean that legal experts do not perform a comparison of the similarities and 
differences between the past and present case. Nevertheless, with regards to legal 
cases, the assessment of similarities and differences is not performed merely at a 
superficial level, but at a level where pre-established legal categories are taken into 
account.
171
 In this manner, when legal reasoners compare the facts of legal 
precedents, they do not compare brute facts, but the facts in the light to legal 
concepts. Retrieval presupposes the pre-categorisation of the new case according to 
previously constructed legal concepts, classes or categories, and from which previous 
cases can be understood. The category into which a new case falls might not be 
always clear; thus, some classifying acts might not be definitive. Legal cases are 
preliminarily understood as belonging to a category, which aids the initial retrieval of 
the information. Nevertheless, the legal reasoner might decide to start a new search 
under a different category if his first attempt fails to provide him with relevant cases 
that are not only similar, but also useful for his purpose.  
Determining the relevancy of legal cases involves assessing different factors that 
range from the already mentioned dimensions of conceptual relevancy, and factual 
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relevancy, but also their juristic value.
172
 What is considered to be of juristic value 
has to do with certain institutional aspects as, for example, the hierarchy of the court 
that drafted the decision. Finding a case of the highest court that resembles the case 
at hand is an indication that the new case will be most likely decided along the same 
lines.   
The evaluation of relevancy is, however, highly dependent on the context. This 
means that the similarities and differences that appeared irrelevant at once might 
become relevant under different circumstances, and that cases of low juristic value 
might however become relevant at some point. The contextuality of the assessment 
of relevancy is connected to the legal reasoners needs when retrieving past legal 
cases. Sutton has argued that the notion of relevancy is a dynamic notion with deep 
roots on the form in which the law is practiced. In his view, relevancy is closely 
connected to the attorneys needs in constructing mental models or cognitive maps of 
the law. Therefore, whether a case is consider relevant depends on its potential to 
contribute to the position that the practitioner is trying to defend.
173
 Relevancy has a 
subjective dimension coincident with the legal reasoner’s particular needs; thus, 
sometimes the most similar or in point cases might not be relevant if they are against 
the reasoners’ pretensions. On occasions, some distant matches might result the 
relevant cases for legal reasoners if they can help supporting the client’s claim.  
Legal reasoners have incorporated into their minds a standard map of what the law is 
– that is, an objective institutional model transmitted through enculturation and that 
is more or less shared within the relevant community.
174
 Practitioners’ professional 
success highly depends in their capacity to generate orderly maps with the legal 
information available and to determine which are the stronger and weaker criteria 
supported within a system of law. The cognitive maps held by legal reasoners enable 
them not only to give account of a determinate area of law, but also to determine the 
position of a client’s claim with respect to the whole body of laws. Judges are 
expected to reach legal decisions by using the stronger and most in point available 
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cases, but the case of lawyers is different. Lawyering consists in arguing that a 
determinate claim is strongly supported by the system of law. In this way, lawyers 
will make use of any means possible to try to support their claim. Thus, cases that are 
not conceptually or factually relevant or that have a poor juristic value might actually 
become relevant if they are means to support a legal claim. Therefore, cases that in 
AI terms are reputed as ‘harmful knowledge’, and that generally retrieval systems 
attempt to filter, might actually be relevant under certain circumstances.
175
 
The mental maps of the law become useful instruments not only when retrieving 
relevant information, but also when assessing the potential success of adapting and 
reusing certain cases. Past legal cases show previously acts of classification or 
categorisation, but that does not mean that the resulting categories are static. Based 
on their cognitive maps, human experts also are able to detect when it is proper to 
make analogies or make distinctions that expand or narrow the previously 
determined categories. Experts also know when certain adaptations or stretches of 
categories are more difficult to sustain than others, and that they might receive 
stronger criticisms or stand less chances of success. Proposed legal solutions are 
generally more successful if they are similar, conceptually or factually, and if they 
have high juristic value or, in other words, if they are in point and highly 
authoritative. 
As we have previously mentioned, the last stage of CBR is the retention of new 
cases. Recent legal solutions are retained in order to contribute to the systemic 
learning, but with regards to law, retention is more than a function of the capability 
of computational retrieval systems. Different legal systems opt for different ways of 
incorporating this systemic knowledge. The information that is retained and becomes 
widely available depends on the styles of law reporting of each jurisdiction. In legal 
practice the authority of past cases is also connected to the means by which the 
information is made available.
176
 In this sense, legal reasoners might have access to 
prior cases that fully match a new case and the interests they are defending; 
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nevertheless, if this case has not made publicly available it might not be easy to use it 
as an authoritative model for decision. This does not mean that the legal reasoner 
would not be able to find any use in this information; he could use it as a template, 
instead of starting from scratch. Nevertheless, in legal practice, legal experts expect 
to use authoritative templates that they could present and support as the best decision 
in a dialectic or adversarial context, in which case private, unpublished or 
unapproved precedents might not be considered as having sufficient strength.   
All the basic tasks of CBR above described are potentially useful to describe 
precedent based reasoning across jurisdictions. Nevertheless, as we have argued 
along this thesis, different historical backgrounds have determined the degree of 
reliance on past cases decided by judicial bodies, and even the form in which this 
information is made available. These historically constructed conditions have 
powerful effects on the modes of legal reasoning. Thus, legal reasoning patterns 
might vary with regards to the particularities of each legal system.  
Most of models of legal CBR provided by the community of artificial intelligence 
and the law have as a starting point the practice of precedents in the common law 
context. Computational theories of arguing with precedents, thus, tend to picture a 
form of reasoning where the assessment of fact plays a major role.
177
 In this respect, 
the leading legal CBR systems HYPO and CATO hold that cases are collection of 
factors – that is, relevant legal facts with an outcome either in favour of the plaintiff 
or the defendant. According to Ashley, cases are understood to reflect factors in 
different magnitudes, that is, to be more or less extreme examples of a set of 
factors.
178
 In this way, the processes of comparing cases, making analogies and 
drawing distinctions are understood in connection to the factual dimension of legal 
cases. Nevertheless, as we have previously mentioned, not all legal traditions give a 
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rich description of the facts of the case. Therefore, the AI and law community has 
acknowledged the possible limitations on the computational models that have been 
designed so far, and has shown interest in understanding precedent based reasoning 
in the civilian tradition. 
The increasing attention posed on precedents beyond the common law tradition 
seems to have also been identified by the artificial intelligence and the law 
community. Ashley – taking into account the fact that civil law systems seem to be 
increasingly using legal precedents – has identified two potential different lines of 
legal precedent based-reasoning: the abstract precedent scenario or the fact-based 
precedent scenario. In his view, in the abstract precedent scenario is useful as it 
indicates that another court has already established a connection between an abstract 
rule or principle and a particular article of a statute or code, or has formulated an 
abstract rule or principle in a particular manner. The abstract precedent might or 
might not contain a description of the facts from which the rule or principle derived; 
thus, the future court will be more or less uninterested in understanding the factual 
context when making use of the precedent.
179
 On the contrary, in a fact-based 
scenario, a precedent will be a useful indication on how a different court has decided 
a case in the view of a certain factual context. The decision usually has a rich 
description of the facts of the case, and the future court is overly concerned with how 
they should be evaluated.
180
 The second scenario seems to be closer to the common 
law model of reasoning with precedents, while the first seems to be more 
representative of the civilian approach. According to Ashley, the main difference 
between the two approaches resides in the importance granted to the factual context 
of the case, but both are deemed useful inasmuch as they provide influential 
exemplars of courts’ practice.
181
 Nevertheless, he argues that precedents with rich 
mention of the facts are somehow superior as precedents providing more concrete 
information help legal reasoners to fill legal gaps with more accuracy. This 
consideration motivates Ashley’s suggestion to civilian legal systems to expand their 
mentioning of the factual circumstances of the case. Herein, we do not aim to discuss 
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the rightness of this argument, as the decision not to include facts in legal decisions 
seems to be strongly entrenched in certain legal systems, and such a change in the 
tradition would require major efforts of persuasion.  
In Ashley’s view, since computational models of precedent-based reasoning are, to a 
great extent, implementations of the model of analogy making in the context of 
factual circumstances, they might be of limited relevance in civil law jurisdictions. 
These models will be deemed useful to the extent to which these systems allow 
reasoning with facts. For example, they might be of aid in illustrating some basic 
ways of case-based reasoning, such as drawing inferences from fact comparisons, 
testing hypotheses about the winning argument, providing counterexamples and 
distinguishing cases, and increase or decrease the importance of distinctive 
aspects.
182
 In this sense, to make these computational models useful for a different 
context we might need to attenuate the emphasis in the factual context. 
Therefore, there are some questions that we should ask. How can we understand 
precedent based reasoning in a more abstract scenario that seldom, if ever, provides a 
statement of the facts of the case? Are abstract precedents absolutely different to 
those that have a rich statement of the facts of the case? Are the insights about 
factual precedents absolutely irrelevant when attempting to understand legal 
reasoning with precedents of a more abstract character? We consider that many of 
the insights on precedents provided by the AI & law community with respect to 
factual precedents are actually useful to understand abstract precedents.  
In abstract precedent scenarios, past legal decisions do not provide a full statement of 
facts. The content of precedents might, however, range from a full factual description 
to an absolutely abstract construct. Whether a decision has a full mention of fact or 
just gives hints of the circumstances surrounding the case, these information can be 
used by the legal reasoner to inform the more abstract deliberations contained in the 
precedent. The distinction between factual and abstract precedent scenarios, thus, 
might not be as straightforward as it appears at first glance. In fact, legal experts 
from a specific legal system might have at hand precedents with different degrees of 
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‘abstractness’ or ‘factualness’, deriving in slightly different precedent based 
reasoning approaches.  
As we have seen, CBR is a form a problem solving method in which a subject uses 
past concrete situations to solve a new problem. In this sense, previous cases appear 
as past happenings immerse in the factual circumstances in which they arise, for 
which abstract legal decisions might not be properly considered as cases for the 
purpose of CBR. If that is the case, CBR might not be the default problem solving 
method in abstract precedent scenarios. Nevertheless, some of these more abstract 
precedents do have some indications of the facts of the case, in which case legal 
practitioners engage in some sort of reasoning involving facts. However, we ought to 
remember that the comparison is not performed between brute facts but between 
legal facts – that is, facts built around legal concepts or categories. 
Even in abstract cases, where factual circumstances are absent, the legal reasoner 
might recur to other problem solving methodologies, such as analogy making. It is 
important to remember that CBR is just an instance of analogical reasoning, and that 
reasoners are able to make analogies beyond the dimension of facts. Abstract 
precedents can be also used for analogy making processes in a similar manner as in 
CBR with factual precedents. In this sense, one of the most important problem 
solving methods used in precedent-based reasoning is analogy making. Analogy 
making is a basic cognitive process used to make sense of the world, while at the 
same time generating new knowledge. In this respect, Thagard and Holyoak argue 
that ‘the human ability to find analogical correspondences is intimately linked to the 
evolutionary development of the capacity for explicit, systematic thinking.’
183
  
Methods as analogy and CBR are used by legal reasoners to build theories (in the 
psychological sense of the word) of different areas of law with whatever means they 
have available.
184
 Nevertheless, theory formulation in law is usually performed in a 
dialectical or adversarial context, which means that these theories need to be strong 
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to stand after a process of disputation. This means that these theories need to be built 
on strong legal features, such as in-point and juristically valuable precedents.  
An important realisation has been that in the construction of these theories legal 
practitioners need to order numerous precedents, which might actually be 
contradictory. For Prakken and Sartor one criterion for dealing with conflicting 
precedents is selecting the ones that are more in point – but besides similarity 
lawyers could use other criteria like determining whether the precedent comes from a 
higher court or it is more recent.
185
 This process seems to be so complex that 
computer models have not been able to account for the multifactorial assessment 
performed by human experts when determining the precedents relevant from a pool 
of multiple and potentially conflicting precedents.  
4.5 Lessons on Precedent-Based Reasoning 
As we have seen, precedents have an elusive nature that has been difficult to capture 
by a single theoretical effort. Nevertheless, the model that considers precedents as 
rules binding in an all-or-nothing way seems to have particular problems to portrait 
several aspects of precedent-based reasoning. Our exploration of precedents leads us 
to the conclusion that past legal cases are better understood as dynamic and flexible 
legal resources that have an important role in the construction of a systemic body of 
knowledge in the face of legal argumentation. 
Precedents are deeply connected to the dynamics of legal argumentation – therefore, 
there is always the possibility that they will suffer an expansion or compression to 
include or exclude novel facts or hypothesis.  However, this enterprise does not exist 
without constraint. Legal reasoners need to create narratives that ‘fit’ better within 
the relevant normative environment, and that are considered strong according to the 
institutional setting. Only this way they have the potential to resist an adversarial 
process.   
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Identifying connections between different legal precedents and new real or 
hypothetical situations seems to be at the core of precedent-based reasoning. It is by 
being able to see how different past decisions ‘fit’ together and with other legal 
features, as well as how they relate with new facts and hypothesis that legal 
practitioners are able to build ordered ‘maps’ of the law. In this way, the capacity to 
accommodate numerous (and sometimes contradictory) legal precedents in an 
orderly map of the law is one of the main competences of legal practitioners of both 
the common law and civil law traditions. As we have seen the evaluation of 
precedents entails dealing with multiple factors, than range from the substance of the 
case to formal institutional features, such as hierarchy, age and so on.  
Mexican (federal) legal precedents also may be assessed according to multiple 
factors. Precedents in that context do not follow a consistent format yet; thus, they 
range from formulistic and abstract statements to discursive formulations that include 
a description of the factual scenario of the decision and the reasons behind it.
186
 In 
this manner, the assessment of in-pointness may be performed attending to the 
available facts and the established legal concept of category. Mexican practitioners 
also need to assess the formal characteristics of precedents: their rank according to 




 the jurisdiction they emerge from,
189
 their 
category (according to the jurisprudencia and isolated thesis classification)
190
 their 
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relationship with other precedents,
191
 and so on. An important particularity of the 
Mexican system of precedents is the historical distinction between jurisprudencia 
and isolated thesis. The first are considered to be binding legal criteria, while the 
others are considered persuasive. Nevertheless, the fact that the legal reasoner needs 
to take into account a plurality of considerations dilutes the strong division between 
binding jurisprudencia and isolated thesis.
192
  
In this sense, Mexican legal practitioners, in the same form legal professionals in 
other legal systems do, need to be able to see and assess all relevant aspects affecting 
precedents. In our view it is this competence what Mexican legal practitioners are 
lacking of. That is why they are not able to see ordered patterns arising from a body 
of numerous precedents. In this manner, this is the expert knowledge that we need to 
help legal practitioners develop. This competence, however, requires the 
development of an embodied ability that goes beyond the acquisition of propositional 
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5. Learning Precedents through Computer Assisted 
Visualisation 
“In the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity”  
Sun-Tzu, The Art of War 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Experiencing challenges often leads us to reconsider some aspects of our practices. 
However, changing our practices and building new ones might require the 
acquisition of different knowledge. At such junctures, inquiring about the forms in 
which the new and necessary knowledge can be acquired or developed becomes of 
extreme importance. New knowledge might dawn spontaneously into an individual 
once he has realised the novel trends and needs that are transforming his practice. 
However, individuals might take time to arrive to such an acknowledgement, and 
they might take even more time to make these insights the new shared establishment. 
In fact, not even the passing of time can guarantee that the members of a certain 
community will be able to conquer this understanding or that they would be able to 
develop a more functional knowledge framework.
1
  
In this sense, the process of transition from one knowledge framework to another 
might be a long and uphill endeavour, as understanding, operating under and 
embracing the new schema in full can prove to be quite a challenge. In the case of 
revolutionary changes in the knowledge structures of particular communities, 
difficulties might be experienced on two levels: change might hit those deeply 
embedded within a specific tradition or framework, but it might also bring forward 
questions regarding the knowledge that should be transferred to future generations. 
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Newer generations are ‘destined’ for a different modus operandi – that is, a 
framework which has yet to be mastered. In this way, after a major disruption, a 
community of practice will most likely need some time to recover; time for those 
members of the community who were bred into the former tradition to build new 
knowledge and to introduce future practitioners to it. For Holyoak and Thagard when 
the familiar patterns of action are broken and understanding of our surroundings 
becomes difficult, the mind needs to make new connections; in other words, it 
requires making a leap.
2
 Facing the potential risk that this spontaneous process might 
not take place at all, it might not always be possible to wait for gradual processes of 
knowledge construction to take place. In this way, we might need to inquire if there 
are forms that facilitate directly the process of knowledge construction so as to 
increase the possibilities of a successful transition, as well as speeding up this 
process. This chapter aims partly at investigating the way in which tradition-bound 
Mexican legal practitioners can make the required ‘mental leap’; but beyond that it 
will also explore how to form practitioners with the necessary mindset for 
performing under changing circumstances.  
In a legal system – where practitioners should at any time be able to account for what 
the law stands for, and securing a certain level of predictability is seen as a major aim 
of the legal enterprise – not seeing clear patterns arising from previous cases can turn 
into an important source of problems. Legal practitioners need to be able to analyse 
legal information in past legal decisions, in order to evaluate the legal scenario and 
assess the possibilities of certain arguments to succeed. Delay in the acquisition of 
this expertise does not only cause detriment to legal professionals, but it also 
undermines the possibilities for developing relationships of mutual trust between 
citizens and authorities. Therefore, waiting for a natural process of knowledge 
acquisition – that might be time-consuming or might actually never occur – seems to 
represent a burden to legal practitioners and to those citizens expecting to be living 
under a predictable system of law. With these considerations in mind, our analysis 
will additionally look into ways for speeding up the process of change and 
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guaranteeing that the community in transition develops accurate knowledge 
structures fitting the new set of needs.  
This matter points us to an often overlooked topic in both comparative law and 
jurisprudence; that of the processes through which legal knowledge develops and 
becomes shared establishment at a certain place and time. In comparative law, the 
work of Pierre Legrand heralded a ‘cognitive turn’ that identified legal families and 
legal systems by the unique ‘legal mentality’ of their members.
3
 In legal theory too, 
certain cognitive structures shared by a group feature prominently in a wide variety 
of theoretical accounts of the notion of ‘legal system’, from the systems theoretical 
account of Gunther Teubner to the ‘interpretative community’ of Ronald Dworkin. 
However, while the emphasis on the cognitive-affective traits shared by the legal 
community confers an important insight, there exists little analysis on how these 
shared understandings arise and become a common knowledge background, over 
which practice is built. Seemingly, the knowledge structures that make a group of 
legal professionals a more or less cohesive community of practice are usually taken 
for granted. Moreover, the legal systems considered by theoretical accounts are 
typically mature systems that have evolved over several years or even centuries, and 
accumulated in the process a rich stock of knowledge and problem solving 
methodologies.
4
 Most importantly, these legal systems are regularly understood as 
developing under normal circumstances; that is, as following a progressive evolution, 
where the shared knowledge framework is not subjected to major challenges, 
revisions or accommodations, and no cognitive problem needs to be addressed.  
The question we are left with is where these cognitive-affective features come from 
in the first place and how can we alter their course when they seem insufficient. For 
example, in Dworkin’s theory the legal system is already mature, its interpretative 
communities well established and benefiting from an abundance of data points. Even 
if not all judges and lawyers are demi-gods as Hercules, they seem to be working 
under a fair understanding of several aspects of their practice.
5
 In Legrand’s 
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approach, the common lawyer and the civilian lawyer are equally already ‘fully 
formed’, and so ingrained in the cognitive paradigm of their respective systems that 
they may well be ‘uneducable’ in principle, and unable to ever develop a true 
understanding of what it means to be a lawyer in a different legal system.
6
 In 
Legrand’s account, the cognitive-affective maps shared by a legal community appear 
as immutable structures deriving from nowhere. As a consequence, these theories are 
not designed to analyse and understand legal systems in radical transition, to the 
point that Legrand seems to deny that deep cognitive change is even possible. 
The missing element in all these accounts, in our view, is legal education. Civilian 
and common lawyers are not born, they are made. Many of the mental frameworks 
shared by specific legal communities can be seen as the product of a number of 
socialising interactions or exchanges, from which legal education emerges as the 
most important process in forming the legal mind. Legal communities exist because 
of the relevant communications that provide them with a set of common values, 
beliefs, concepts and ways of doing things, or in other words, due to a communal set 
of cognitive-affective traits that characterise them. These communications are 
actually educational experiences through which a series of social communalities are 
transferred across generations. From all possible educational social interactions 
affecting legal professionals, the process of formal education seems to be particularly 
powerful in structuring the legal mentality. It is mainly in the process of formal 
schooling that lay minds are turned into legal minds or, in other words, where 
students learn the art of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ in that particular context.  
Studying legal education and the way in which it imparts certain cognitive traits on 
its ‘raw material’ should therefore be, in our view, integral to both the jurisprudential 
question pertaining to the nature of legal knowledge and the comparative legal 
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question regarding the most basic differences and commonalities between legal 
systems. From this it follows that to understand and to support the cognitive 
transition of a legal system such as Mexico, we need to look at the dimension of legal 
education much more urgently than at reforms of the legal framework (e.g. statutory 
indications on the use of precedents, as requested by the Mexican practitioners). It is 
through legal education that a different mental framework has to be delivered to both 
already formed professionals and new generations of legal practitioners. It is here 
that we encounter, of course, some systemic difficulties: educators that developed 
their own skill sets and cognitive schemata under one system are charged with 
imparting radically different modes of thinking to their students. At the same time, 
practitioners are often outside the reach of intensive educational measures, and tend 
to expect consistency in the knowledge displayed by younger generations.
7
 This 
tendency to reaffirm cognitive schemata by reproducing certain communications 
reminds us of the systems theory account of Luhmann and Teubner, and their 
emphasis on the tendency of systems to replicate themselves and their underlying 
conceptual orderings.
8
 To break this circle, we need therefore to enable cognitive 
schemata outside the established training pathways, and to address directly the 
development of cognitive skills, not just to introduce additional factual information 
(as in the above mentioned case of statutory indications). On the contrary, if we 
addressed the problem by drafting new explicit legal rules regulating how to deal 
with precedents (regardless of the fact that their operation does not communicate 
well by means of explicit procedural indications), they would eventually be ‘filtered’ 
through the same body of knowledge deriving from a rigid approach to law. This is 
the reason why our target should be to reach the deeply engrained cognitive-affective 
structures operative within that specific context. 
In Mexico the legal community has been keen on thinking that legal education needs 
to be reformed to complete the transition started by the rule of law reformation 
program. While the most frequent argument is that Mexico needs to transit towards 
some pedagogical methods characteristic of the American legal education, this 
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statement is regularly not fully informed on educational, cognitive and 
jurisprudential research, and it does not tend to target particular regional 
deficiencies.
9
 In this context it has been missing a close exploration into the broad 
range of possibilities that educational research offers, which could be used to reform 
practice according to certain legal theoretical insights, and attending to particular 
local needs and circumstances.  
Therefore, our following examinations will finally  reflect on ways that could break 
that circle and aid the transition towards more functional knowledge structures, 
which allow legal practitioners (both present and future) to engage consistently in 
precedent-based reasoning. Supporting the cognitive transition of the legal 
community is likely to reduce the time of groundless practice that is producing the 
complaints of local professionals, and also to diminish the chances of holding 
conflicting ideas regarding practical matters. Herein, we aim to suggest a practical 
solution for the specific legal system, which not only helps the acquisition of abstract 
understanding with respect to the intrinsic flexibility of legal precedents, but also 
prepares legal practitioners to operate with full competence under the new 
framework. Therefore, we will discuss the potentially useful educational methods 
that could support developing the knowledge framework that the legal community 
needs.  
5.2 Form an Substance in Legal Education 
Education is often offered as the key to solve any sort of problem; however, it cannot 
be used just as an open discourse attempting to meet any kind of needs. Educational 
experiences need to be meaningful in different levels so that they have an important 
impact. Therefore, they need to be mindful of a set of several factors that have an 
important effect in the learning process. Educational solutions need to look not only 
at the knowledge that is to be learned, but also at the pre-existing cognitive biases 
held by the learners, the methods and even the learning platform that would best 
develop that particular knowledge. Education entails rich interactions that transport 
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much more meaning than the one expressively intended – thus, it is very important to 
be mindful of not only the substance that is aimed to be transmitted, but also of the 
forms in which it is delivered. In fact, when thinking about education, 
communication has to be understood broadly as the forms constitute meaningful 
messages in themselves. In this way, in educational interactions, the form or method 
is closely intertwined with the substance or subject matter. 
Certain braches of educational research have extensively explored the numerous 
factors affecting the teaching-learning process – that is, the set of substantive and 
formal features that play a role in education. Legal education, thus, can benefit from 
the wider research of educational psychology and sciences education, where 
supporting the acquisition of new knowledge and generating conceptual change, 
seems to be a major concern. Herein we will attend to a series of consideration noted 
by the broader educational research. Additionally, we will take into account some 
perspectives developed concretely by researchers on legal education, which are 
potentially suitable to solve the problem of knowledge experienced by the Mexican 
legal community. Herein we will explore different considerations regarding the 
process of teaching and learning, which can help designing a functional platform to 
support the learning process of the Mexican legal community.  
5.2.1 Pre-existing Cognitive-Affective Structures 
To assist the transition of the entire Mexican legal system we ought to think that 
there are two different types of subjects that need to develop new knowledge 
structures: fully formed legal professionals and young law students who have not yet 
acquired a legal mind. At first, the distinction might appear irrelevant, but for 
educational purposes it is significant in the different approach called for each group. 
As we shall see, the knowledge structures of fully formed professionals are different 
than those of students in their formative years. This has important consequences for 
the process of teaching and learning. Educational solutions ought to be mindful of 
the previous knowledge schemata carried by potential learners in order to secure a 
good understanding and command of new knowledge. 
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The areas of psychology and education have for a long time recognised that the 
minds of learners are not empty vessels, but, on the contrary, they are naturally 
loaded with representations of the world.
10
 These pre-existing structures affect the 
reception of new knowledge: they might act as assets or liabilities, depending on 
their potential to impulse or draw back learning. The previously loaded cognitive 
information determines the strength and difficulty of the learning experience. 
Understanding what learning might mean for a subject has an important educational 
effect; it determines the support that ought to be provided to the learner and the 
manner in which its previous knowledge needs to be addressed.  
There are reasons to believe that the learning experience in young students and full 
formed members of a professional community is not exactly one and the same. 
Educational psychologists have argued that any subject engaging into a learning 
experience is actually going through a set of cognitive changes.
11
 Nevertheless, fully 
formed professionals possess a set of more cohesive and deeply engrained structures, 
while early learners regularly have more scattered fragments of ‘naïve’ 
understandings that might be easier to change. In this respect, students in the process 
of formation might not have held yet structured cognitive-affective maps on a 
determinate subject domain. Thus, we can assume that early law students, who have 
not been provided with the cognitive framework that allows them to think as lawyers, 
do not have deeply embedded theories of what law is and what thinking as a lawyer 
means. Law students most probably will not hold strong pre-conceptions about the 
law, and most importantly what reasoning with precedents entails; therefore, to them, 
the introduction of this new knowledge most probably will not deliver a 
revolutionary shift, but just a more mundane form of knowledge acquisition. 
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Nevertheless, it is important that educators identify the pre-loaded cognitive-
affective structures held by law students and to directly address any problematic 
feature.  
Fully formed professionals will most likely hold stronger cognitive-affective 
structures that would appear more difficult to change. Legal professionals do not 
hold ‘naïve’ assumptions, but a more developed and coherent framework of 
knowledge over which they operate in practice. Legal practitioners have a default 
form of understanding and for carrying on legal tasks. The possibility of changing 
their legal ways might even be perceived as a threat to their character of experts, and 
thus face some kind of opposition, not only cognitive but also of an emotional kind. 
Changing the minds of professionals is a more radical cognitive learning experience. 
Already formed legal practitioners are the ones that live an authentic cognitive 
revolution when attempting to change their minds. Therefore we may argue that the 
introduction of new knowledge needs to have a strong cognitive impact that is able to 
generate the needed gestalt-shift.  
In essence there are no impediments to using the same learning platforms for both 
early legal learners and fully formed professionals. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that legal professionals might need to receive more assistance with 
what in their case becomes apparently a more difficult learning experience. In this 
respect, we might need to reflect if additional educational methodologies might be 
needed to aid the transition of fully formed professionals. According to educators, 
those difficult learning experiences resulting from the existence of pre-charged 
biases might benefit from the introduction of meta-learning strategies.
12
 These 
strategies generally are used when previous beliefs or values clash with the new (to-
be learned knowledge) in a way that might hinder the acquisition of knowledge. 
Meta-learning involves an active reflection by the learner on the limits of their 
previously held knowledge in contrast with the new knowledge.
13
 We consider that 
this type of methodologies might help enhance the learning of those individuals with 
a heavier bias. This thesis, however, will focus on the design of a main educational 
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platform that could be used by both types of learner, both law students and fully 
formed practitioners. In any case, we acknowledge that there are some peripheral 
activities to be developed in the future towards enhancing the educational experience 
of different types of learners.  
5.2.2 Computer Assisted Education 
Delivering a different cognitive-affective framework to that which has been 
circulating in and outside the law schools in Mexico can be somehow tricky. The 
usual problem in such transitions is who can deliver the novel form of knowledge: 
that is, who can actually stand out of the establishment and start drawing on 
something different. Neither developing knowledge in a group of educators, nor 
bringing educators from outside to, later on, educate the quite big group of Mexican 
legal practitioners and law students, seem like feasible measures towards introducing 
change. Moreover, the knowledge that the legal community needs to develop is 
mainly of tacit character, and, consequently, communicating a set explicit concepts, 
beliefs and procedures might be of limited use. Expository ‘transfer’ of knowledge 
does not appear as the adequate means to achieve a good understanding of precedent-
based reasoning, as this type of procedural knowledge is not easy to enclose by 
means of explicit directions. What this legal community needs is to develop a type of 
embodied knowledge that is only possible by practically engaging in precedent-based 
reasoning.  
Legal artificial intelligence systems (legal AI) meet these criteria. At their best, they 
are build on sound cognitive science principles and therefore particularly suitable for 
the type of cognitive change discussed above.
14
 Japan, a country that also faced an 
important legal transition from a passive role for the lawyers towards one more 
active and creative, considered computer assisted legal education as a prime enabler 
to bring about the necessary change to legal education.
15
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Additionally, computer assisted educative systems allow the building of interactive 
scenarios where learners can develop ‘hands on’ knowledge. Legal AI allows the 
active involvement of the learner in relevant activities designed to develop embodied 
knowledge.
16
 In this form, legal learners are enabled to develop their capacity to 
identify patterns and awaken their professional intuition. An advantage of computer 
assisted platforms is that they allow active interaction under controlled 
circumstances. Learners might not yet be ready to engage in the chaos of real life, 
where there usually exists a much broader information load. Nevertheless, a 
somehow simplified environment allows them to build the necessary knowledge to 
‘see’ patterns in more complex scenarios.  
5.2.3 Visualisation 
A way to help ‘seeing’ the emerging patterns of law displayed by precedents could 
be achieved by using the method of visualisation. The graphical representation of 
argumentation has often been considered as an important tool for exploring and 
assessing arguments. Therefore, computer scientists have developed automated tools 
to assist with the graphical representation of arguments. These tools – which usually 
produce ‘box and arrow’ graphs – have often been created to ‘map’ an argumentative 
field; however, some others have been built with the educational purpose of teaching 
critical and argumentative skills. The general premise underlying these educational 
platforms is that the user will improve his hands-on knowledge. The analysis of the 
empirical evidence regarding the use of this kind of support software has not yet 
been able to provide a definitive conclusion regarding the benefits of such platforms; 
however, the overall positive results can be seen as sufficient reasons to believe that 
computer assisted visualisation does help in improving argumentative related skills.
17
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Visual maps have also been frequently used in the area of law, where several AI 
expert systems have been proposed to represent legal argument. While it is not 
uncommon to promote this type of expert systems for use in legal education, few of 
the existing approaches have been designed with an educational purpose in mind;  
they have instead tended to emerge as decision support tools, which are then 
assigned a secondary function as teaching or training aid. Kevin Ashley’s LARGO 
(‘Legal ARgument Graph Observer’) system deviates from this pattern.
18
 The 
LARGO system has been built as an educational tool that helps students reconstruct 
examples of hypothetical reasoning by representing these in simple diagrams. 
LARGO is based on the landmark HYPO expert system.
19
 The actual follow-up to 
HYPO, CATO, was already an educational aid and not just a reuse for a secondary 
market.
20
 Consequently, the system has been built taking into account insights 
coming from educational theory. Unlike many other AI and law systems promoted as 
teaching tools, both CATO and LARGO have been subject to some empirical 
evaluation of their efficiency; the fact that in this respect the picture remains 
ambivalent is in itself an important finding.
21
  
The hypothesis behind the program was that students who used LARGO to diagram 
hypothetical reasoning would learn and acquire skills better than learners not using 
the expert system. Therefore, the hypothesis was evaluated by two successive 
experiments: one in 2006 and another in 2007, which included first year students of 
the University of Pittsburgh. The initial group using the system in 2006 showed signs 
of having benefited from the use of LARGO, but the larger sample of students using 
the system the following year was not able to reproduce the same results.
22
 Other 
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studies have provided similar inconclusive results regarding their capacity to help 
improving the learner’s performance.
23
  
As Larkin and Simond noticed ‘a diagram is sometimes a thousand words’; however, 
that is not always the case.
24
 The possibilities for a diagram to succeed as a 
communicative or educational tool depend on a set of factors, a point also raised by 
Cox who distinguished three of such grounds: ‘a) the cognitive and semantic 
properties of the representation; (b) the match between the demands of the task and 
the type of information read-off afforded by the representation and (c) the effects of 
within-subject factors (e.g. prior knowledge, cognitive style).’
25
 
For these reasons, even if LARGO is a good starting point, we must build a system 
that meaningfully represents the particular features of precedents which seem to 
cause doubts in the Mexican community and, also, that targets the cognitive style of 
these users. Our limited reuse of the LARGO system, thus,  responds to the fact that 
it does not reflect many of the features of precedents that are problematic for the 
Mexican legal community and that need to be directly approached by our educational 
platform. In addition, diagrammatic representations along the lines of the LARGO 
system might be somehow sterile as communicative tools. Therefore, we propose a 
different form of visual tool that distances from the arguments as ‘box and arrow 
graphs’ design commonly used in legal AI. In this particular case we consider that a 
visual metaphor might be worth a thousand words. This tool might help ‘seeing’ 
different aspects of precedents (beyond those represented by LARGO), and, also, it 
might aid activating certain emotional dispositions in our learners that prepares them 
for a different form of legal practice.  
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5.2.4 Analogies and Metaphors  
When we face novel material, one basic human reaction is to search for similar 
experiences that give an explanation to the new one. In other words, we attempt to 
understand the unknown by creating parallelisms or correspondences with 
experiences stored in our memory. This process of comparison and transferral of 
knowledge is what resides at the core of analogical reasoning. Analogy is a basic 
cognitive tool that allows us to see relational patterns or ‘sameness’ connecting two 
or more experiences, and in that manner, it helps us to expand our knowledge. In 
analogy making we can distinguish two elements: a target, which is the phenomenon 
that needs to be explained, and the source, which is the previously known 
phenomenon that serves to reveal some characteristics of the target. Identifying 
resemblance between a source and a target allows us to transfer some knowledge 
from one to the other.
26
 
Some analogies result spontaneously in our quest to understand the world that 
surrounds us, but some others are deliberately created to communicate complex ideas 
and emotions. Certain forms of analogies, such as metaphors, connect targets and 
sources that seem quite remote from each other.
27
 In literature it is very frequent to 
find metaphors comparing people or sensations with objects of nature or human 
artefacts, in order to express people’s qualities, appearance or feelings. It is often the 
case that a good metaphor more easily transfers complex situations than a simple 
description. Due to their evident expressivity, analogies and metaphors are no 
surprising a common educational resource used to communicate and create 
familiarity with new material. For example, explaining to young learners that ‘an 
atom is the basic unit of an element’ might be less complicated if we analogise atoms 
with Lego blocks. Atoms and Lego blocks are, at first glance, very different; one of 
them is very visible toy that comes in different colours and the other one is an 
invisible to the eye piece of matter. Nevertheless, both of them have a similar 
function: they are basic pieces that serve to build different structures. In this way, 
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communicating to learners that atoms, like Lego blocks, are elemental structures that 
make everything around us, might actually help them expand their understanding of 
atoms. Educational analogies and metaphors can be a very important means in 
enhancing learning experience, but they have to be carefully selected in order to be 
effective.
 28
 Meaningful analogies and metaphors have to show that there are relevant 
parallelisms between the source and the target, which justify extending certain piece 
of knowledge from the one to the other.
 
The research on educational metaphors and 
analogies has indicated that good metaphors have an important value for learners, but 
that they risk being misleading if not carefully selected and properly introduced.
29
 
Therefore, it is highly important that our metaphors, verbal or visual, have strong 
similarities with the subject to be explained. This is due to the fact that analogies and 
metaphors are more than communication devices; they actually possess the capacity 
to shape our understanding of a determinate matter.
30
  
The law has repetitively recurred to metaphors in order to understand more complex 
phenomena. Actually, several metaphors have marked the way we think about 
different legal issues.
31
 The learning platform we propose uses a metaphor to deliver 
a general understanding of the functioning of legal precedents. We use the image of 
the battle to represent the elusive nature of precedents. In fact, the law holds an 
intimate relationship with war that can be traced back through centuries. In this way, 
the similarities between law and war might well go beyond a simple metaphor. We 
prefer to use the image of war in a metaphorical way due to the fact that the historical 
link is not felt strongly in our days. Nevertheless, building on the historical 
connection between law and war allows us to understand the soundness of the 
comparison.  
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Trial by combat or judicial duel was a common method to settle disputes both in 
Britain and the continent. The battle could involve a duel between individuals, but 
also a fight between entire groups. In Britain, the formal trial replaced gradually the 
combat, and slowly the crown started gaining monopoly over the use of violence – 
although this process was seemingly longer that the one taking place in the continent. 
An important fact connected to this development was the emergence of the legal 
profession as a powerful independent body, which created in the process a set of 
complex arguments and fictions. The common law professionals seem to have 
perpetuated their historical legacy in a stronger form that their continental 
counterparts; it is in their history the reason why their model of legal practice and 
education prepares them to encounter war.
32
 
The image of the law as a battle is quite common in common law systems, where 
there seems to exist a deep understanding that the trial process involves some kind of 
duel between the parties; where the lawyers perform as the ‘seconds’ and the judge 
as the neutral arbitrator. Karl Llewellyn, one of the most influential advocates of 
legal realism, was well aware of the war-like nature of the law when he described the 
‘duelling cannons of interpretation.’ He clearly saw that the law was struggle when 
he argued that every ruling could be rightfully ‘knocked out.’
33
 Nevertheless, not 
only the common law is the product of war. In ‘The Struggle for Law’ Jhering 
argued that: 
‘The end of the law is peace. The means to that end is war. So long as the law is 
compelled to hold itself in readiness to resist the attacks of wrong – and this it will be 
compelled to do until the end of time – it cannot dispense with war. The life of the law 
is a struggle, – a struggle of nations, of the state power, of classes, of individuals. All 
the law in the world has been obtained by strife. Every principle of law which obtains 
had first to be wrung by force from those who denied it; and every legal right – the legal 
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rights of a whole nation as well as those of individuals – supposes a continual readiness 
to assert it and defend it. The law is not mere theory, but living force.’
34
 
This last image is particularly sound as it portrays the law as an ongoing battle taking 
place with every legal trial. The law appears as a particularly dynamic and unsettled 
enterprise. In this form legal contents appear as being permanently negotiated upon 
each legal encounter. This picture puts into perspective the enlightened portrait of 
law as a set of certainties definitely settled in advance; an image that has resounded 
strongly in the minds of several generations of Mexican practitioners. Understanding 
the idea of law as a constant struggle might help this legal community feel more at 
peace with the absence of fixed certainties, and lead them to find securities and 
opportunities in war-time.  
However, we must be alerted to certain possible implications of the use of the war 
metaphor in law. In some adversarial systems, it has been noted that metaphors like 
that of law as battle might take law’s combative aspect too far.
35
 Nevertheless, we 
limit our war to the ground of reasons, where the only weapons are legal arguments. 
Therefore, in this way we limit the metaphor from reviving the violent characteristics 
of trial by combat. In fact, the platform we propose shows only argumentative 
opposition, without bringing the belligerent personal attitude that the in-class 
Socratic Method unfolds. Moreover, we believe that emphasising the struggle 
between legal reasons is an important deterrent from actual violence.  
Another important implication of our metaphor is that it reminds us that war is not 
usually a reckless enterprise; that in war there is restraint.  People usually assess 
carefully the scenarios they might face when going to battle. Before going to war, it 
is necessary to evaluate the strength of our troops – our soldiers, their ranks, their 
weapons and skill – opposite to our adversary’s artillery and advantages. War is 
complex and involves the assessment of a broad scope of eventualities (let’s not 
forget that Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo due to unforeseen weather 
conditions) but good strategists know well their chances. Our position might 
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sometimes call for riskier moves. For example, if in the middle of a battle we cannot 
get out and our possibilities of winning are minimal, we might send our only soldier 
in hope that he turns into a mythological hero and defeats a whole army. But hoping 
that a hero will make us win a difficult battle does not mean we do not know where 
our chances stand. When sending a lonely soldier to fight a war we must know that 
we are defying what it is most certain to happen. The same holds for those that have 
the best soldiers and the most technologically-advanced weapons: they must know 
that even if there are no absolute assurances, they most certainly will succeed. This 
realisation is equally useful for the litigating warrior and for the impartial judges. 
Judges also need to be able to understand the battleground and where the strongest 
factors reside. Knowing the battle-ground allows judges to assess the arguments of 
the parties and their own posture on the matter.  
5.2.5 Reaching Emotions 
An important matter regarding analogies and metaphors is their power to unleash 
emotional reactions; that is, they can persuade about the emotional attitude that 
should prevail in a specific situation. Thagard’s recent analysis of the emotional 
dimension of cognition has suggested that by using analogies we are capable of 
transferring or generating complex emotional states.
36
 In this respect, the use of 
metaphors cannot only help us in communicating a new idea or a ‘cold’ description 
of a phenomenon, but also in delivering a ‘hot’ emotional message.  
The metaphor that we suggest is an emotion-triggering device. The use of the battle 
to teach the Mexican legal community how to reason with precedents aims also to 
carry on some emotional changes. With the images of war and battles we aim to 
activate legal practitioners into engaging with the ongoing ‘struggle for law.’ Instead 
of being passive recipients of fixed authoritative orders, we would like them to 
engage in a more active process of meaning construction: in other words, we want 
them to ‘join the fight’. This image has also important implications regarding the 
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moral life of the law and the role of legal practitioners in this enterprise, which we 
will not be able to discuss as it goes beyond the scope of the present thesis.
37
 
Another important emotional state that we are willing to impart with our battle 
metaphor is the feeling of certitude in flexible, changing and contested environments. 
As we have seen throughout this work, the uncertainty experienced by the legal 
community with regards to having a plurality of precedents was mostly ‘sensed’, 
rather than factual. In this way, we aim not only to deliver a ‘cold’ cognitive 
understanding on how to build certainties by creating orderly maps of legal 
precedents; we also aim to build a different affective framework. We may be able to 
create a different emotional state in the recognition that practitioners are able to find 
certainties even in less straight-forward legal indications, and despite the fact that 
these certainties are at imminently defeasible.
38
    
5.3 The Battle of the Precedents: Facilitating Legal Education with Computer 
Assisted Visualisation 
In the previous chapter we explained how a system of precedents provides a more or 
less wide range of past decisions of a certain degree of authority that can be 
evaluated according to a set of complex considerations (e.g. precedents of lower 
courts are trumped by precedents of higher courts; new or old; in point or tangential; 
decided by majority or unanimous decisions; line of precedents or isolated precedent; 
etc.). 
The metaphor or the battle is a semantically rich resource to understand these 
characteristics of legal precedents. Precedents are actually marks of previous legal 
battles, and consequently they might show traces of the struggle in their 
argumentative part or in the dissenting opinions. Also, precedents are context-
sensitive sources of law, which, like soldiers, they possess a rank and other 
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characteristics that determine their overall strength. Similar to troops, precedents 
stand in groups that reinforce their strength and combat during attacks. As the legal 
war is regularly an ongoing one, our soldiers and troops can always suffer new and 
unexpected attacks that might harm or eliminate them. Using this metaphor we 
would like to introduce a computer assisted visualisation platform that should allow 
its users to understand legal precedents along these lines and, additionally, to acquire 
the necessary expertise. 
5.3.1 The LARGO System 
First we would like to have a closer look at the LARGO system, from which we take 
some inspiration. LARGO focuses on one aspect of case-based reasoning: testing the 
applicability or ‘in-pointness’ of a precedent to a given scenario by means of 
hypotheticals. Hypotheticals are ‘what if’ situations that challenge the substance of 
the precedent and might lead to either its expansion or its narrowing. Hypothetical 
reasoning is an exploratory tool to look into the meaning of concepts, rules and 
doctrines and draw their possible limits. This system reinforces the dialectical model 
of dispute that characterises precedent-based reasoning, and which was also the core 
of the earlier systems HYPO and CATO. The system was designed to have early 
(common) law students engaging with this dialectical interplay, but a similar system 
can be imagined to aid fully formed lawyers that have not developed fully the 
necessary adversarial skills. 
LARGO uses U.S. Supreme Court’s oral arguments to show how judges constantly 
perform an assessment of similarity between previous rules, doctrines or principles 
and hypothetical situations that are somehow ‘disruptive.’ This assessment 
necessarily entails narrowing or expanding the rule, doctrine or principle to stabilise 
the disruption. This constant dialogue between the settled certainties of the law and 
factual or hypothetical situations is what keeps a legal system from stagnating. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen throughout this thesis, this mode of thinking about the 
law has not been properly reinforced in the minds of Mexican legal practitioners, 




An illustration of this system might, however, help to understand it even better. In 
the case California v. Carney
39
 (used by Ashley and a series of works in the field of 
AI and law)
40
 the general rule involves that the search in a person’s dwellings 
requires a warrant. In the case at hand Mr. Carney had a motor home. The question is 
whether motor homes can be considered dwellings for the law or they are cars? 
According to the prosecution: If the place that is searched has indicia of mobility and 
is self-propelling, then no warrant is required, it is a car. According to the defence 
the test should be different: If the place to be searched is a motor home, then it has to 
be treated as a dwelling compartment and warrant is needed. The judge uses 
hypotheticals to question both sides. He asks the prosecution: If the vehicle has a 
camper’s tent attached to it, would this be a home? The prosecution can either stick 
to their initial assertion (but knowing that it is under attack) or try to offer a narrower 





















5.1 LARGO Reasoning Diagram Source: K Ashley 2009, 329 
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Propose test for deciding cfs & 
give reasons. 
test1: If place to be searched has 
indicia of home then warrant 
required. 
 
Reason: Protect privacy. 
Attack test as too broad; pose 
analogous hypo such that test 
applies but yields “wrong” result & 
give reasons. 
hypo1: Suppose… big stretch 
Cadillac… in a parking lot, and 
[curtains pulled all] around it… and 
a bed; 
 
Reason: Bright-line rule more 
important than protecting privacy. 
Modify test so it doesn’t yied 
“wrong” result. 
test2: If vehicle has “reasonably 
objectively observable attributes of 
a home” then warrant required. 
 
Reason: Accomodate bright-line 
rule. 
Attack test as too broad; pose 
analogous hypo such that test 
applies but yields “wrong” result & 
give reasons. 
hypo2: What about a van… 
running down the road at 55 mph? 
 
Reason: Preventing evidence loss 
is more important than protecting 
privacy. 
Modify test so it doesn’t yield 
“wrong result”. 
hypo3: If vehicle has “reasonably 
objectively observable attributes of 
a home” then warrant required 
unless it is imminently capable of 
motion. 
 
Reason: Accommodate preventing 
evidence loss. 





These diagrams aim to introduce the dynamic and defeasible nature of legal 
reasoning. Drawing on insights from the ‘Best Practices for Legal Education’, 
Ashley argues that reasoning with hypotheticals is particularly suitable ‘to 
demonstrate complexity and indeterminacy of legal analysis.’
41
 In this respect, the 
use of hypotheticals might help in attaining some of our purposes, especially that of 
introducing the idea of law as a complex and undetermined enterprise in the Mexican 
context. As we have argued before, one of the major misunderstandings regarding 
the use of precedents in that particular context is that they are expected to operate as 
clearly determined, settled rule statements. Arguing with hypotheticals allows legal 
practitioners to come into terms with the idea that legal certainties are not static but 
they can always suffer revisions according to others considerations. Such revisions 
are performed along the lines of broader principles or policies; consequently, 
reasoning with hypotheticals allows the incorporation of broader social and political 
considerations into the process of legal reasoning.
42
 
Although the model of hypothetical reasoning captured by the LARGO system has 
been created according to common law understandings of legal practice, that does 
not exclude its potential usefulness in the civil law world.
43
 In the comparative 
research of the Bielefelder Kreis it was observed that ‘[i]n performing their roles as 
organizers, rationalizers and critics of precedent, academics in some systems in the 
study make extensive use of hypothetical cases in their work […] Indeed, it is a 
major technique used in the United Kingdom and in the United States, and also in 
most civil law countries.’
44
 The use of hypotheticals is then seen as having a series of 
potential uses in legal reasoning: 
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1. ‘construction of clear cases to which a code section, statute or doctrine must apply if 
it is to have any rational application;’ 
2. ‘the construction of reductio ad absurdum arguments demonstrating the unsoundness 
of proposed applications of code sections, statutes or doctrinal formulations;’ 
3. ‘the elaboration of coherent patterns of applications of authoritative language and 
demonstrations of how proposed or possible applications would not be coherent,’ 
4. ‘the formulation of paradigm cases so as to display a policy rationale in its clearest 
application;’ 
5. ‘the articulation of distinctions between paradigm cases and borderline cases;’ 
6. ‘the creation of conceptual bridges between cases along a continuum;’ 
7. ‘use [of] a well-designed hypothetical case to help justify extending a rule;’ 
8. ‘use of a hypothetical case … to help justify rejecting the application of a rule in a 
precedent to the case … about to be decided.’
45
 
Of these points, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 entail important procedural knowledge that ought 
to be mastered by anyone engaging in precedent-based reasoning, and that need to be 
particularly reinforced in the Mexican legal community.  
The LARGO system aims to address all these points by engaging students in 
particular reasoning processes. The system is intended to help students identify 
examples in real oral arguments, represent them graphically in the terms of the 
process of hypothetical reasoning, and reflect about the examples according to the 
feedback provided by the program. The learners’ diagrams help to target good and 
bad performance, introducing expert’s guidance towards improving. In this sense, 
when the diagrams created by a learner are incomplete or considered not standard 
according to the model, LARGO takes advantage of the pedagogical opportunity, 
invites the learner to reflect on this matter and gives suggestions.
46
 Due to its graph 
form, LARGO can compare the learner’s diagram with standard solutions, on the 
basis of which it provides some kind of tailor-made feedback. Nevertheless, LARGO 
does not target other features of precedent-based reasoning that the Mexican legal 
community needs to master.  
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5.3.2 Battle Maps as Visual Facilitators 
As we have previously explained, the Mexican legal community has particular 
problems with understanding that it is possible to have a plurality of precedents  
(with repetitions and contradictions) and that the authority of precedents authority is 
graded and dependent on a relatively large set of features. Practitioners, in particular, 
seem to have difficulties understanding that it could be possible to have an ordered 
and non-arbitrary system of law under these conditions. With our educational 
platform we aim to change this intuition; thus, we will introduce both early students 
and ‘reforming practitioners’ to a different form of  thinking about and engaging into 
precedent-based reasoning. In this way, the system should help its users finding a 
way to reason with and about the various degrees of ‘authoritativeness’ of 
precedents; finding ways to order a plurality of precedents; and reaching an 
acceptable equilibrium between conflicting precedents. Legal practitioners need to be 
prepared to perform in this way in order to avoid the historical temptation of 
reducing the complexities encompassed in different legal reasoning processes to 
simpler calculations.  
LARGO, like other diagrammatic legal AI systems, is not particularly dedicated to 
represent argumentative strength. Systems like HYPO and CATO understand the 
degree of authoritativeness of precedents as derived from them being in-point. In this 
sense, the assessment of the relevance and value of a precedent seems to be 
determined by the substantive comparison between cases. For example, HYPO is 
built over a theory of precedents that assumes that reasoning with past legal cases 
can be understood as an assessment of ‘factors’, where factors are collections of facts 
that favour or hurt the arguments of one of the parties.
47
 The weight of these factors 
is a measure of the support it gives to the claim of one of the parties. In this way, this 
account does recognise that some precedents might be stronger and better to cite than 
others in certain circumstances, but it does so considering a single legal feature: their 
relevant (factual) similarities and differences. In this respect, the evaluation of 
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precedents is limited, as it does not allow other legal criteria ‘like the recentness of 
precedents or the pedigrees of the deciding courts.’
48
 
The omission of this element might actually lead to a reductive idea of the legal 
reasoning process that precedents involve. Ashley was aware that his computational 
theory of arguing with precedents did not include all evaluation criteria used in legal 
practice; thus, he explicitly stated these limitations of his account and compromised 
with including the missing criteria in the future.
49
 Nevertheless, the AI community 
sometimes finds it difficult to represent in computer terms certain complex human 
processes. As AI systems regularly have very specific aims, such as solving a case 
or, as in LARGO, giving students automated feedback to their answers, they need to 
operate under a more simple rule-like logic, in order for the data to be understood 
and processed by the computer. Therefore, the computational design might 
eventually lead to the simplification of complex processes performed by human 
reasoners. 
This is nothing but an expression of a broader dilemma: the more we expect from the 
computer programme to do, the more prescriptive it is going to be. For example, 
mind maps allow the user almost unrestricted freedom with how to arrange the 
information, LARGO imposes considerably more  constraints in order to allow more 
computational functions, and CATO as well as Verheij’s ArguMed impose still more 
restrictions, as to enable the computer to suggest feedback, and on top of that to 
identify and correct mistakes.  
In this respect, in order to design our computer-assisted tutor we not only need to 
take into account the nature of the task that will be represented, the needs of the 
learner and the pedagogical soundness of the diagram, but also the artificial 
representation that could best fit all these characteristics. In fact, it has been noted 
that ‘[a] problem in developing intelligent tutoring systems (ITSs) in law is the need 
to represent legal problems and arguments in artificial terms an ITS can analyze.’
50
 A 
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full reflection on the architecture of this program is beyond the scope of this 
research. However, on the basis of what we have been discussing in this chapter, we 
will propose an alternative way in which precedents-based reasoning can be 
represented, and which would be more suitable for the purposes of the present thesis.  
Our visualisation tool needs to communicate the following features: a) that precedent 
have viable strength or force; b) that the strength of precedents is given by a set of 
features; and c) that precedents might ‘cluster’ or form a ‘front’ that cannot be 
reduced to individual support relationships. Additionally, we aim to provide the user 
with enough flexibility to adjust the representation to his legal role (e.g. arguing for 
the plaintiff or for the defendant), and also to his cognitive style. We find that the 
maps used in military history possess some characteristics that fit these criteria. 
Battle maps follow a semantic style that is sufficiently standardised, but at the same 
time is open to allow dynamicity and flexibility. Additionally, battle maps use the 
metaphor of war, and as we have discussed earlier, they are richer means for 
transmitting ideas, dynamics and emotions that are not immediately connected with 
the single activity of precedents.   
A typical battle map usually depicts the troops of both sides (including e.g. their 
numbers and weapons) and their actual or possible moves. The maps are helpful to 
depict historical battles, but they are also used to train officers in the art of 
recognising the strengths of each army. The skill that the individual officer takes 
from this is the ability to see, immediately and without the need for precise 
calculations, how a combination of factors creates a winnable or an indefensible 
position. It is this quick recognition skill (which is crucial for legal practitioners) that 
Mexican law professionals are lacking of, and that we consider can be developed 
with a similar visualisation tool.  
In our representation the size of the boxes and arrows is used to show the strength of 





5.2 Attack in Oblique Order Source: the Art of Battle website
51
 
In the legal setting battle maps can be used to represent precedents as individual 
units. Each box represents a precedent. The size of the box represents the force of a 
precedent according to formal considerations, such as the hierarchy of the court from 
which it derives or the age of the precedent. The size of the arrow expresses the 
strength of the precedent due to its substantial in-pointness in a particular factual 
situation. As any expert in precedent-based reasoning might know, an objectively 
powerful precedent – for example, a precedents issued by the Supreme Court – might 
become weak and easy to defeat if it is not in-point. On the other hand, an in-point 
precedent that was only held by a hierarchically lower court a long time ago might 
not be a very strong ‘ally’ to fight in the battle. Nevertheless, precedents might group 
together and form a cluster. In this case all units can be seen as holding mutual 
support relationships that make them a cohesive front; this form of support cannot be 
understood linearly (as usually represented in diagrams), but as a synergetic union. 
Also, the visualisation of the battle ground helps in identifying subdivisions within a 
side, which could at some point be understood as possible weaknesses of the 





opponent. In the same way, certain precedents from other jurisdictions can be 
marked up as ‘auxiliary troops’ helping the coalition.  
 
5.3 Battle map of Carney v. US 
On figure 5.3 we represent how the case used as an example to explain the LARGO 
system can be translated into the semantics of the battle map.  
Carney is hiding behind the 4th Amendment, which secures the right to privacy. The 
social and doctrinal value underpinning the 4th Amendment is indicated by the boxes 
with a cross bar. The prosecution is using Carroll v. US
52
 as a lead case. In this case 
the court held the ‘automobile exception’ which can be seen as opening a gap to the 
operation of the right to privacy behind which the defendant is hiding. This case is 
represented with a big block leading the attack because of its high hierarchical origin 
and its landmark status. Their case is supported by a number of ‘smaller’ precedents 
(for example, United States v. Ross,
53
 Cardwell v. Lewis
54
 and Cooper v. 
California
55
), which altogether are helping the attack. By this moment Carney’s 
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lawyer should have already seen that the battle ground does not look favourably and 
that he owes to reinforce his defence by any possible means.  
At this point, the defence launches a counterattack in the form of a hypothetical: 
What would be the case if a motor home had a tent attached to it? Would the tent be 
protected by the right to privacy but the car would be not?  
 
5.4 A hypothetical attacking a precedent 
As there were no more cases to favour the defence, the lawyer had to devise a 
hypothetical to attack the leading case. The hypothetical – as it is not a precedent – is 
represented in the shape of blobs. The aim of preparing an attack against Carroll v. 
US by a hypothetical is to overextend the strongest unit and find an unprotected gap 
where the enemy forces could filter. In real life the tactics of Carney’s defence did 
not succeed, since the hypothetical lacked the strength to accomplish its mission. 
Nevertheless, if Carroll had taken the bait, overextending itself and finally getting 




















5.5 A hypothetical isolating and destroying a precedent 
5.3.3 Representing Mexican Precedents 
Battle maps are flexible and semantically rich tools that allow the representation of a 
plurality of factors and scenarios. We would like to try the soundness of our 
visualising method by representing a set of Mexican precedents. As we have 
explained before one of the problems that we might encounter, contrary to the 
general perception of legal practitioners, is that the number of precedents available as 
data resources is still reduced. In this respect, our maps could appear as not having 
recruited many troops. Nevertheless, when the reasoners face a shortfall in 
precedents, our maps have the flexibility to widen battle fronts with different types of 
allies. In this form, we may add extra considerations – such as constitutional 
principles, values or doctrines – and try to work out solutions on the basis of all these 
extended resources. In countries like Mexico, where judicial precedents are just 
starting to line up for battle, it is important that reasoners know that they can count 
with further support. 
First, we would like to represent what would be a Mexican form of California v. 


















because motor homes are less common than in the United States. Nevertheless, we 
can easily imagine a neighbour American (called Carney) who, while living and 
travelling in his motor home around the Mexican territory for over a year, has finally 
found himself in trouble with justice. In our example, the police found different types 
of guns and big amounts of cash in Carney’s motor home when performing a search 
without a warrant – just after receiving information from a snitch about Carney’s 
guns distribution enterprise. Carney is now fighting his case at the Mexican tribunals, 
asking to expand the protection given by the right of privacy, in order to consider his 
motor home as dwellings for the purpose of law, and to consequently declare 
unlawful the unwarranted search.  
In Mexico there have not been many cases deciding on the privacy protection that a 
vehicle should be granted. There is only a single precedent from a collegiate tribunal 
that develops the ‘automobile exception’ regarding the right of privacy – that is, a 
Mexican Carroll v. US, but in this occasion decided in 1996 by a low in hierarchy 
court. According to the precedent, which in Mexico would be named Tesis Aislada 
No. 201145, a car cannot be considered an extension of a person’s dwellings and 
consequently there is no need for a warrant to search it. Generally, in Mexican 
precedents we do not find a full description of the facts, although we could always 
find the full resolution describing them if we have doubts about the matter stated in 
the precedent. In this particular precedent the court held that a search (without 
warrant) performed by the federal police on a vehicle where drugs were found, was 
not against Article 16 of the Constitution, because vehicles are not the extension of a 
person’s dwellings: they are just means of transportation and not where the person 
lives. This precedent opens a small gap to Article 16 and the right to privacy by 
narrowing its protection to actual fixed houses, which the prosecutor might find 






5.6 Representation of Carney if happening in Mexico 
We do see how Carney is comfortably hiding behind a thick wall erected by Article 
16 of the Constitution and the praised value of privacy. Against him he has just a 
small precedent sending a weak attack. The prosecutor knows that his attack has little 
chances of succeeding if performed in this manner – not only the precedent has not a 
strong ‘objective’ authority, but also its substance could be easily distinguished. 
According to the precedent the test to consider something as dwellings is living 
there. Carney’s car is not only ‘an extension of his home’, but it is his actual home. 
The defendant could then easily claim that the precedent does not apply to him 
because he does live in his motor home. 
Therefore, the prosecutor needs to reinforce his lines if he wants to have a successful 
attack. He decides to send a hypothetical to the front: what if the motor home was 
running down the highway? Could it still be considered a home under the protection 
of the right to privacy? The reason underlying this different treatment is preventing 
Carney’s escape with the evidence. Prosecuting crimes is also a value that can be 
used to strengthen the new attack – especially since it seems to be a very important 
one for the tribunals in these days’ wars against organised crime. The new scenario 




5.7 Carney using a hypothetical and value 
The battle starts looking more even and therefore more difficult for Carney. In fact, 
the prosecutor might even remember the original case California v. Carney and bring 
it in as a weak yet, still, useful ally from comparative law. In Mexico, the resolutions 
of foreign and international courts are sometimes cited by the Supreme Court of 
Justice to point out a tendency in legal developments. Therefore, legal practitioners 
might be able to introduce some of these cases to make their armies appear larger and 
stronger. In the absence of a very clear ‘gravitational centre’ we can assume that the 
battle is not going to be such an easy win for any of the parties, and for that both the 
defender and prosecutor ought to prepare their best war tactics.  
As we can see, the semantics of the battle maps allow us to represent situations 
where there are not many precedents, and yet communicate a clear understanding of 
the scenario by introducing more considerations. We consider that this is an 
important feature of our platform, as Mexican practitioners are likely to encounter 
situations where precedents are still scarce and that require taking into account other 
considerations to start building a gravitational centre. Mexican legal practitioners, 
however, did not complain about too few precedents, but, on the contrary, of too 
many precedents being available. For this reason, we need to make sure that our 
system works equally well for introducing legal professionals to the dynamics of 
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more complex battles. In other words, we need to devise maps that allow them to see 
what to do with numerous precedents, and that instruct them on how to deal with a 
multitude of these and potential conflicts within. For this, we will represent a 
situation that matches these characteristics.  
The precedents we will analyse now have to do with the human rights protection 
provided to a corporation (or artificial person). It is important to mention that 
currently there is a ‘complaint of contradictory precedents’
56
 to be solved by the 
Supreme Court.
57
 According to the complainant, there are two contradicting 
precedents: one granting human rights protection to artificial persons and the other 
one denying it. However, as we will see, the ‘objective’ strength of the precedents 
and the existence of a broader consistent line of precedents pointing to one direction 
allow us to see a clear image of the battle ground, in which the contradiction 
becomes less disrupting. Our following representation will help us ‘see’ that despite 
this contradiction there is still an ordered map of the law. We expect that 
representing legal precedents in this way will allow legal practitioners to intuitively 
recognise steady patterns even when there are unresolved contradictions.  
Herein we will imagine a case involving these two different viewpoints on the same 
legal subject. We will assume that there is a NGO set up for environmental defence 
purposes. They have been delivering leaflets and posters exposing the actions of a 
local politician, which they claim are causing environmental harm. The politician has 
sued them, claiming that this is defamatory speech that should be considered 
unlawful. The NGO is trying to defend their actions under the right to freedom of 
speech, but the plaintiff is arguing that artificial persons do not enjoy human rights 
protection. The plaintiff is using two precedents: ‘Tesis Aislada No. VII.2o.A.2 K 
(10a)’ and ‘Tesis Aislada No. VII.2o.A.1 K ( 10a)’ to support his claim. The 
precedents, which were both drafted by the same low in hierarchy court, have 
declared that human rights only protect individual persons and not artificial persons. 
Nevertheless, the NGO is defending the extension of human rights to artificial 
persons by using article 1 of the Constitution, the American Convention of Human 
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 The complaint of contradictory precedents is a request to start an analysis of a potential 
contradiction between precedents and decide in favour of one of the criteria. 
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 Contradiction No. 360/2013 to be solved by the Supreme Court of Justice in full court.  
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Rights and a series of precedents held by different courts. This battle ground looks as 
follows: 
 
5.7 Battle map of multiple precedents in Mexico 
The NGO’s claim that, as an artificial person, it is under the protection of human 
rights seems an overwhelmingly strong argument. It is grounded on a set of diverse 
considerations, including a strong body of precedents from different courts. Some of 
these precedents are even considered ‘binding’ jurisprudencia for determined 
territorial circumscriptions, which means that the criterion has been held at least five 
times by the federal tribunals of that territorial jurisdiction. We represented these 
bigger units at the front of the defendant’s army, reinforced by smaller units at the 
back. Some of these precedents are backed by the dispositions of the American 
Convention of Human Rights and the 2002 case Santos v. Argentina, solved by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. It is important to mention that the Mexican 
Supreme Court has declared that the precedents of the Inter-American Court, in 
which human rights are expanded, should be considered as authoritative.
58
 All these 
features together form a quite strong gravitational centre that should be clear enough 
for legal practitioners and judges.  
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 Contradiction No. 293/2011 solved by the Supreme Court of Justice. 
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 In this context, the politician’s claim as it stands seems rather weak. The plaintiff 
needs to think of forms to reinforce this argument if he wants to stand a chance of 
winning the battle against the NGO. He might, then, call for the help of a 
hypothetical that narrows down the protection of human rights to artificial person. 
Nevertheless, the need of extra help should appear almost intuitive for the lawyer 
handling the case. He must see very clearly that the existence of a contradiction, and 
therefore, of a section of judge-made law standing on his side is not something to 
rely on in this war.  
With this example we aimed to show how the users could potentially benefit from 
the visualisation tool we propose when dealing with diverse and contradictory legal 
precedents. We expect that, as in the example, legal reasoners will learn to see 
established patterns that allow them to plan their legal battles with a fair amount of 
certainty, without the need of having to wait for univocal signs given by the 
authorities. In this sense, we hope that this educational tool helps future and present 
legal practitioners, and consequently the legal system, to recover the certainty that 
seemed lost due to the development of judge-made law. 
5.3.4 Further Considerations 
These battle representations are visual tools easy to adapt to different precedent-
based reasoning scenarios. Consequently, we consider that this platform could 
equally help students and practitioners in understanding precedent-based reasoning 
and developing the tacit knowledge behind it. There are still several features to be 
analysed with respect to our learning facilitator.  
The representations could benefit from different upgrades. For example, battle maps 
are commonly compute animated representations. What computers also add in value 
is their ability to incorporate them into animations. Particularly good examples can 
be found at the Art of Battle
59
 which also provided the blueprint for the above 
illustrations, History Animated
60
 or the Discovery Channel
61
 websites. The animation 









will, hopefully, include a dynamic element that helps the legal transition from a more 
static form of legal practice towards another one involving mobility. As a next step, 
though, we hope to represent a number of interesting cases both as animated and 
static battle maps, using a variety of representation forms. 
In the future, we hope to test these on large groups of law students and of fully 
formed professionals, both performing as passive consumers and, at the same time, 
as active creators of these maps. Should there be indeed a measurable benefit, the 
issue of balancing the demands of computer readability with the desirable freedom of 
the map users to develop representations that suit their personal cognitive style 
would have to be addressed. Also, the efficacy of the platform in assisting the 
learning process of two distinct groups – students and formed professionals – should 
be assessed to determine the conditions under which the platform gives the best 
results. As mentioned above, practitioners who are already ‘charged’ with previous 
knowledge might be more difficult to educate. Therefore, we need to make sure they 
can also have a meaningful learning experience when using the platform.  
Another important point that will need to be analysed is the form of making the 
platform available to both students and professionals. What we learned from the 
evaluation of LARGO is that we could probably obtain better results if we secure a 
high engagement with the platform. This could be easier if it is made available 
through a formalised educational setting. Therefore, reaching students, still under the 
formal educational model, might be easier than engaging professionals. What makes 
particularly difficult to reach fully-formed legal practitioners is the lack of a bar 
association in charge of accrediting the Mexican legal profession and providing 
further training. Nevertheless, we could probably reach professionals participating in 
university seminars or in training courses provided by the ‘The House of Legal 
Culture’ institute which is directed by the Supreme Court. Professionals participating 
in a more or less formal educational program might show more motivation and 
commitment to use the platform, allowing more learning benefits.
62
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 Motivation was one of the main factors determining the success of LARGO. See: Neil Pinkwart and 
others, ‘Re-evaluating LARGO in the Classroom: are Diagrams Better than Text for Teaching 
Argumentation Skills?’ in Intelligent Tutoring Systems (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2008). 
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We also need to determine the best timing for using the platform. Students could 
interact with the program during their first year, as part of their ‘Introduction to Law’ 
course, just like in the case of LARGO. Practitioners could be introduced to the 
platform when taking one of the currently popular courses or seminars on legal 
argumentation, which despite their good intentions have not yet been dedicated to 
develop the intuitive competence that precedent-based reasoning requires. However, 
we must be mindful that in the classroom law students and practitioners might be 
receiving different theoretical knowledge about legal reasoning, especially regarding 
precedent-based reasoning, which could affect the potential benefits of the platform.  
Therefore, our next steps are designing the platform, determining the circumstances 
of use and evaluating its performance in different contexts. We are well aware that 
our educational suggestion is modest and that many other efforts might be needed to 
secure a full transition in the different areas of practice that is changing (for example, 
the introduction of oral trials). In any case, for the above mentioned reasons we 
consider that computer assisted tutors designed according to the insights of 
educational and cognitive studies are a good candidate to perform this transition, by 
reaching to the minds and hearts of legal practitioners. The educational platform we 









This thesis presented a multidisciplinary approach that brought together comparative 
law, legal theory, legal education, legal AI and some insights from cognitive sciences 
in order to account for the relatively broad cognitive-affective dimension behind 
legal practices, which goes beyond the understanding of law as text-based rules. Our 
aim was to understand and suggest solutions for the (knowledge) problems 
experienced by legal practitioners in systems in transition, although most concretely 
for the problems of legal professionals in the Mexican legal context with respect to 
legal precedents. The present work, thus, expects to have made some contributions to 
the theoretical debates regarding legal knowledge and legal transitions, but also to 
the practical debate regarding the particular transition of the Mexican legal system.  
We expect that this study showed that addressing the matter of legal knowledge in 
legal studies is a fruitful enterprise. According to Paul Thagard, currently we are 
experiencing ‘the brain revolution’; in other words, now more than ever science is 
being able to report research about the human brain and, consequently, of the 
cognitive and affective framework surrounding human life.
1
 This is not to say that 
we should accept any scientific (and pseudo-scientific) output as indisputable truths, 
but that in these developments we can expand our interests and engage into legal 
philosophical debates that are informed by this sort of scientific research. What 
Thagard himself is seemingly doing is finding intersections or meeting points 
between philosophical enquiry and the latest developments regarding human 
cognition. In law, and especially legal philosophy, there is also room for such an 
enquiry.  
                                                 
1




A cognitively informed enquiry can develop in different areas of law. In this work it 
emerged as a reflection regarding legal change. One of the major debates taking 
place in legal comparative studies has to do with the manner of accounting for legal 
change, and especially for the changes that derive from the transposition of legal 
features. This thesis, indirectly contributes to this debate inasmuch as it discusses the 
cognitive implications of legal change. Despite the fact that certain comparative 
lawyers seem to be taking a ‘cognitive turn’ in their way of approaching different 
traditions and legal systems, there is still a long way to understand the relationship 
between legal change and the reorganisations on the legal knowledge structures held 
by legal practitioners of a determined legal community. We consider that our 
cognitively-informed account on legal transfers as ‘cognitive irritants’ capable of 
unleashing simple epistemic changes or authentic knowledge revolutions offers a 
method to revise and assess the magnitude of legal change in different contexts. This 
approach could potentially lead to unlocking the current impasse that the discussion 
about the possibility or impossibility of legal transplants seems to be facing in the 
past years.  
We consider that our cognitively informed approach unlocks yet another discussion; 
that of legal knowledge acquisition. One of the major contributions of legal 
comparative studies has been their focus on ‘legal culture’ and ‘legal traditions’, 
which assumes that each legal practitioner participant of a determinate legal system 
possesses a ‘cultural’ cognitive load. Acknowledging that complex knowledge 
structures lie behind legal practices leads to asking where do these come from, which 
eventually pushes our focus to legal education processes (either happening at the law 
school or outside it) and their impact on that fuzzy ‘cultural’ legal knowledge. In this 
sense, legal transfers are often seen as external disruptions to the normal 
development of this cognitive framework. We consider, that legal education must be 
brought into the discussion in order to analyse its capacity of generating internal deep 
cognitive changes that may bring considerable shifts in legal style.  
We also expect that our work draws attention to the fruitfulness of using legal 
theoretical perspectives in understanding the teleology and function of legal features. 
Nevertheless, we do not suggest these to be used as all-or-nothing indications, but to 
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be treated as means from which it is possible to derive meaningful lessons. We, thus, 
hope to motivate legal theoretical enquiries as means of understanding local 
problems and build ad hoc solutions. In a way our approach reminds Martin 
Krygier’s assertion that to reform the law (and introduce a proper rule of law regime) 
one should start with teleology.
2
 We consider that understanding the teleology and 
way of functioning of legal features one can use legal theoretical insights. Legal 
theories somehow compile the experience of others and through others we can learn 
and become a better version of ourselves. Of course, one must always be mindful of 
not overgeneralising; that is, of turning contextual traits into general traits. Most 
importantly, one must use theory to learn deep and meaningful lessons and not just to 
mindlessly following what others seem to be doing.  
In fact, legal changes (both discursive and cognitive) may better arise from the 
internal reflection regarding the local needs and problems in the light of foreign 
theories or sociological experience, than from the un-reflected subscription to 
international policies and reform programs. This particular point does not feature 
strongly in the present work, but it somehow underlies it, as we think that in the 
present case the rigidity of the Mexican approach to law was problematic in itself; it 
was detrimental of ‘the moral life of the law.’ In this sense, the ideas feeding the 
rigidity of the local framework of law may not have been only undesirable according 
to the rule of law ideal pushed by international reformers. As the present research 
progressed, our interest in this subject has become more pronounced and seems 
indicate the development of our future work. Our future research will feature more 
prominently questions regarding the architecture of ‘good law and working 
arrangements.’ Fuller called this enterprise ‘eunomics’ having in mind the idea of 
analysing the architecture of legal features according to their ethical function within 
society. We, however, do not abandon the lessons learned in the course of this 
research; that is, that human minds and hearts matter. Therefore, we consider that 
cognitive sciences research can be used in yet another way: to inform future legal 
developments in order to make them more meaningful for human life.  
                                                 
2
 Martin Krygier, ‘The Rule of Law: Legality, Teleology, Sociology’ in Gianluigi Palombella and Neil 
Walker (eds) Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart 2009).  
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Nevertheless, apart from the top-down interest in the architecture of legal features we 
will continue our research regarding the bottom-up development of professional 
competences that support the good functioning of legal systems. As we have seen, 
educational experiences can only be meaningful if they are informed in sound 
cognitive sciences that address the mental and affective development of the learner. 
We expect that featuring prominently the fact that the law is put forward by actual 
heart and minds and in service of hearts and minds mobilises legal developments in a 
more humanly conscious direction.  
In practical grounds, we expect that the present work contributes to the debate 
regarding legal reform in Mexico. It brings to the attention of legal reform partisans 
the importance of focusing on the pre-existing knowledge structures of the legal 
community when aiming to attain practical legal change. Since legal practices are 
connected to the shared body of knowledge, to be able to achieve change in practice 
we need to reach and modify the embedded cognitive structures over which it was 
built. In this sense, modifying discourses is not enough to accomplish deep legal 
changes; we need to follow a bottom-up approach that addresses the particular 
cognitive-affective load of legal practitioners. In fact, changing discourses without 
approaching the operative cognitive structures opens the gate to experiencing 
knowledge problems, as in our case study.  
The advocates of legal reform in Mexico need to be mindful of the fact that legal 
change cannot be taken lightly, especially those changes that involve revolutionary 
cognitive reconfigurations. In the Mexican context we have observed a marked 
inclination towards reformation, but what it is lacking is a strong reflection on the 
knowledge held by the local community and the manner in which it can change 
towards the desired direction. Legal transitions need to be cognitively-supported. 
This matter leads us to be observant of the processes of knowledge acquisition, and 
most particularly to the process of legal education. In this particular context, it has 
been noted that legal education has to be reformed to be consonant with the new 
needs of the profession. Nevertheless, legal education must be approached in depth: 
it ought to go beyond the level of discourse and beware of introducing ‘educational 
transfers’ that do not match the style and needs of the learners. Legal education needs 
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to be informed by research in pedagogy and psychology to secure that the learning 
experience is meaningful and develops the knowledge that is intended. Also, it must 
be jurisprudentially informed, to secure the construction of the best possible legal 
practice in accordance to particular legal aims. 
This thesis offers an educational platform to support the learning of a different 
precedent-based reasoning style by the Mexican legal community. The platform is 
designed to meet specific challenges being experienced in the context and is mindful 
of the legal community’s cognitive cargo. This is the most practical contribution of 
this work, as this educational tool is ready to be implemented. Although the platform 
still needs to be used and its success in developing a particular legal reasoning style 
requires to be assessed, we consider that actions in this direction have the potential of 
bringing the aimed changes in practice in a less problematic manner than the mere 
top-down change of legal discourses. 
The platform might be a small contribution in the light of the massive cognitive 
change being experienced by the Mexican legal community. In this sense, many 
more analyses and educational platforms might be needed to deeply reform the local 
legal practice, but we expect that our quest to understand and reach the minds and 
hearts of legal practitioners in these difficult transition times helps drawing a path, or 
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